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The essence of the military reform of Ivan 4. Military reforms of Ivan IV

MILITARY REFORM OF IVAN THE TERRIBLE

Tsar Ivan IV and his entourage set themselves the most important tasks of strengthening the centralized Russian state and establishing its international significance. To implement ambitious geopolitical plans, an effective tool was needed. The global state reforms of Ivan IV the Terrible, the emergence of new types of weapons, constant military threats from the south, west and east, and the difficult economic situation determined the uniqueness of the reforms of the armed forces that covered the period from 1550 to 1571.

CREATION OF REGULAR MILITARY UNITS

To organize personal security, in 1550 the king created a formation of archers numbering three thousand people. The Streltsy Corps was composed of common people and “free willing” people. All soldiers were armed with firearms. There were no analogues to this professional army of shooters anywhere in Europe. The Streletsky army consisted of six articles, 500 people in each. Three orders-divisions performed different functions:

  • the stirrups guarded the court and formed His Majesty’s personal escort;
  • those from Moscow served in the capital’s “izba” (orders);
  • policemen served in garrisons on the southern and western borders.

For each order, a uniform uniform and banner were required. The first mention of the participation of the Streltsy army in hostilities was in the Kazan campaign of 1552. At the end of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the number of regular troops reached 20 thousand people.

"THE CHOSEN THOUSAND"

The Tsar rightly assumed that strengthening the autocracy was possible only with the help of a new class. The reforms of Ivan IV the Terrible needed a serious lobby in the person of Moscow landowners. From small feudal lords, courtyard people living in the capital and its environs, the king forms a special military unit. The sons of landowners, nobles and boyars received state land plots from him, and for this they were obliged to bear military service.

According to the first order, the “thousands” showed up for military service. In peacetime, the maintenance of the army was carried out from the landowners' own funds, and in wartime - at the expense of the treasury. The creation of the “chosen thousand” had great political significance:

  • small landowners-nobles and boyar children were equal in official status with the descendants of the noble nobility;
  • the government’s connection with the local nobles, who formed the basis of the militia, strengthened;
  • Personnel were created to form in the future a whole class of “service people on the Moscow list.”

A total of 1,070 nobles entered the service.


LIMITATION OF LOCALITY

The monopoly of the princely-boyar nobility on leadership positions in the army and government had a corrupting effect on the military people. This was clearly demonstrated during the first campaign against Kazan, during which the tsar had to convince the princes to act under a single command.

The Tsar intended to abolish localism altogether. Effective leadership of troops should be carried out by a talented commander, and not be an inherited duty. But for its time this was too bold an idea.

The military reform of Ivan the Terrible determined the strict subordination of regimental commanders, simplified the leadership of a combat formation and eliminated class disputes in combat conditions. Despite the obvious advantages of the regulations of 1550, this innovation was poorly received by the offspring of well-born nobles. Localism did not immediately give up its position, and the government periodically had to confirm the legitimacy of this resolution.


CODE ON MILITARY SERVICE

In 1555-1556, the military reform of Ivan the Terrible entered the next stage. The new “Code of Service” introduced compulsory military service for children of feudal lords from the age of 15. Young men up to this age were called minors, and those who re-entered the service were called novices. Military service was inherited and was for life.

Rules for mobilization were established. For every 50 acres of land, the feudal lord had to field one fully equipped mounted warrior. Owners of particularly large estates were obliged to bring armed slaves with them.

The Code determined the order of subordination of military leaders. The first codes were drawn up that determined the regulations for the performance of service. Reviews and gatherings were held periodically. A nobleman who did not show up for the review was severely punished. These measures made it possible, in conditions of continuous wars, to have a combat-ready and equipped army.


CENTRAL TROOPS CONTROL SYSTEM

The economic weakness of the state, the lack of infrastructure and the extent of the territories led to the creation of a rigid system of command and control of the army. The following structures-orders were created to control the troops:

  • Bit - in war time carried out mobilization and actually performed the functions of the General Staff.
  • Streletsky.
  • Pushkarsky;.
  • Order of the Great Parish.
  • Order for cash distribution.

The orders were headed by trusted commanders. The results of Ivan the Terrible's reforms significantly affected the overall combat readiness of the Moscow army. Having created a centralized command and control apparatus, Russia was far ahead of Europe in this regard.


DEVELOPMENT OF ARTILLERY

The military reform of Ivan the Terrible affected the “Gunshot outfit”, which existed since 1506. State needs required a large number of new types of guns and ammunition. At the beginning of the Livonian War, the Russian army managed to capture a colossal arsenal. Realizing the shortage of foundry specialists, the Russian Tsar turned to Charles V and Queen Elizabeth with a request to send experienced craftsmen to Russia. The embargo, carried out at the instigation of the Livonians and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth against Muscovy, did not allow Ivan Vasilyevich’s plans to be fully realized.

However, on English and Danish ships, samples of new weapons and specialists still made it to Russia. Recruitment and attraction of captured firearms masters was also carried out. During this period, German masters began to play a leading role. Kasper Ganus, the teacher of Andrei Chokhov, is more famous than others.

Military production grew steadily. The cannon yard cast 5-6 large-caliber guns per year. In the 1560s, the foundation was laid for the production of similar types of guns and ammunition for them. Subordination appears in artillery crews.

In 1570, the “Cannon Order” was created. For greatest efficiency in combat use and standardization in production, artillery is classified. The main types of guns were:

  • bombards (“guns”);
  • mortars (“mounted guns”);
  • squeaked.

It was during this era that the largest guns were created. The crowning achievement of Russian gunsmiths was the creation of the Tsar Cannon and the first breech-loading gun in history. An analysis of sources, including foreign ones, allows us to confidently assert that the military reform of Ivan the Terrible allowed Russia to create the most advanced and numerous artillery fleet in Europe. By the end of the century, there were more than 5 thousand guns.


GUARD SERVICE ORGANIZATION

The reforms of Ivan IV the Terrible regarding the protection of the external borders of the state could not help but affect. In 1571, the “Charter of the Guard and Village Service” was approved. The appearance of this document is an indicator of the high level of Russian military theoretical thought of that era. Developed by Prince M.I. Vorotynsky, the regulations of the border guard determined the strict order of guard duty. The border guard duty lasted from April 1 to November 30. The charter ordered the governors of border cities to send specially trained people to perform patrol duty. For the first time at the state level, the Cossacks were involved in border protection.


REFORM OF IVAN THE TERRIBLE AND COMPLETION OF ORIENTALIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY

The pre-reform army was well prepared to fight the lightly armed irregular formations of the Tatars and Ottomans. However, formed on the basis of the militia principle, the armed forces turned out to be completely unable to withstand the Western European military system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This resulted in a series of military disasters. As a result, expansion in the western direction had to be abandoned.

Decades of military reforms have yielded positive results. In Russia, elements of a regular army and an effective command apparatus began to emerge, and powerful rear structures were formed. We can briefly summarize what Ivan the Terrible’s military reforms achieved in one phrase - a combat-ready army was created to carry out active foreign policy activities.

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Introduction

Chapter 1. Reforms of the armed forces under Ivan IV (the Terrible)

1.1 Prerequisites for the formation of reforms

1.2 Establishment of the Streltsy army

1.3 Local militia reforms

Chapter 2. Oprichnina

Chapter 3. The birth of the navy

Chapter 4. Reform of the guard and village service

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

The relevance of the topic of this work is determined by the fact that after an unsuccessful campaign against Kazan in November 1549. the question arose about the implementation of military reform. Unity of command was strengthened by establishing the seniority of the first (large) governor of a large regiment in relation to the governors of all other regiments. The strengthening of discipline in the noble army was facilitated by the prohibition of localism in the “service” with the governors. This also increased the role of the governor during hostilities. In general, the July verdict of 1550, which limited local settlements based on the established practice of relationships between governors in regiments, was of great importance for the combat effectiveness of the noble army.1 1 Zimin A.A. Reforms of Ivan the Terrible, 345 p.

Along with attempts to strengthen the discipline of the noble cavalry, in the middle of the 16th century the foundation of the emerging permanent (streltsy) army was laid. Between September 1549 and August 1550, Ivan the Terrible established “elected” archers. By his order, 3,000 people were to live in Vorobyovskaya Sloboda under the leadership of boyar children. It was about the reorganization of the old squeaker detachments. From now on, the army of squeakers began to be called Streltsy. To provide for the Streltsy army, a new household tax was introduced - “food money”, which had not previously been collected everywhere. The Sagittarius became the core of the standing army. They had significant advantages over the noble cavalry, which was gradually giving way to him.

The purpose of the work is to study and analyze the military reforms of Ivan the Terrible.

In connection with this goal, it is necessary to solve a number of problems:

Study the features of the historical period

Describe the prerequisites for the formation of reforms

Describe the establishment of the Streltsy army

Analyze local militia reforms

Characterize the features and time period of the oprichnina

Highlight the origins of the navy

Describe the reform of the guard and village service

The subject of the study is the military reforms of Ivan the Terrible

The object of the study is the implementation of army reform during the reign of Ivan the Terrible

Chapter 1. Reforms of the armed forces under Ivan IV (the Terrible)

1.1 Prerequisites for the formation of reforms

The feudal reaction during the childhood of Ivan the Terrible showed that the remnants of feudal fragmentation were still strong among the top of the feudal class. A handful of boyars, led by the descendants of appanage princes, seized power and imposed the order of the former feudal fragmentation. Boyar rule led to a number of anti-feudal uprisings, the largest of which was popular uprising in Moscow in 1547. These uprisings threatened to sweep away not only the boyar rulers, but also the entire ruling class of feudal lords as a whole.

To strengthen the unity of the young centralized state and strengthen the autocratic power of the Moscow sovereigns, the government of Ivan IV (the Terrible) Ivan IV (1530-1584) was the first Russian Tsar, the largest political figure of the 16th century. Since 1547, “Tsar and Grand Duke of All Rus'.” carried out a number of major reforms in the field of administrative and judicial management, army, finance, land ownership, church, etc.

The most important tasks faced the government in the field of foreign policy, which consisted in establishing the international significance of the Russian state. Hesitant activities Vasily III, predecessor of Ivan the Terrible, and boyar rule gave way to more active foreign policy government, the consequence of which was the annexation of the Kazan Khanate in 1552.

The conquest of Kazan sealed the fate of other Tatar khanates. In 1555, the Siberian Tsar Ediger recognized himself as a vassal of the Russian state; in 1556 Astrakhan surrendered. PSRL, vol. XIX, p. 44

After the annexation of Astrakhan, the waterway along the Volga and its tributaries became free. This allowed the Moscow government to establish diplomatic relations and economic ties with the peoples of the Caucasus, and at the end of the 16th century. and with the peoples of Central Asia.

The situation was somewhat different in the West of the Russian state. Western states - Russia's neighbors - tried with all their might to prevent Russians from communicating with Europe and actually kept the Russian state in a blockade. To develop the country's productive forces and establish economic, political and cultural ties with Western Europe, Russia needed access to the Baltic Sea. The difficult Livonian War, which lasted 25 years, began for the return of the ancestral Russian lands in the Baltic states.

Despite the long struggle in which high quality Russian troops and Russian diplomacy, in an unfavorable international situation for Russia, the government of Ivan the Terrible was unable to solve the Baltic problem. But the foresight with which Ivan the Terrible realized the main task of Russian foreign policy is worthy of the greatest recognition.

