Lidl Hart strategy of indirect actions. The strategy of indirect action in a new form. Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry Strategy of Indirect Action

After the First World War, the eminent English historian Liddell Hart reflected on the reasons for such high loss of life and developed the principles underlying good strategy. They seem so universal and undeniable that they can be called axioms. These eight principles provide practical guidance in any situation where conflicting interests may lead to conflict. Hart calls six principles positive and two negative.

The books of B. Liddell Hart have an amazing fate. Unexpectedly for the author, the military-analytical essay “The Second World War” turned into the official British version of the history of the Second World War. And the book “The Strategy of Indirect Actions,” like Sun Tzu’s treatise, has become a real encyclopedia on strategy and a reference book for many great leaders.

After the publication of the book “The Strategy of Indirect Action,” Harte began to be called the “Sun Tzu of the 20th century,” so much in common in their views on strategy. The term "indirect action" has become firmly established in the vocabulary of those who study strategic thinking and use the acquired skills in their work and Everyday life. Liddell Hart's book has become a classic instruction in the ability to think and act strategically, on par with such great works as Sun Tzu's The Art of Strategy, Niccollo Machiavelli's The Prince and Carl von Clausewitz's On War. You can read all these books in the Library “Main Thought. Books in summary".

Liddell Hart identified 6 positive and 2 negative principles.

Positive principles

Principle No. 1.“Choose a goal according to your means”

Recommendations: When determining a goal, you should be guided by common sense and sober calculation. There is no point in “biting off more than you can chew.” Learn to face the facts without losing faith in your abilities. Confidence is like electric current in the battery. Don't let it become a waste of energy. Remember that your confidence will be useless if the elements of your battery - the people on whom you depend - are morally depressed.

Principle No. 2.“Never forget your goal when adapting your plan to a changed environment.”

Recommendations: You can achieve your goal in different ways, but make sure that capturing each intermediate object brings you closer to your intended goal. When choosing objects, evaluate the possibility of capturing them and the extent to which this will affect the achievement of the main goal. It’s bad to deviate to the side, but it’s even worse to find yourself in a hopeless situation.

Principle No. 3.“Choose for your actions the direction from which the enemy least expects a blow.”

Principle No. 4."Follow the line of least resistance"

Principle No. 5.“Choose a direction in which a simultaneous threat to several objects can be created”

Explanations: Thus, you will put the enemy in a dilemma and, taking advantage of this, you will be able to capture at least one less protected object, and maybe other objects. If you mark only one object, in this case the enemy will not be helplessly weak, and you will certainly fail, since the enemy will know the direction of your blow.

Principle No. 6.“Ensure that your plan is flexible to accommodate possible changes in the environment.”

Negative principles

Principle No. 1.“Do not strike with all your might while the enemy is on the alert.”

Recommendations: History teaches that unless the enemy is too weak, it is impossible to strike him effectively until his strength of resistance or ability to evade the blow is paralyzed. Therefore, no commander should strike an enemy entrenched in a position until he is sure that the enemy is paralyzed.

Principle No. 2.“Do not resume an offensive in the same direction after it has been defeated.”

Recommendations: Simply reinforcing troops is not a sufficient basis for resuming the offensive, since the enemy will also be able to strengthen his troops during a period of calm. In addition, it is likely that the enemy's successful repulsion of your previous offensive will strengthen him morally.

Indirect Method

A direct attack exhausts the attacker and tightens the defense of the defender, while an indirect approach weakens the defender, throwing him off balance, says Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart created his strategy, called the “method of indirect action,” by studying the methods and victories of the great strategists of the past (especially Sun Tzu and Napoleon). He believed that indirect action was a common element in their strategy.

What rules underlie this strategy and how to apply it in practice, you can read in just 15 minutes in the book “Indirect Action Strategy” by Liddell Hart, which is presented in

War is the path of deception. Therefore, even if you can do something, show your opponent that you cannot; if you use something, show him that you don’t use it; even if you are close, show that you are far away; even if you are far away, show that you are close; lure him with benefits; upset him and take him; if he has plenty of everything, be ready; if it is strong, avoid it; by arousing anger in him, bring him into a state of frustration; Having assumed a humble appearance, arouse conceit in him; if his strength is fresh, tire him out; if he is friendly, separate him; attack him when he is not ready; perform when he doesn't