The tasks facing the government of Ivan the Terrible in the field of domestic and foreign policy could only be achieved if there was a sufficiently powerful armed force. However, the armed forces of that time, in their composition and organization, did not correspond to the grandiose tasks that faced the government of the Russian centralized state. The government of Ivan the Terrible carried out fundamental military reforms in order to strengthen and strengthen the military power of the state. These reforms were carried out throughout the reign of Ivan the Terrible, including during the Livonian War (1558-1583).

The need for military reforms was clear to leading representatives of the nobility. This is evidenced by the journalistic works of that time. The outstanding publicist and major military theorist Ivan Semenovich Peresvetov, V. F. Rzhiga, I. S. Peresvetov - publicist of the 16th century, paid especially great attention to military issues. M., 1908, pp. 79-80

Peresvetov, as a representative of the nobles, was a supporter of strong centralized power. Peresvetov's works constitute a whole stage in the development of Russian military theoretical thought. The military reforms and strategic plans he recommended were of an advanced nature and met the interests of the development of the Russian state.

The content of all of Peresvetov’s works is imbued with the idea of ​​the need to strengthen royal power. Only with unlimited royal power did he consider it possible to implement his reforms. Peresvetov sharply opposed the ruling elite of the noble boyars, the “nobles”, who were enemies of the centralized state. Peresvetov had a different attitude towards small serving feudal lords - nobles and boyar children, or “military”, “warriors”. The main idea of ​​all Peresvetov’s works was that the support state power They are not large feudal lords, but feudal service small fry - nobles and boyar children, who form the core of the state's armed forces.

Not limiting himself to instructions regarding general measures to improve the state’s armed forces, Peresvetov also proposed specific measures to reorganize the army. Particularly noteworthy is Peresvetov’s proposal to form a standing army of 20 thousand brave young men (“juniors”) “with fiery shooting, much more inflicted.” Peresvetov justified the idea of ​​​​creating a permanent army by the need to strengthen the defense of the southern border; he believed that the reorganization of the army would allow the government to pursue a more active foreign policy.

Peresvetov's noble program served as the basis for the reforms of the government of Ivan the Terrible. This is the great historical significance of Peresvetov’s works.

Around the same time (mid-16th century) another reform project, Add. to AI, vol. III, nos. 65, 67 of another outstanding publicist of that time - Ermolai (in the monasticism of Erasmus).

The author focuses on the same service people - nobles and boyar children. The project, in a more specific form than that of Peresvetov, sets out measures to improve the financial situation of landowners and patrimonial owners who performed military and civil service. The oldest discharge book, p. 128.

A study of the project shows that the author built his plans on the basis of a deep study of contemporary reality. Much of what the author talked about partly already existed in practice. Thus, government needs were largely covered by income from state property. The service of nobles and boyar children was mainly provided by estates, although at the same time as estates there were monetary salaries and feedings. After the introduction of the local system, the peasants supported the serving nobility, while at the same time continuing to fulfill state taxes and duties. Finally, the norms of local land ownership proposed by the author were almost the same as the existing land salaries. The requirement of the project to establish military service from a certain amount of land was implemented by the reforms of Ivan the Terrible.

Despite significant differences, the projects of Peresvetov and Ermolai - Erasmus are united in their clearly expressed class noble character. Both projects are aimed at improving the legal and economic situation of the bulk of service people - small-scale nobles and children of boyars.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that all the reforms of the armed forces that were carried out by the government of Ivan the Terrible were part of a broadly planned and implemented plan of state reforms.

The reign of Ivan the Terrible was almost a continuous war. In 1549-1556. there was a struggle for the Volga region. In 1558, the Livonian War began and lasted for almost 25 years. The serious military danger in the southeast from the Tatars forced the state to be in a state of constant military readiness. All this taken together affected the timing, forms and content of reforms of the armed forces. Having arranged these reforms in chronological order, let us first of all dwell on the establishment of the Streltsy army.

1.2 Establishment of the Streltsy army

There are different opinions about the time of the appearance of the Streltsy army in historical literature. This is explained by the fact that documentary sources testifying to the establishment of the Streltsy army have not been preserved, and perhaps they never existed. Therefore, some researchers of PSRL, vol. VIII, pp. 206, 501, 502 limit themselves to only mentioning the middle of the 16th century. or the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Most pre-revolutionary historians claimed that the archers appeared in 1550; some historians attributed the time of their appearance to the 15th - early 16th centuries, considering the squeakers as archers. By identifying the Streltsy with the Pishchalniki, they thus removed the question of establishing a Streltsy army.

Soviet historians joined the opinion of the majority of pre-revolutionary authors who believed that the Streltsy appeared in Rus' in 1550. For historiography and more detailed information about the Streltsy, see A.V. Chernov, Education of the Streltsy Army, Historical Notes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, vol. 38, 1951.

A careful study of the sources makes it possible to clarify this issue.

On January 16, 1547, Ivan the Terrible was crowned king. Noting in this regard the position of the military men under the new king, the chronicler points out: “... and again, add to them a lot of fiery archers, much studied in military affairs and not sparing their heads, and at the right time fathers and mothers and wives , and forgetting their children, and not being afraid of death...” PSRL, vol. XIX, p. 44

The chronicler's message gives the right to assert that the Streltsy army was established under Ivan the Terrible. Noting the appearance of the Streltsy in connection with the accession of Ivan the Terrible, the chronicler apparently recorded a fact that took place even before Ivan the Terrible’s accession to the throne, that is, before 1547. Other sources confirm this assumption.

K. Marx points out in his “Chronological Extracts” on the history of Russia that in 1545 Ivan IV established a permanent personal guard (Leibwache), which he called archers, since it was armed with arquebuses, that is, firearms instead of bows and quivers. He sent part of this guard as the main core to the troops. See Archives of K. Marx and F. Engels, vol. VIII, p. 164

K. Marx's instruction is confirmed by some Russian sources.

In June 1546, a supporter of the Moscow government, Kasimov's Tsar Shah-Ali, sent from Moscow on April 7 of the same year, was imprisoned in the Kazan Khanate. “The Legend of the Conception of the Kingdom of Kazan” reports on this occasion that Shah-Ali went to Kazan, accompanied by a three-thousand-strong detachment of Tatars and did not take with him “neither fiery archers” nor “attack” (artillery).

Shah-Ali stayed in Kazan for about a month and was expelled by the former ruler of the Kazan Khanate, Khan Safa-Girey. Sources indicate that the next year after the expulsion of Shah Ali, Ivan the Terrible sent his governors Semyon Mikulinsky and Vasily Obolensky Serebryany to Kazan with a large army, which included the “fiery archers” The most ancient discharge book, p. 128. Thus, the archers took part in the hostilities of the Russian army in 1546-1547. and, therefore, appeared earlier than this time.

In 1550, “elected” rifle detachments were formed. “Russian Chronograph” talks in some detail about the appearance of these archers. Under 7058 we read: “... the tsar made ... elected archers and 3000 people from the arquebuses, and ordered them to live in Vorobyovskaya Sloboda, and killed the children of the boyars...” In total, six “articles” were created "(detachments) of elected archers, 500 people each. The “Articles” were divided into hundreds, headed by centurions from the boyars’ children, and probably into dozens. Sagittarius received a salary of 4 rubles per year.

The creation of elected archers was part of the major military reform of Ivan the Terrible and was closely connected with the establishment of the “chosen thousand” in the same 1550 (see below). The “thousand” was a detachment of elected cavalry; elected archers made up a three-thousand-strong detachment of selected infantry. Both of them were the personal armed guard of the king. The elected cavalry and foot units created by Ivan the Terrible were the predecessors of the Russian Guard.

Elected archers differed from the local militia primarily in that they lived in a special settlement and were provided with a constant cash salary. The Streltsy army in its structure approached the regular army.

The social status of the archers was different from that of the local cavalry from the nobles and children of the boyars; the archers were recruited from the people, mainly from the tax-paying townspeople population Russian Chronicle (Moscow Chronicle), 1894, pp. 177-183.

The structure of the Streltsy army was reminiscent of the existing organization of the Russian army (hundred division), but this army also had its own characteristics (reducing hundreds into five hundred detachments - articles). Streletsky “articles”, later orders (devices), existed until the second half of the 17th century. In the second half of the 17th century. they began to gradually be replaced by combined arms regiments, and hundreds by companies, and soon lost their originality.

The Streltsy received their first major baptism of fire during the siege and capture of Kazan in 1552. Chronicle sources tell in some detail about the actions of the Streltsy army in this campaign.

The Hertaul, advanced and large regiments were sent to storm Kazan. Ahead of the regiments, foot archers and Cossacks with their heads, atamans and centurions went on the offensive.

A shootout ensued, in which the archers also took part. When the mounted Tatars made a sortie against the foot archers, the king indicated the Ertaul commander to the governors. regiment to “help” the archers. By order of the governor, the archers “buried themselves in ditches” on the bank of Bulak and did not allow the Tatars to make forays out of the city.

The second governor of the large regiment, M.I. Vorotynsky, was ordered by the entire regiment to dismount from their horses and ride on foot to Kazan.

Vorotynsky “first ordered the archers led by their heads to go to the city,” then the Cossacks with their atamans, the boyar people with their heads and the tours to roll to the indicated place, “and you yourself go with the boyar children after them.” While the tours were being installed (“50 fathoms from the city”), archers, Cossacks and boyars fired at the city with arquebuses and bows. When the tours were installed, all the people were taken to them. “And before the tours, the archer and the Cossack are ordered to dig into ditches against the city.” The battle lasted all night M. M. Bogoslovsky, A few words about one project of reforms of the 16th century, Proceedings of the Archaeographic Commission of the Moscow Archaeological Society, vol. I, no. 1-3, M., 1898, pp. 5-12.

On Saturday, August 27, Voivode M. Ya. Morozov was ordered to roll out a “large outfit” to the tours. Artillery shelling of the city began. The archers, who were in the trenches before the tours, actively helped the artillery, “not allowing people to be on the walls or climb out of the gates.”

On Monday it was decided to stage tours along the river bank. Kazankas. The governors sent forward the archers under the command of Ivan Ershov and the atamans with the Cossacks, who dug in the ditches. The archers responded to shelling from the city with arquebuses, and the Cossacks with bows. Meanwhile, the governors placed the tours in the designated place. The same thing happened when installing the tour from the Arskoe field; the Kazan forays were repelled by archers, boyar people and Mordovians.

To intensify the shelling of the city, a 12-meter tower was built near the tour, on which guns were raised. Active assistance to the artillery was provided by the archers, who fired at the city walls and streets with hand-held arquebuses day and night.

According to the royal decree, the first to attack the city were the archers, Cossacks and boyar people. They had to withstand the main blow of the besieged and capture the city walls. The attackers were helped by the governors with the boyar children from the regiments. The archers and other foot soldiers filled the ditch with brushwood and earth and moved towards the city walls. “And so,” the chronicler adds, “he soon ascended the wall with great strength, and put up that shield and fought on the wall day and night until the city was captured” PSRL, vol. VI, pp. 307, 310.

Sources show that the decisive force in the capture of Kazan were archers, Cossacks and boyar people (slaves), i.e. foot soldiers. The Sagittarius also took an active part in the Livonian War. The siege and capture of all Livonian cities and castles took place with the participation of archers. The siege of Polotsk showed quite well the role and importance of the Streltsy army in the armed forces of the Russian state in the 16th century.

On January 31, 1563, the Russian army approached Polotsk. On the same day, Ivan the Terrible ordered his regiment to set up a convoy (“kosh”) and placed archers in front of the regiment, near the city, who guarded the royal regiment all day. Polotsk residents opened gunfire on the Russian regiments. Situated on the banks of the river. On the island of Dvina and on the island, the gunners and archers knocked down the enemy gunners from the island and killed many people in the prison. The next day, the king sent two more devices (detachments) of archers with heads to the island; The archers were ordered to dig in and begin shelling the settlement.

On February 4 and 5, the deployment of tours and detachments began, the protection of which from possible attacks by the enemy was carried out by archers, Cossacks and boyar people. At the same time, the archers of the device of the head of Ivan Golokhvastov lit the tower of the PSRL prison, vol. XIX, p. 425; The Legend of the Conception of the Kingdom of Kazan, pp. 94, 95 from the direction of the Dvina and through the tower entered the fort. However, the tsar ordered the archers to be taken back, “without intent” they went to the fort, since the siege tours had not yet been set up everywhere. In a bold attack, the archers lost 15 people killed.

The enemy tried to stop the siege through negotiations, but the siege continued. The tours were deployed, and the arriving battering squad joined the shelling of light and medium cannons; The archers settled under the tours. On February 9, the Polotsk governor ordered the fort to be set on fire in several places, and the townspeople from the fort to be driven into the city. Streltsy, Cossacks and boyars burst into the fort, and hand-to-hand combat ensued. Reinforcements from the royal regiment were sent to help the archers. After the capture of the fort, tours were placed around the city, followed by large and mounted guns, and they began round-the-clock shelling of the city. The arrangement of the tours and their protection were carried out by archers and boyar people. On the night of February 15, the archers set fire to the city wall. The regiments were ordered to prepare for the assault, but at dawn on February 15, Polotsk surrendered. Russian Chronicle (Moscow Chronicle), 1894, pp. 177-183.

The success of the siege of the city was the result of the active actions of artillery and archers, who numbered up to 12 thousand near Polotsk. Here, as well as near Kazan, the burden of the siege of the fortress fell on foot soldiers, the central place among whom was occupied by “fiery” archers.

Having briefly traced the participation of the archers in the siege and capture of Kazan and Polotsk, we will draw some general conclusions.

The absence of permanent infantry in the Russian army has been felt for a long time. A long and unsuccessful struggle with Kazan throughout the first half of the 16th century. was partly a consequence of the fact that the Russian army did not have permanent detachments of foot soldiers.

The government sent dismounted cavalry to Kazan, but it could not replace standing infantry, especially since the noble cavalry considered it beneath its dignity to carry out military service on foot. Neither the pishchalniks, temporarily convened for military service, nor the Cossacks, armed primarily with bows, could replace the permanent infantry.

The Streltsy were the embryo of that standing army to which F. Engels attached great importance. Localism is the monopoly of the princely-boyar nobility on the highest positions in the army and government.

Engels wrote that to strengthen and strengthen the centralized royal power in the West (and therefore the tsarist power in Russia), a standing army was needed. See K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, vol. XIV, part 1, p. 447.

It is important to note the fact that the archers were armed with arquebuses. For the Russian army, whose noble cavalry was armed with bows and edged weapons, the appearance of detachments with firearms was of great importance. The universal arming of the archers with firearms placed them above the infantry of Western states, where some of the infantrymen (pikemen) had only edged weapons.

Sagittarius were good at using firearms. Already near Kazan, according to the chroniclers, “the archers danced byahu skillfully and learned military skills and arquebus shooting, like small birds in flight, killing with hand arquebuses and bows” PSRL, vol. XIX, p. 425; The Legend of the Conception of the Kingdom of Kazan, pp. 94, 95.

Finally, repeated indications in the chronicles indicate that the archers knew how to adapt to the terrain and use artificial shelters, and this was possible only as a result of the archers being trained in military affairs.

Thus, it is impossible to identify archers with squeakers. Pishchalnikov can be called the predecessors of the Streltsy, but only in relation to the nature of the service (branch of the army) and weapons. Both of them (the squeakers predominantly) were foot soldiers, and both of them had firearms. This is where the continuity ends. The Streltsy army, which was permanent, in its organization and combat capability stood incomparably higher than the detachments of temporarily convened pishchalniks - militias. Therefore, even after the formation of the Streltsy army, the pishchalniks could not have disappeared, but remained part of the march army, although sources, mostly foreign, sometimes call Streltsy by this name.

1.3 Local militia reforms

The second in time were the reforms of the local militia. The government of Ivan the Terrible showed special attention and care to the military structure of the nobles and children of the boyars. The noble militia was not only the basis of the armed forces of the state, but, most importantly, it was the class support of the autocracy. To improve the legal and economic situation of the nobles and boyars' children, to streamline their military service and, in connection with this, to strengthen the condition and organization of the local militia, and therefore the entire army as a whole - these were the tasks that Ivan the Terrible set for himself when carrying out reforms of the local militia.

The earliest of the military reforms of the nobility of the mid-16th century. there was a verdict on localism Localism is the monopoly of the princely-boyar nobility on the highest posts in the army and government.

In the fall of 1549, Ivan the Terrible began a campaign against Kazan. On the way, the tsar invited the clergy to his place and began to convince the princes, boyars, boyars’ children and all service people who had set out on the campaign that he was going to Kazan “for his own business and for the zemstvo”, so that there would be “discord and place” between the service people... “None of them were there” and during the service everyone “went without a seat.” In conclusion, Ivan the Terrible promised to resolve all local disputes after the campaign. The most ancient discharge book, p. 137.

The fact that during the campaign it was necessary to convince the military people of the need for unity, for which the clergy were specially invited, shows how corrupting the influence of localism was on the army. The persuasion did not yield positive results, and the boyars continued to wage a fierce struggle for “places.” Then the government decided to influence the recalcitrant through legislation.

In July 1550, the tsar, the metropolitan and the boyars reached a verdict on localism. The verdict consisted of two main decisions. The first decision concerns localism in general. At the beginning of the sentence it is stated that in the regiments, princes, princelings, nobles and boyar children must serve with the boyars and governors “without places.” The verdict proposed to write down in the “service order” that if nobles and boyar children happen to be in the service of governors not in their “fatherland”, then “poruhi.” That is, there is no violation of the fatherland in this.

This part of the sentence quite decisively raises the question of localism and on the basis of it alone one can conclude that the tsar wants to completely abolish localism in the army. However, the further content of the verdict significantly reduces the first part of the decision. Further, that is, violations in the verdict we read: if large nobles, who are in the service of smaller governors not in their own country, in the future happen to be governors themselves along with the previous governors, then in the latter case the parochial accounts are recognized as valid and the governors must be “in their fatherland "

So, canceling parochial claims on the part of ordinary soldiers to their governors, i.e., to the command staff, the verdict upheld and confirmed the legality of these claims to the places of governors among themselves. Thus, the sentence of 1550 did not yet completely abolish localism in the army, but, despite this, it was of great importance. The abolition of localism between ordinary soldiers and ordinary soldiers with their governors contributed to the strengthening of discipline in the army, increased the authority of the governors, especially the ignorant, and generally improved the combat effectiveness of the army.

The second part of the sentence was an adaptation of the local accounts between the governors to the existing division of the army into regiments: “he ordered to write in the service outfit where to be in... the service of the boyars and governors by regiment.”

The first (“big”) governor of a large regiment was the commander of the army. The first commanders of the forward regiment, the regiments of the right and left hands and the guard regiment stood below the large commander of the large regiment. The second commander of the large regiment and the first commander of the right-hand regiment were equal. The governors of the forward and guard regiments were considered “not inferior” to the governor of the right-hand regiment. The commanders of the regiment of the left hand were no lower than the first commanders of the forward and guard regiments, but lower than the first commander of the right hand; the second governor of the regiment of the left hand stood below the second governor of the regiment of the right hand of TsGADA, rukop. dept., No. 109/154, l. 182; No. 113/160, pp. 23-24; No. 395/847, pp. 245-247.

This means that all the governors of other regiments were subordinate to the first governor of a large regiment (the commander of the army). The governors of all the other four regiments were equal to each other, and equal to the second governor of the large regiment. The exception was the commander of the left-hand regiment, who stood below the commander of the right-hand regiment. This subordination was stipulated, apparently, because in fact the regiments of the right and left hands (flanks) occupied the same place in the army. The subordination of the first regimental governors corresponded to the subordination of the second, etc., governors, and within the Central State Administrative District, Rukop. dept., No. 109/154, l. 182; No. 113/160, pp. 23-24; No. 395/847, pp. 245-247 of each regiment were subordinate to the first governor, the second, third governor, etc.

The official position of regimental commanders, established by the verdict of 1550, existed until the middle of the 17th century, that is, until the collapse of the old regimental organization of the army. The verdict determined the relationship between the regimental commanders, simplified and improved the leadership of the army and reduced local disputes. Despite the obvious advantages of the new procedure for appointing commanders in the army, this procedure was poorly absorbed by the arrogant boyars. Localism continued to exist, and the government had to repeatedly confirm the verdict of 1550.

The next step taken by the government of Ivan the Terrible to organize a local militia was the formation of the “chosen thousand.”

On October 1, 1550, the king and the boyars passed a verdict on allocating 1,000 boyar children with landAAE (Acts of the Archaeographic Expedition), vol. 1, no. 225; The thousandth book of 1550, prepared for printing by A. A. Zimin, M. - L., 1950.

The verdict provided for the “infliction” of 1,000 people in the Moscow district, Dmitrov, Ruza, Zvenigorod, in quitrents and other villages from Moscow 60-70 miles away from Moscow. These boyar children were divided into three articles and received estates: the first article was 200, the second was 150, and the third was 100. In total, according to the verdict, 1078 people were “placed” in the vicinity of Moscow and 118,200 quarters of land were distributed into local ownership.

This “chosen thousand” was included in a special “Book of a Thousand” and marked the beginning of the service of boyar children according to the “Moscow list”. For the children of boyars, service in the thousanders was hereditary. For many boyar children, entry into the “thousand” meant a major promotion, getting closer to the royal court.

The “chosen thousand” included many representatives of the most noble princely and boyar families. N. Myatlev, Thousanders and the Moscow nobility of the 16th century, Orel, 1912. The recruitment of princes into the service was of great political importance. Receiving estates with the obligation to be ready “for dispatches” to fill various positions in the military and civil service, the descendants of appanage princes moved from their family estates to estates near Moscow, where they were ordered to live permanently. Thus, AAE (Acts of the Archaeographic Expedition), vol. 1, no. 225; The thousandth book of 1550, prepared for printing by A. A. Zimin, M. - L., 1950. The princes flocked to Moscow, became noble landowners and lost contact with those places where they owned hereditary appanage lands as descendants of appanages princes.

The division into three articles did not last long. By decree of 1587, the same size of local dachas near Moscow was established for all Moscow nobles at 100 quarters per field (150 dessiatinas in three fields). This decree was included in its entirety in the Code of 1649.

Sources of the second half of the 16th century. (rank books and chronicles) show that the thousand officers, who were obliged to always “be ready for dispatch,” spent most of their time outside Moscow, mainly in military service. In peacetime, they were sent as city governors or siege leaders to border cities, assigned to patrol the towns and to build cities and border fortifications.

During hostilities, a significant number of thousands became regimental commanders, heads of hundreds, streltsy, Cossacks, staffs, convoys, outfits, etc. Many thousanders were among the command staff of the “sovereign” regiment and in the tsar’s retinue. Thousanders were sent ahead of the troops setting out on a campaign as quarterers; they also monitored the condition of roads, bridges and transportation. Through them, in times of peace and war, relations were maintained with the army and city governors.

Thousanders stood at the head of the orders, were governors and volosts. They appointed captains of thousands and tiuns, mayors, sent for inventory, surveying and patrol of lands and a census of the tax population, sent as ambassadors and messengers to other states, etc.

The creation of the “chosen” thousand was the beginning of the formation of a new group of urban nobility; elected nobles and boyar children or simply “choice” appeared. Elected nobles and boyar children received official recognition from 1550. From the elected nobility at the royal court a special category of service people emerged under the name of “tenants”.

The thousanders did not lose their former estates and estates and maintained contact with the district nobility. An estate near Moscow was given to the “tenant” as an aid, since he was obliged to be in Moscow, far from his land holdings. Being part of the district nobility, elected nobles (thousanders) were counted in the 16th century. (57) N. Myatlev, Thousanders and the Moscow nobility of the 16th century, Orel, 1912. , however, not to the provincial, but to the metropolitan nobility V. O. Klyuchevsky, Composition of representation at the zemstvo councils of ancient Rus', “Russian Thought”, No. 1, 1890, p. 165. . They became part of the sovereign's court and were included in the so-called courtyard notebook, compiled, as A. A. Zimin's research has established, in 1551. The Thousandth Book of 1550 and the Courtyard Notebook of the fifties of the 16th century, M. - L. , 1950, p. 17

Elected nobles and boyar children strengthened the Moscow metropolitan nobility and were the cadres from which service people were later formed, in the terminology of the 17th century, the “Moscow list” or “Moscow rank”.

The education of the chosen thousand was of great political importance. The descendants of the well-born nobility were equal in official position with the landowners-nobles and the children of the boyars. The government's connection with local nobles and boyar children, who made up the bulk of the local militia, expanded and strengthened. There appeared cadres of service people on whom the autocracy could rely.

Together with the “elected” (Moscow) archers, the thousand officers constituted the closest armed force and guard of the tsar.

The verdict of 1550 marked the beginning of the reorganization of the service from estates and estates, which received its final establishment in the “Code of Service” of 1556.

In 1556, a verdict was passed on the abolition of feedings and on the service of PSRL, vol. XIII, pp. 268-269; vol. XX, p. 571; Russian Chronicler, part V, St. Petersburg, 1792, pp. 122-127; Khitrovo N.P., Legislative monuments of the XVI and XVII centuries, p. 169, according to which a major reform of the noble militia was carried out.

The verdict, first of all, noted the enormous harm of feeding. The princes, boyars and boyars’ children, who sat in cities and volosts as governors and volosts, “created many empty towns and volosts... and committed many evil deeds against them...”

In this regard, the feeding system was abolished, and the governor's "feed" was replaced by a special state monetary collection - the "feed payback". The payback went to the treasury and was one of the main sources of state income. The introduction of payback made major changes to the system of the state apparatus. Special state financial bodies were created - “quarters” (fours) V. O. Klyuchevsky, Composition of representation at the zemstvo councils of ancient Rus', “Russian Thought”, No. 1, 1890, p. 165.

All these events had important political and economic consequences. The abolition of feeding and the liquidation of the governor's office led to the fact that huge funds collected by the boyars from the population in the form of governor's feed began to flow into the state treasury. Thus, the boyars became economically and politically weaker, and the fed payback turned into a source of financing for the nobility. Cash income in the form of payback allowed the government to assign a constant cash salary to the nobles and boyars' children for their service. The abolition of feedings was carried out in the interests of the nobility.

The verdict of 1556 also resolved the issue of the service of nobles and children of boyars. This part of the sentence was called the “Service Code”.

Central to the verdict is the decision to establish service from the ground. From fiefdoms and estates, the owners had to perform “stipulated service.” From one hundred quarters (150 dessiatines in three fields) of “good pleasing lands” one man was sent on horseback and in full armor, and on a long journey with two horses. For service to landowners and patrimonial owners (except for land ownership), reward was established in the form of a permanent cash salary. Salaries were also given to people brought with them by landowners and patrimonial owners. Those nobles and boyar children who brought with them people in excess of the established number under the sentence had their salaries increased.

If the landowner or patrimonial owner was not on duty, he paid money for the number of people that he was obliged to provide according to the size of his land holdings.

The Code of 1556 established the norm for military service from the land; an estate of 100 quarters provided one mounted armed warrior. The Code equalized service from estates and estates; service from the latter became as compulsory as from manorial lands. This meant that all those patrimonial lords who had previously served individual feudal lords had to perform public service. The Code created the interest of landowners and patrimonial owners in the service and led to an increase in the number of noble militia by attracting new landowners to the service. In general, the Code improved the recruitment of troops.

In addition to the indicated purely military reforms of the noble militia, the government’s concerns about improving the legal Thousand Book of 1550 and the Yard Notebook of the fifties of the 16th century, M. - L., 1950, p. 17 and the economic situation of the nobles and boyar children were expressed in general a number of other legislative acts.

The landowners received the right to have their cases judged, except for “murder, theft and robbery,” directly from the tsar himself; Judicial power over the peasants living on his lands was concentrated in the hands of the landowner, and, finally, it was forbidden to turn the children of the boyars (except for those unfit for service) into slaves, which was supposed to lead to the preservation of cadres of military men.

In addition to the “Code of Service” of 1556, the government took a number of measures to alleviate and eliminate the debt of landowners.

Finally, a major reform of local government controlled, carried out in the mid-50s, transferred local power from the hands of princely-boyar circles (governors) to the jurisdiction of local landowners, who were under the control of the central state apparatus.

In general, all the reforms of the mid-16th century. had a pronounced noble character and reflected the growth of the nobility as a reliable political, economic and military force in a centralized state.

Chapter 2. Oprichnina

The creation of the oprichnina should also be included among the reforms of the armed forces of the Russian state.

All the reforms of the 50s, aimed at improving the situation of nobles and boyar children and streamlining their service from local and patrimonial lands, still did not lead to significant changes in the existing situation. After the reforms, most of the land continued to remain in the hands of the boyars, since in essence the reforms themselves were carried out by the boyars. Dissatisfied with the rule of the boyars, the nobility wanted to have a strong royal power capable of satisfying the needs of serving people.

In turn, the boyars were not satisfied with the noble policies of Ivan the Terrible and his measures to strengthen the autocracy. The boyars were aware of the need to strengthen centralized power. But at the same time, large feudal lords sought to achieve participation in government. Wanting to preserve their former feudal privileges, the boyars interfered with the implementation of reforms. Provided with land and having numerous armed servants, the boyars could keep their peasants in obedience without PSRL, vol. XIII, pp. 268-269; vol. XX, p. 571; Russian Chronicler, part V, St. Petersburg, 1792, pp. 122-127; Khitrovo N.P., Legislative monuments of the XVI and XVII centuries, p. 169 assistance to centralized state power. The boyars had less need of strong royal power than the nobles and boyar children.

The princes and boyars tried to preserve their feudal rights in the conditions of a strengthening centralized state and limit the royal power. When in 1553 Ivan the Terrible became seriously ill and the question arose about his successor, many boyars refused to swear allegiance to Ivan the Terrible’s young son, Dimitri, preferring to see the appanage prince Vladimir Andreevich Staritsky, who was closer to them, on the royal throne. Vladimir Staritsky and his mother prepared armed forces in the event of a palace coup: they gathered their boyar children and distributed salaries to them, and secretly consulted with many princes, boyars and boyar children. Some of the boyars and Prince Staritsky were sworn in almost by force.

These events showed Ivan the Terrible that he could not rely on princes and boyars in his activities. Among the boyars, who dreamed of restoring their lost independence, plans for active protests were ripening.

In the struggle against the growing tsarist power, the princes and boyars tried to use a relic of feudal fragmentation - the right of departure. At the beginning of his reign, Ivan the Terrible fought against the departures of princes and boyars in the old way - he took oaths from persons suspected of intending to “departure”. But, despite mutual responsibility, escapes of boyars outside the state took place.

In the spring of 1564, during the Livonian War, one of the prominent confidants of Ivan the Terrible, who enjoyed great confidence in him, Prince A.M. Kurbsky, went over to the enemy’s side. He entered into relations with the Lithuanian command and fled to the enemy camp along with some nobles and boyar children. Kurbsky's betrayal was an open challenge to the tsar and the new orders of the centralized state and had major political significance. Subsequently, in correspondence with Ivan the Terrible, Kurbsky, indicating his origin of the Tales of Prince. Kurbsky, St. Petersburg, 1842, pp. 231-233, tried to justify his action by the feudal right of princes to leave.

Simultaneously with open treason, there were facts of criminal behavior on the part of other boyars - the voivode. This refers to connections with the boyars who lived on the territory of the zemshchina (part of the state given over to the management of the Boyar Duma) at the theater of war. In January 1564, the Russian army suffered a heavy defeat on the river. Ule near Orsha due to the governor’s oversight. At the same time, many “uncorrections and untruths” of Prince Vladimir Staritsky were revealed. To top it all off, in the fall of 1564, the Crimean Khan, bribed by the Lithuanian-Polish government, raided Rus'. To the intensification of the struggle of the reactionary boyars, who had taken the path of direct treason, Ivan the Terrible responded with an extraordinary measure - the creation of the oprichnina. Ivam the Terrible began to form special detachments of people (oprichniki), on whom he could rely in his fight against the boyars. At first, 1000 people were selected from the nobles and boyar children, then this figure increased to 6000. Subsequently, the oprichnina army consisted (together with the boyar people) of 15-20 thousand horsemen, not counting the oprichnina archers and Cossacks, the number of which is unknown.

Ivan the Terrible made up the oprichnina from small-scale service people. Before enrolling in the oprichnina, a special commission found out family ties candidates. Persons included in the oprichnina list were sworn to not have any relations with any of the zemstvos, even with their relatives. The duty of the guardsmen was to protect the royal power. Behind the oprichnina army stood the broad masses of the city nobility and townspeople. Both were interested in strengthening the unified royal power and supported the activities of Ivan the Terrible.

The oprichnina army took a direct part in military operations on the southern and western borders.

Already in 1565, governors from the oprichnina were sent to Volkhov, and in 1567, oprichniki were also sent to the southern border with the governors. In the process of further expansion and strengthening of the oprichnina, the oprichnina army was separated from the zemstvo regiments. In 1568, when the zemstvo regiments were pulled to the western border for a campaign in Livonia, only the oprichnina army guarded the southern border. Three oprichnina regiments (large, advanced and guard) with their governors were stationed in Mtsensk, three regiments in Kaluga. When the enemy appeared, the regiments were ordered to converge and be according to the list: a large regiment with a large one, an advanced one with an advanced one, etc. This refers to the connection with the boyars who lived on the territory of the zemshchina (part of the state given over to the control of the Boyar Duma).

The following year, the protection of the southern border was carried out simultaneously by zemstvo and oprichnina regiments, with five zemstvo regiments stationed in Serpukhov, Kolomna and Kashira, and five oprichnina regiments were located in Kaluga (large, advanced and guard) and Rzhev (regiments of the right and left hand).

In 1570, all five oprichnina regiments were stationed in Tarusa, and a governor from the oprichnina was ordered to be in Kaluga. The military registration (category “from the field and on the shore”) provided for joint actions of zemstvo and oprichnina regiments in case of military danger, and a large zemstvo regiment had to unite with a large oprichnina regiment, etc., i.e., according to the generally accepted rule of uniting regiments DRV (Ancient Russian Vivliofika), part XIII, pp. 397, 400, 403, 412, 415; TsGADA, handicraft. dept., No. 112/158, pp. 289-292, 354-355; No. 113/160, pp. 219, 222.

In 1571, five oprichnina regiments with their governors were stationed in Tarusa, and in Kaluga there were governors from the oprichnina. After 1571, the oprichnina regiments disappeared from military paintings on the southern border.

The oprichnina army also took part in the Livonian War. So, during the siege of Revel, according to the chronicler Ryussov, “a strong army of Russians, called guardsmen, approached the city.” During the campaign of 1577, the army consisted of 1280 sovereign (oprichnina) and 5190 zemstvo archers of the TsGADA, rukop. dept., No. 112/158, pp. 354-355.

This was a completely combat-ready army, guarding the borders of the state and participating in military operations along with the zemstvo regiments. The oprichnina army was included in the combined arms lists (ranks) in the same way as the zemstvo detachments, was divided into the same regiments as the entire Russian army, had a governor at the head of the regiments, the regiments united with each other and with the zemstvo regiments according to existing rules, etc. .

Special institutions were created to manage the military affairs of the oprichnina. The emergence of such special governing bodies dates back to 1565, when Ivan the Terrible ordered his boyars and nobles to build courtyards and huts in the Aleksandrovskaya Sloboda. Later, the oprichnina Discharge Order became the head of the entire department; At the same time, there was also a “Zemstvo” category. The functions of the Sinbirsky collection, M., 1845, p. 22 of the Oprichnina Discharge were similar to the functions of the Discharge Order in the Zemshchina.

After the renaming of the oprichnina to the “yard”, the discharge order from the oprichnina became a “yard order”. The Yard Discharge also existed in the first half of the 80s, when the Zemstvo Discharge is mentioned {66} . This means that the division of the department into two orders continued to exist and probably ended with the death of Ivan the Terrible.

With the emergence of the oprichnina, the Russian state was divided into two parts: state territory (zemshchina) and oprichnina, i.e. lands that personally belonged to the tsar (from the word “oprich”, i.e. especially). The division of the Russian state into the oprichnina and the zemshchina dealt a blow to the very basis of the economic power of the boyars - the ancestral fiefdoms. At the same time, a massive confiscation of the lands of the boyars was carried out in favor of the oprichniki nobles. Princes and boyars had the right to receive lands in other places, which in fact was not always fulfilled, and the new lands were far from equivalent to the previous ones. Cut off from their homes, the princes and boyars in the new possessions no longer had such strong ties with the population as in the hereditary estates.

By destroying the princely-boyar landownership, Ivan the Terrible deprived the large feudal lords of their former political importance and created a cadre of small landowners who were entirely dependent on the tsarist power and were ready to support it in every possible way.

Relying on the guardsmen and the boyars obedient to him, Ivan the Terrible took county by county into the oprichnina and “sorted through the little people.” First of all, large landowners - princes and boyars - were evicted to the outskirts of the state or destroyed; their servants either followed their master or went into government service. Large estates were divided into small shares, which went to the estate for the children of the boyars - the guardsmen. The large landowners were followed by small estate owners: they were also taken to new places, deprived of old estates and estates, and in their place new people were planted, more reliable for the oprichnina.

An important consequence of the destruction of boyar land ownership was the changes that took place in the organization of the army. Numerous detachments of the DRV (Ancient Russian Vivliofika) disappeared with the oprichnina, part XIII, pp. 397, 400, 403, 412, 415; TsGADA, handicraft. dept., No. 112/158, pp. 289-292, 354-355; No. 113/160, pp. 219, 222 armed servants, with whom the princes used to go into service, all other appanage customs and liberties in the field of official relations also died out. Service people of private individuals, moving to public service, were placed in direct dependence on the tsar.

By the beginning of the 70s of the 16th century. The oprichnina fulfilled its main role: the boyar-princely landownership was destroyed, and the most opposition-minded large feudal lords were exterminated. The devastating raid of the Crimean Khan in 1571 on Moscow showed that the separation of the army on the southern border into zemstvo and oprichnaya had a negative impact on the protection of borders and that the independent existence of the oprichnina army was not justified. In 1572, the oprichnina was officially abolished, but continued to exist, called the “court,” until the end of the 70s, when the entire state was again united under the general control of Grozny.

Oprichnina was one of the stages in the creation and strengthening of a single centralized state. It had to uproot all remnants of feudal fragmentation, make it impossible to return to it, and thereby ensure the unity of the country. This issue was especially acute in the mid-60s, during the Livonian War, which required the exertion of all the armed forces of the state. The lack of unity and subordination in military affairs negatively affected the success of actions. To eliminate these shortcomings and the reasons that gave rise to them, the oprichnina was created.

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The core of the Russian army in the 15th century. There remained a grand-ducal court, consisting of small service people (boyars and “children of boyars”). Over time, the grand ducal court increased significantly and turned into a grand ducal army.

The second component was the “city regiments”. They were recruited from the townspeople. Their basis was the “Moscow army”, i.e. troops staffed by artisans, merchants and other layers of Moscow residents.

The third part was the “chopped army”, i.e. army collected from a certain amount of dry. This army was also called the “road army” and was fielded by the rural population according to the established calculation.

The fourth component of the Russian army were the Cossack troops. Already from the second half of the 14th century. Cossack watchmen are mentioned who carried out surveillance duties along the Khopr and Don, Bystraya and Quiet Sosna and other rivers. A line of fortified cities emerged, defended by “urban Cossacks.” The village Cossacks performed guard duty. One warrior from 20 households was exhibited for village service. The chronicles also noted the "zasechnaya guard" who defended the border fortifications.

The fifth component of the army were mercenary detachments of foreigners. At this time, “serving Tatar princes”, “Horde princes”, “Lithuanian princes” and others with their warriors performed military service on a contractual basis.

The Russian army of this period had two main types of troops: the “forged army” and the “ship army”. The forged army is a cavalry staffed with well-armed horsemen. The ship's army is infantry, most of which were “chopped army”. The infantry was called the ship's army because, as a rule, it traveled on ships along rivers.

The organization of troops for marching and combat was divided into regiments: guard (advanced), large, right and left arms, and ambush (reserve).

The regiments were commanded by regimental governors, who were appointed by the Grand Duke of Moscow. Several governors were appointed to each regiment, one of whom was the main one. The appointment of governors took place not on the basis of taking into account their military qualities, but on the basis of their nobility of origin (localism). The “sovereign of all Rus'” retained the general command and exercised it personally or appointed a great governor.

The military reforms carried out by the government of Ivan IV played a major role in the development of the Russian army. They responded to the prevailing conditions of the fight against an external enemy and were carried out in the following areas of military affairs: the creation of central control bodies - orders and the organization of centralized control in the army; streamlining the system of recruiting troops and military service in them; the creation of a new standing army armed with handguns (streltsy army); the allocation of an artillery unit into an independent branch of the military; the birth of battlefield engineering equipment; centralization of the supply system; creation of a permanent guard service on the southern border.

Among the most important measures that were carried out by the government of Ivan the Terrible is the creation by him of a centralized system of military command and control in the state. In the system of military command and control of the Russian army in the 15th–17th centuries. general leadership was carried out by the king. Direct control of individual issues of the construction and training of armed forces was concentrated in orders. The highest body of military control was the Rank Order. The rank order was in charge of accounting for service people, their appointment to positions, their service, and prepared calculations of the required forces and means for each campaign. The functions of the Discharge Order also included the organization of coastal (stanitsa, guard, abattoir) service at the border lines. In wartime, the Rank Order carried out the collection of the entire army, its formation into regiments, including the appointment of governors and their assistants, as well as the general management of military operations. In accordance with the objectives, a plan for waging war was developed. Preparation for it was of great importance. In advance, in accordance with the choice of target for attack, guns and food were transported to certain cities. A rally point for the troops was planned well in advance and the time and order of the march to the intended object were carefully worked out. Maps were used to develop the plan. Depending on the nature of the upcoming hostilities, regiments were formed according to ranks at the place of military gathering ("discharge" - distribute regiments). Each army had at least three regiments. After the review, the troops set out on a campaign.

The Streletsky Prikaz was in charge of the archers and city Cossacks, the Pushkarsky Prikaz was in charge of the production, storage and distribution of guns, gunpowder and shells, the accounting and distribution of gunners and other service people of the Pushkar rank (tweeters, collar workers, blacksmiths, carpenters) among cities and fortresses, the construction and repair of fortresses and fortified lines (by engineering), armored - by the manufacture of weapons.

The formation of the “chosen thousand” in 1550 played an important role in the centralization of control of the armed forces. In peacetime, “thousanders” were sent as city governors or siege leaders to border cities, appointed by commanders to patrol behind abatis and for the construction of cities and border fortifications. During hostilities, a significant number of them became regimental commanders, heads of hundreds, streltsy and Cossacks, commanders of the “pososhny” army, convoy, outfit, etc. There were many “thousanders” among the command staff of the sovereign’s regiment and in the tsar’s retinue. The “thousanders” were sent ahead of the troops setting out on a campaign as quarterers; they also monitored the condition of roads, bridges and transportation. Through them, in times of peace and war, relations were maintained with the army and city governors. The “thousanders” stood at the head of the orders, were governors and volostels (chiefs over a particular volost).

As a result, not only did another armed formation appear in the hands of the central government, but a kind of executive body emerged, designed to implement the government’s military policy at the local level.

The increase in the combat effectiveness of Ivan the Terrible's army was greatly facilitated by the organization of centralized control in it. The sovereign of “All Rus'” reserved the overall command of the entire army and exercised it personally. If the sovereign was absent, then the great governor commanded. He was also the first commander of a large regiment. Separate units of the army were led by governors. Each regiment had two or three governors, with one of them being the main one. In addition to the regimental ones, voivodes from the squad (chief of artillery), “walking” voivode (chief of the “walking city”), and Ertaul voivode (chief of intelligence) were also appointed. After the governors stood the “heads”. Below them are centurions, semi-centurions, tens of each branch of the army.

Very important role For centralization and better control of troops on the march and in battle, a system of subordination of governors in the army was established. According to the “sentence” of the tsar with the metropolitan and the boyars on localism in 1550, the first (large) governor of a large regiment was the commander of the army. The first commanders of the forward regiment, the regiments of the right and left hands and the guard regiment stood below the large commander of the large regiment. The second commander of the large regiment and the first commander of the right-hand regiment were equal. The governors of the forward and guard regiments were considered equal to the governor of the right-hand regiment. The commanders of the left-hand regiment were no lower than the first commanders of the forward and guard regiments, but lower than the first commanders of the right-hand regiment; the second commander of the regiment of the left hand stood below the second commander of the regiment of the right hand. Thus, all the governors of other regiments were subordinate to the great (first) governor of a large regiment (commander of the army). The governors of all the other four regiments were equal to each other, and equal to the second governor of the large regiment. The exception was the commander of the left-hand regiment, who stood below the commander of the right-hand regiment. The subordination of the first regimental governors corresponded to the subordination of the second governors, etc., and within each regiment the second, third governor, etc. were subordinate to the first governor.

Also, from 1550, when appointing command positions, not only the nobility and wealth of the family, but also military merits began to be taken into account.

Simultaneously with the appointment of a great governor, he received a royal order from the Discharge Order. The order said: with whom to wage war; from which cities and counties should servicemen participate in the campaign; when and where to gather individual regiments and the entire army; who should command individual regiments, outfits, etc., and also manage the distribution of salaries and all supplies. The order gave the routes of movement of individual regiments and the entire army, and a plan of military operations. Along with the order, the great commander of a large regiment was awarded a rank - military registration of military men and commander of the regiments. Each of the first regimental governors received a special order, which in relation to his regiment indicated the composition of the regiment, its route of movement, the functions of the governor, etc.

For current work, clerks were appointed to help the governors. These clerks, together with their assistants (clerks), wrote orders, kept logs of military operations, and “managed the sovereign’s treasury.” They formed the headquarters of the army, which received in the 16th century. the name is "discharge tent".

The streamlining of the system of recruitment and military service in the local army was important for the development of the armed forces of Rus'.

Regarding the problem of changes in the system of recruitment and organization of the Russian army in the 16th century, it should be noted that it arose in the 15th century. The local system of recruiting troops was finally established and was consolidated by the decrees of Ivan the Terrible.

In 1555, the “Code for Service” was published, which equalized patrimonies and estates, declared the military service of patrimonial lords and nobles compulsory and hereditary, and determined their official duties depending on the size of land holdings.

For service, a land plot ranging from 150 to 3 thousand hectares was given. In addition to the land allotment, a monetary allowance was provided depending on the category - from 4 rubles. up to 1200 rubles, which was given to them when they went on a campaign or two years later on the third.

For every 100 dessiatines (about 50 dessiatines) of good land, one warrior “in full armor, on a long march with two horses,” had to set out on a campaign. In this case, monetary support was provided for soldiers during military campaigns. The estate passed from father to son. When he turned 15 years old, he signed up for the “ten” (service list) and became a “novice”. To record and check the serving nobles, reviews were periodically held. This order extended to the city Cossacks, who began to receive estates on the borders.

The local troops also included the Tatar nobility, who went into the service of the Moscow sovereign and received estates from him.

The local army was the basis of the Russian army and constituted the main branch of the army - the cavalry. The introduction of the local system made it possible to significantly increase the number of troops. If necessary, the Moscow sovereign could mobilize from 80 to 100 thousand cavalry. The best part of the local cavalry was the royal regiment (up to 20 thousand people).

The second component of the Russian army of the 16th century. there was infantry, it consisted of: foot city Cossacks, pososhnye people (staffs), archers.

Urban Cossacks were developed as a new branch of the army under Ivan IV. They were recruited by the government from free (“willing”) people. City Cossacks were usually named after the city in which they served. The Cossacks lived in families, received cash salaries and were allocated land. The service life was not determined by him. Entire Cossack detachments (villages) from the Don, Volga, Yaik and Terek were recruited for service. When entering the service, a guarantee was required from at least 10 old-time Cossacks and an obligation “not to betray the sovereign Tsar.” The city Cossacks were mounted and on foot, and served with their own weapons. They existed until the end of the 17th century; their number by that time had reached 7 thousand people. The foot Cossacks, in essence, did not differ from the position of the archers. Organizationally, they were divided into units (detachments) of 500 people. Many of them received estates for their service, becoming local Cossacks. Urban Cossacks should not be confused with Cossacks who lived in the border steppes.

In the 16th century Linear Cossacks also arose. The beginning of the service of the Cossacks to the Russian Tsar is considered to be January 3, 1570. On that day, with the boyar Ivan Novosiltsev, a royal letter was sent to the Cossacks living along the banks of the Don, in which they were invited to enter the service of the Tsar. The Don Cossacks gave rise to other Cossacks that arose at the same time, in the 16th century: Terek, Grebensky, Siberian and Yaitsky.

The plow army (pososhnaya people) was collected in a certain quantity from the plow - that was the name of the unit of taxation. Often, one person from 50, 20, 10 and even 5 or 3 households was included in the road army. Walking people were exhibited on horseback and on foot, aged from 25 to 40 years. They were distinguished by good health, knew how to shoot well with bows and arquebuses and ski. Military engineering work was carried out on the construction of roads and bridges, ammunition and food were transported, artillery pieces were transported and installed.

The “Code” also equalized the service of landowners with patrimonial landowners, that is, the state service of patrimonial landowners became as compulsory as the service of landowners. This meant, in essence, the elimination of the feudal militia as such.

In the 16th century under the leadership of Ivan the Terrible, as part of the strengthening of the Russian state, transformations were carried out in the field of recruitment, armament and organization of the Russian army. He created a new standing army, armed with handguns (streltsy army).

The reform began with the release of the “Code of Service”, according to which, for the first time, permanent formations were created at the state level - Streltsy regiments (articles, orders). The Sagittarius appeared organizationally in 1550, when a detachment of 3 thousand people was organized. The detachment was reduced to six articles (orders) of 500 people each, and the last hundreds, fifty, dozens.

Military training arose in the Streltsy detachments and hundreds. The archers were trained in formation and shooting from arquebuses. They knew how to “bury themselves in ditches” (Western mercenaries did not do this because it was not “unpaid work”), shoot from arquebuses, etc.

A special cavalry detachment was formed from the best archers. These archers were called stirrups, they guarded the royal palace and usually accompanied the sovereign. At the end of the 16th century. there were up to 12 thousand archers. Of these: 2 thousand stirrups; 5 thousand Moscow foot soldiers; 5 thousand policemen.

The new army, consisting of archers, had some elements of a regular structure: service in peacetime and wartime, constant state maintenance, uniform type of weapons, organized combat training.

In relation to the types of troops, the archers were infantry. A small part of the streltsy army was cavalry, called stirrup streltsy. According to the place and conditions of service, the Streltsy army was divided into “elected” (Moscow) and police (served in other cities). By the end of the 16th century. The Streltsy army as a whole numbered 20–25 thousand people. In peacetime, the archers carried out garrison and guard duty, guarded the border, and in wartime they took part in the most important campaigns and battles. The archers received their baptism of fire during the siege and capture of Kazan in 1552.

In addition to the archers, city Cossacks, line Cossacks, gunners (as already mentioned), as well as strikers and collars carried out permanent service in the Russian army.

Zatinshchiki (from the word "zatin" - space behind the fortress wall) are servicemen who served the fortress artillery. The collars were intended to protect the gates of cities and fortresses.

The Tatars and some other eastern peoples, subordinate to the Moscow government, in case of war, supplied special cavalry units for joint actions with Moscow troops.

The tsar’s merit also lies in the fact that artillery became an independent branch of the military. "Attachment", that is, artillery, was the third component of the Russian army in the 16th century. By the middle of the 16th century. service people of the Pushkar rank are organized into a special part of the army, subordinate first to the Rank Order, and from 1577 to the Pushkar Order, which was in charge of the affairs of the outfit. The term “gunners” was adopted by the artillerymen of the Russian state in the first half of the 16th century, before the campaign against Kazan. Gunners initially served in the artillery for life, and from the second half of the 16th century. - 25 years. The government encouraged service in the ranks of gunners and fighters who had the necessary knowledge and skill. They had benefits. They were recruited mainly from free artisans. Their service was inherited: the father passed on knowledge to his son. The gunners who serviced the guns and all those who served in the detachment (artillery) received grain and cash salaries, and sometimes land plots. They, like the archers, lived in cities, in Pushkar settlements, and had the right to engage in crafts. In addition to servicing guns, gunners in peacetime were engaged in the production of saltpeter, gunpowder, shells, performed guard duty, and carried out various types of military engineering work. The service people of the Pushkar rank also included carpenters and blacksmiths who were at the guns and monitored their serviceability. Artillery was divided into fortress artillery, intended to protect cities, siege artillery - battering rams and field artillery with medium and light guns.

Under Ivan IV, the troops assembled for the campaign were divided into armies, each of which acted independently. The composition of the army included from 3 to 7 regiments for various purposes: large, right and left arm, forward (vanguard), guard (rearguard), ambush (reserve), ertaul (reconnaissance). These main, consolidated regiments (as in the 14th–15th centuries) were composed of smaller units, also called regiments, which bore the names of the localities and cities where they were recruited. The latter were divided into “thousands”, “hundreds”, “fifty hundred” and “ dozens."

The organization of the Russian army, while retaining mainly its old forms, adapted them to the new requirements of strategy and tactics. Thus, the combined regiments - the main organizational and tactical units - were infused with rifle orders, the main task of which was to strengthen the firepower of the given combined regiment as a whole. The firepower of the regiments, in addition, was strengthened by the creation of regimental artillery (for example, 6–8 guns were included in the Streltsy regiment).

The guns that were in reserve (in storage) were used in wartime for special duty. Service people were assigned to them, a special governor was appointed, and the outfit was included in the large regiment. During the battle, this outfit was distributed among other regiments and it served as field or siege artillery.

The fourth element was the “Gulyai-Gorod” (movable field fortification). In fact, the specially trained personnel of the “walk-city” were the beginnings of engineering troops. The “walk-city” shelter is a lightweight, movable protective device assembled from wooden shields, transported on wheels in the summer and on runners in the winter. The archers and gunners fired through the loopholes of the "walk-city". Its use made it possible to use firearms most effectively in field battles. In fact, battlefield engineering equipment appeared in Russian military art, consisting of a wooden shield cover.

A “walk-city” assembled from shields could be stretched at the front from 3 to 10 km. Permanent people (carpenters) were used to build the fortification, assemble it and move it. The construction of “walking cities”, fortresses, and siege work was supervised by “rozmysly” (engineers).

In addition, for example, during the siege of Kazan, a battle tower was built under the leadership of the Russian engineer clerk I. Vyrodkov. It was 13 m high, 7 m wide and 16 m long. It had three tiers of loopholes. Each tier housed archers with arquebuses and guns. In total, the towers contained 50 archers, 10 large guns and 50 hand-held and arquebuses. The fortress was bombarded daily from the tower. From this fire, the besieged suffered heavy losses in manpower. But the main thing was that a system of parallels was built around Kazan, which made it possible to bring troops to the fortress for an assault. This system was applied in the West only 50 years later. The two lines of parallels were fortified with tours; they sheltered the troops intended for the assault.

An important role in increasing the combat effectiveness of Ivan the Terrible’s troops was played by the partial centralization of its supply system.

In the 16th century In the mercenary armies of European countries, there was a so-called “marketing” supply system, in which the warring armies were followed by convoys of merchants (marketers), who sold food and fodder to the soldiers. Troops usually took reserves of cannonballs and gunpowder with them for the entire period of hostilities.

In Russia, the mercenary army and the accompanying “marketing” supply system have not become widespread. According to the "Code of Service of 1555" The local army was staffed by “service men” who were obliged to go on campaign “on horseback and in arms.” For their economic (material) support during the campaign, “people in the purse” were allocated from the estates. The Streltsy army, gunners, city Cossacks and the militia of the Danish people were provided at the expense of the state treasury. The supplies of weapons, ammunition, food and fodder prepared for them by the state were usually transported along with the army along peasant convoys or river (sea) vessels rented from private individuals. Only in the 17th century. As the so-called “new system” regiments were deployed in the armed forces of the Russian state, the bulk of the troops were transferred completely to centralized state material support.

The achievements of the government of Ivan IV include the establishment of a permanent guard service (“zasechnye lines”) on the southern borders (the creation of the first border units), where the Crimean Tatars were rampant.

This circumstance forced the government of Ivan the Terrible to reorganize the border service, which was carried out under the leadership of governor M. Vorotynsky. At the beginning of 1571, the “children of the boyars” and the Cossack villagers, who carried out border service there, were summoned to Moscow from the southern border cities. The meeting ended with the drawing up of the “Verdict on the village and guard service.” According to the “Sentence,” border protection was entrusted to outposts (“watchmen”) and the so-called villages. The posting of a “watchman” was envisaged annually from April 1 until winter. The southernmost cities of the Russian state - Putivl and Rylsk - were identified as control centers for the southern border guard. Outposts were to be sent from these and other cities for a period of six weeks, taking into account travel time. Then a second outpost was sent for the same period, followed by a third, then the first again, but for a month. It was strictly forbidden to leave your post before the arrival of the shift. “Stanitsa” in this case were called mobile units guarding the border. The “sentence” established that each large city should send eight “stanitsa”. The “stanitsa” were sent on patrol one by one, for a period of two weeks, from the 1st to the 15th of each month. Four months later, on August 1, the “Stanitsa” left for the second time and carried out patrols until December 1. City Cossacks, as well as the local townspeople and peasant population, were involved in guard and village service.

Thus, the military reforms carried out by the government of Ivan IV met the prevailing conditions of the fight against the external enemy. They allowed him to have a fairly disciplined and numerous national army, including a standing infantry army. In the 16th century The armed forces of Rus' consisted of local cavalry, archers, city Cossacks, datochny militia



Modern historical science cannot exist without close integration with the science of other countries, and informing some scientists and just people interested in foreign science is not only a consequence of the globalization of information flows, but a guarantee of mutual understanding and tolerance in the field of culture. It is impossible to understand each other without knowledge of history. Where, for example, do the same British historians and students get acquainted with the military history of foreign countries and, in particular, the military history of Russia? To do this, they have at their disposal numerous publications from such publishing houses as Osprey (Osprey), which since 1975 has published more than 1000 titles of a wide variety of books on military history, both in England itself and in foreign countries. The publications are popular science and serial in nature, which allows you to get a comprehensive idea of ​​a particular period or event in military history. The most popular series include the publications “Men-at-arms” (“Armed People”), “Campaign” (“Campaign”), “Warrior” (“Warrior”), and a number of others.

The volume of publications is fixed: 48, 64 and 92 pages, there are no references to sources in the text itself, but there is always an extensive bibliography. The publications are richly illustrated with photographs, graphic drawings (drawings of armor and fortifications) and - which is a kind of “calling card” of the publishing house - the presence in each of the books of eight color illustrations made by the most famous illustrators in Britain! Moreover, these illustrations are made according to sketches provided by the author himself, and in them arrows indicate not only the colors and material of the clothing and armor of the warriors depicted on them, but - and this is the most important thing - from where this or that detail of the drawing was borrowed. That is, you can’t just take it and draw it “out of your head”! We need photographs of artifacts from museums, photocopies of drawings from archeology magazines, page-by-page links to monographs of famous scientists, so the degree of scientific content of these books, despite the lack of links directly in the text, is extremely high. The text is provided to the publisher at English language, it does not make translations.

As for Russian history, the publishing house has no prejudice in its regard, so in the list of Osprey books you can also find works by Russian authors dedicated to Seven Years' War And Civil War 1918 - 1922, and books written by foreign historians about the army of Peter the Great. Historians have not ignored the early periods of Russian military history, and, in particular, such a famous British medievalist as David Nicol. It was in co-authorship with him that the author of this article had the opportunity to publish a book in the “Men-at-Arms” series (No. 427) “Armies of Ivan the Terrible / Russian Troops 1505 – 1700” by the Osprey publishing house. Below is an excerpt from this publication, which allows you to get a clear idea of ​​what information the British and, for example, students of British universities can get from it on Russian military history and, in particular, the military history of the Russian State during the era of Ivan the Terrible.

Local horsemen and guardsmen. Illustration by Angus McBride based on sketches by the author and D. Nicolas.

“The Streltsy Troops of Ivan IV, armed with rifles and cannons, were the first army in the history of Russia. Ivan III's wars and diplomacy made Muscovy one of the most powerful states in Europe in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, but serious internal and external problems remained. One of the most pressing threats from the east and south was the threat of Tatar raids, while the regional independence of large feudal lords or boyars undermined the power of the Grand Duke from within. For several years, when Russia was virtually ruled by the boyars, young Ivan IV found himself hostage to their abuses and self-will; however, when the teenager finally ascended the throne, instead of being content with the title of Grand Duke, he took on the title "Great Tsar of All Rus'" (1547). This was connected not only with the desire to strengthen his royal dignity, but also became a warning to all those around him that he intended to rule as a true autocrat.

Having become Tsar, Ivan IV tried to solve his two most pressing problems at the same time. His closest external enemy was the Kazan Khanate. On six previous occasions (1439, 1445, 1505, 1521, 1523 and 1536) Kazan attacked Moscow, and Russian troops invaded Kazan seven times (1467, 1478, 1487, 1530, 1545, 1549 and 1550). Now Tsar Ivan ordered the construction of Sviyazhsk, a fortress city and military depot on an island on the border with Kazan, to serve as a base for future expeditions along the entire middle reaches of the Volga River. The campaigns of Russian troops in 1549 and 1550 failed, but Ivan was adamant, and in 1552 the Kazan Khanate was finally destroyed.

First of all, the strengthening of the military power of the Russian state was facilitated by the creation of infantry units armed with firearms. Now such units have been transferred to a permanent basis. According to the chronicle: “In 1550, the tsar created elected archers with arquebuses in the number of three thousand, and ordered them to live in Vorobyovoy Sloboda.” The archers received a uniform consisting of a traditional Russian long-skirted caftan reaching to the ankles, a conical cap or fur-trimmed hat, and boot. They were armed with a matchlock musket and a saber. The berdysh, or long stalked ax with a sickle-shaped blade, which could both chop and stab, and which could also be used as a stand for a musket, became the second most important weapon of the archer. Gunpowder and lead was given to them from the treasury, and they cast the bullets themselves. Their earnings ranged from 4 to 7 rubles per year for ordinary streltsy, and from 12 to 20 for a centurion or commander of a hundred. From 30 to 60 rubles a streltsy, “head” or regiment commander received While ordinary archers also received oats, rye, bread and meat (lamb), senior ranks were allocated land plots ranging from 800 to 1350 hectares.

At that time, this was a very high fee, comparable to the salary of the aristocratic, that is, local cavalry. For example, in 1556 payments for its riders ranged from 6 to 50 rubles per year. On the other hand, the cavalrymen were also paid lump sums for six or seven years, which allowed them to purchase military equipment. They then lived off the income from their lands, and their peasants accompanied their masters to war as armed servants. This was the usual feudal system, in which landowners with large estates were required to field more cavalrymen on the campaign.

In peacetime, such landowners lived in their villages, but had to be prepared for military service if necessary. In practice, it was difficult for the king to assemble large forces in a short time, which is why the archers, who were always at hand, were very valuable. Their numbers began to grow rapidly from an initial number of 3,000 to 7,000 men under the command of eight “heads” and 41 centurions. By the end of the reign of Ivan the Terrible there were already 12,000 people, and by the time of the coronation of his son Fyodor Ivanovich in 1584, this standing army reached a number of 20,000. At first, the Streletsky Izba was responsible for the Streletsky army, which was soon renamed the Streletsky Prikaz. These institutions can be compared to the modern system of ministries, and such an order was first mentioned in 1571.

In many respects, the Streltsy of the 16th and 17th centuries in Russia had much in common with the Janissary infantry of the Ottoman Empire, and perhaps their appearance is partly due to their successful experience in wars. Each regiment differed in the color of their caftans, and, as a rule, was known by the name of its commander. In Moscow itself, the first regiment belonged to the Stirrup Order, because it served “near the royal stirrup.” In fact, it was a regiment of the royal guard, followed by all the other rifle regiments. Some other Russian cities also had rifle regiments. But the Moscow Streltsy had the highest status, and they perceived demotion to “city streltsy” and exile to “distant cities” as a very severe punishment.

One of those who personally observed these troops was the English ambassador Fletcher, sent to Moscow by Queen Elizabeth I. In 1588, he wrote that the archers were armed with a pistol, a berdysh on their back and a sword on their side. The finishing of the barrel was of very rough work; Despite the heavy weight of the gun, the bullet itself was small. Another observer described the appearance of the king in 1599, accompanied by 500 guards dressed in red caftans and armed with bows and arrows, sabers and reeds. However, it is unclear who these troops included: streltsy, “children of the boyars,” junior nobles, or perhaps stewards or lodgers - provincial nobility periodically invited to live in Moscow as the tsar’s praetorian guard.

Sagittarius lived in their own homes with gardens and orchards. They supplemented the royal salary by working as artisans and even traders in their free time - again, the similarity with the later Janissaries of the Ottoman Empire is striking. These measures did not contribute to the transformation of the archers into effective infantry, however, during the storming of Kazan (1552) they were in the forefront of the attackers and demonstrated good combat skills. Chronicles of the time claim that they were so skilled with their arquebuses that they could kill birds in flight. In 1557, a Western traveler recorded how 500 riflemen marched with their commanders through the streets of Moscow to a shooting range where their target was an ice wall. The archers started shooting from a distance of 60 meters and continued until this wall was completely destroyed.

Oprichnina army

The most reliable bodyguard of Ivan IV were the guardsmen (also called kromeshniks, from the word except). Russian historians use the word oprichnina in two senses: in the broad sense it means the entire state policy of the tsar in 1565-1572, in the narrow sense it means the territory of the oprichnina and the oprichnina army. Then the richest lands in Russia became the territory of the oprichnina, thereby providing the tsar with abundant income. In Moscow, some streets also became part of the oprichnina, and the Oprichnina Palace was built outside the Moscow Kremlin. In order to become one of the guardsmen, a boyar or nobleman underwent a special check to weed out everyone who aroused the tsar’s suspicions. After enrollment, the person took an oath of allegiance to the king.

The oprichnik was easily recognizable: he wore rough, monastic-style clothes lined with sheepskin, but underneath he wore a satin caftan trimmed with sable or marten fur. The guardsmen also hung the head of a wolf or dog* on the neck of a horse or to the pommel of the saddle; and on the handle of the whip there was a tuft of wool, sometimes replaced by a broom. Contemporaries reported that all this symbolized the fact that the oprichniki were gnawing at the tsar’s enemies like wolves, and then sweeping away everything unnecessary from the state.

In the Alexandrovskaya Sloboda, where the tsar moved his residence (now the city of Alexandrov in the region of Vladimir), the oprichnina took on the form of a monastic order, where the tsar played the role of abbot. But this false humility could not disguise their enthusiasm for robbery, violence and unbridled orgies. The king was personally present at the executions of his enemies, after which he experienced periods of repentance, during which he passionately repented of his sins before God. His obvious nervous breakdown is confirmed by many witnesses, for example, the fact that he beat his beloved son Ivan to death in November 1580. However, the guardsmen were never an effective army of Ivan the Terrible. After victories over Kazan in 1552, Astrakhan in 1556, and some initial successes in the Livonian War against the Teutonic Knights on the Baltic Sea coast, military luck turned away from him. In 1571, the Tatar Khan even burned Moscow, after which the main leaders of the guardsmen were executed.

Local cavalry

The main force of the Russian army during this period remained the cavalry, whose riders came from the noble landowner class. Their income depended on their possessions, so each horseman was dressed and armed as he could afford, although the government demanded uniformity in their weapons: each cavalryman had to have a saber, helmet and chain mail. In addition to chain mail or instead of it, a cavalryman could wear a tyalyai - a thickly quilted caftan with metal scales or plates sewn inside.

Those who could afford it were armed with arquebuses or carbines with a smooth or even rifled barrel. Poor warriors usually had a pair of pistols, although the authorities encouraged landowners to purchase carbines as weapons with a longer firing range. Since such weapons took a long time to reload and often misfired when firing, cavalrymen, as a rule, also had a bow and arrows in addition to it. The main melee weapon was a spear or owl - a polearm with a straight or curved blade as a tip.

Most of the riders had sabers of the Turkish or Polish-Hungarian type, copied by Russian blacksmiths. Oriental sabers with strongly curved Damascus steel blades were very popular in Russia at that time. The straight-bladed broadsword was also popular, richly decorated and the weapon of noble warriors; its blade was reminiscent of European swords, but was narrower than that of a sword from medieval times. Another type of bladed weapon was the suleba - a type of sword, but with a wide, slightly curved blade.

The weapons of the Russian local cavalry were richly decorated. The sheaths of the sabers were covered with Moroccan leather and decorated with overlays with precious and semi-precious stones, corals, and the handles of the sabers and the butts of arquebuses and pistols were inlaid with mother-of-pearl and ivory, and the armor, helmets and bracers were covered with notches. A large number of weapons were exported from the East, including Turkish and Persian Damascus steel sabers and daggers, Egyptian bowls, helmets, shields, saddles, stirrups and horse blankets. Firearms, bladed weapons, and saddles were also imported from Western Europe. All this equipment was very expensive: for example, the complete armament of a 16th century cavalryman cost him, as contemporaries report, 4 rubles 50 kopecks, plus a helmet worth one ruble and a saber costing from 3 to 4 rubles. For comparison, in 1557 - 1558 a small village cost only 12 rubles. In 1569–1570, when a terrible famine struck Russia, the cost of 5–6 poods of rye reached the incredible price of one ruble.

The term “pishchal” in the Russian army of Ivan the Terrible was more or less common for both infantry and cavalry, and also called pishchal artillery pieces. There were squeaks - large caliber, used for shooting from behind walls; and curtained squeaks, which had a leather belt so that they could be worn behind the back. Pishkas were, in fact, the common weapon of townspeople and lower class people, whom the nobles viewed as rabble. In 1546 in Kolomna, where there was a serious clash between people armed with pikes and the riders of the local cavalry, pikes showed high efficiency, so it is not surprising that the first Russian archers were armed with precisely these weapons. But even after the archers became “the sovereign’s people” and proved their usefulness in battle, the local cavalry rarely used firearms.

Horse composition

Despite these strange contradictions, it was this time that became the golden age of the Russian noble cavalry, and this would have been impossible without improved horse breeding. The most common breed of horse in the 16th century was the Nogai horse - small, coarse-haired steppe horses 58 inches high at the withers, whose virtues were endurance and low demands on food. Stallions of this breed usually cost 8 rubles, a filly 6 and a foal 3 rubles. At the other end of the scale were argamaks, including thoroughbred Arabian horses that could only be found in the stables of the king or boyars and cost between 50 and 200 rubles.

A typical 16th century saddle had the pommel angled forward and the pommel angled backward, as was typical of nomadic saddles, so that the rider could turn to effectively use his bow or sword. This indicates that the spear was not the main weapon of the Russian cavalry at that time, since then its riders would have had a different form of saddle. Moscow riders rode with bent legs, leaning on short stirrups. There was a fashion for horses, and having expensive ones was considered prestigious. Much, and not just saddles, was again borrowed from the East. For example, a whip - a heavy whip or arapnik - was named after the Nogais; it is still used by Russian Cossacks to this day.

Regarding the organization Russian army, then it was the same as in the 15th century. The troops were divided into large formations of the left and right wings, a vanguard and horse guard. Moreover, these were precisely field formations of cavalry and infantry, and not fixed regiments as in later times. On the march, the army was under the command of a senior commander, and commanders of lower ranks were at the head of each regiment. Military flags, including those of each governor, played an important role, as did military music. Russian troops used huge copper kettledrums carried by four horses, as well as Turkish tulumbas or small kettledrums attached to the rider's saddle, while others had trumpets and reed pipes.


Russian gunners.

16th century artillery

During the reign of Ivan IV, the role of the Moscow artillery, which was led by the Pushkarskaya Izba, greatly increased. In 1558, the English ambassador Fletcher wrote: “No sovereign Christian sovereign has so many cannons as he does, as evidenced by the large number of them in the Palace Armory in the Kremlin... all cast in bronze and very beautiful.” The dress of the artillerymen was varied, but in general it was similar to the caftans of the archers. However, in artillery the caftan was shorter and was called chuga. The first artillerymen also used traditional chain mail, helmets and bracers. Their winter clothing was traditionally Russian, folk - that is, a sheepskin coat and a hat.

During this period of time in Russia there were many talented cannon craftsmen, such as Stepan Petrov, Bogdan Pyatov, Pronya Fedorov and others. But Andrei Chokhov became the most famous of all: he cast his first arquebus in 1568, then a second and third in 1569, all of which were sent to strengthen the defense of Smolensk. Chokhov cast the first known large-caliber gun in 1575 and it was again sent to Smolensk. 12 of his cannons have survived to this day (he made more than 20 in total). Of these, seven are in the State Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg, three in the Moscow Kremlin, and two in Sweden, where they ended up as trophies during the Livonian War. All Chokhov's cannons had their own names, including "Fox" (1575), "Wolf" (1576), "Persian" (1586), "Lion" (1590), "Achilles" (1617). In 1586 he created a huge cannon, decorated with the figure of Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich on horseback, which became known as the "Tsar Cannon" and which now stands in the Moscow Kremlin. However, the common belief that 16th century Russia mainly cast large cannons is incorrect. A wide variety of guns of different calibers were cast and supplied to many fortresses on the eastern border of Russia. There, heavy battering squeaks were simply not needed!

Gunners or gunners received large salaries, both in cash and in bread and salt. On the other hand, their occupation was not considered a very noble cause, and moreover, it required significant experience with no guarantee of success. Streltsy often refused to serve as gunners, and this branch of the military profession became more hereditary in Russia than others. Russian artillerymen often showed great devotion to their duty. For example, in the battle for Wenden on October 21, 1578 during the Livonian War, they, being unable to remove their guns from the battlefield, fired at the enemy to the last, and then hanged themselves with ropes attached to the trunks.”

*Due to this information is a well-known fact, a number of questions arise to which the sources of that time do not provide answers. For example, where did these heads come from, since the guardsmen needed a lot of them? So you won’t have enough dogs if you chop off all their heads, and you have to go into the forest to hunt for wolves, and when then will you serve the king? In addition, in the summer the heads were supposed to deteriorate very quickly, and flies and the smell could not help but bother the rider. Or were they somehow processed, and, therefore, for the needs of the guardsmen there was a certain workshop for the mummification of dog and wolf heads?

Literature
Viacheslav Shpakovsky& David Nikolle. Armies of Ivan the Terrible/ Russian Troops 1505 – 1700. Osprey Publishing Ltd. Oxford, UK.2006. 48p.

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After the crowning of the kingdom, together with a narrow circle of trusted representatives (the “Chosen Rada”), he decided to carry out large-scale reforms, including in the military field. Old system princely squads have outlived their usefulness. A centralized state required a clearly organized army.

The main foreign policy problem of the young tsar was the threat from the Kazan kingdom. Localism in the army was a huge problem. Usually, during training camps and even during military operations, there were fierce disputes about who was “higher-born” than whom. This was clearly demonstrated during the first unsuccessful Kazan campaign (1547-1548). As a result, Ivan the Terrible introduced service “without seats,” which allowed truly talented, rather than well-born, commanders to be promoted to command positions.

First attempts to reform the army

On October 3, 1550, the so-called the chosen thousand of Ivan the Terrible, who turned into Main Headquarters and the basis of the royal guard. The selection was very careful. The thousand included “the boyar’s best servants.” Only past merits and “deeds of the fathers” were taken into account. All low-income “thousanders” were allocated land estates near Moscow.

In 1550, the first attempt was also made to create a regular army. This was expressed in the formation of a corps of three thousand “archer archers”, entirely supported by the treasury. The building was located in Vorobyovskaya Sloboda, near Moscow. It had a clear structure: 6 “articles” of 500 people each. Each “article” was divided into hundreds with their own commanders. This structure subsequently became the basis for the formation of the Russian army.

The basis of the army became the landowners' equestrian militia (servicemen "in the homeland"). In addition, the state fully provided for service people “according to equipment” (shooters, artillerymen). An additional role was played by the “staff” (a set of townspeople and peasants).

"Code of Service" of Ivan the Terrible

The central point of the military reform was the “Code of Service” (1555), which radically changed the legislation in the field of local land ownership. It was established that for the normal service of “a man on horseback and in full armor” (“on a long journey about two horses”) it was necessary to have 100 “quarters of good land” (about 150 dessiatines), so any service person could demand a land grant the area is no less than this size. The first hundred quarters fully provided for the owner himself, from the subsequent ones he brought out his armed men. An important point was the equation of estates with estates. Thus, the patrimonial owners became the same service people as the landowners.

A landowner became a servant at the age of 15 (“novik”). He was obliged to serve as long as his health permitted or until the king appointed him to a diplomatic or administrative position. Failure to show up for conscription was severely punished: the landowner was beaten with a whip and all land holdings were taken away.

Closely connected with this reform is the introduction of a national tax - “fed farming”. These funds went to the state treasury and were given to those landowners who brought people beyond the norm, as well as to those whose holdings were less than the established norm. Some service people received such “help” annually, the rest - once every three or four years. Those who brought out fewer people than they actually could were subject to fines or even corporal punishment.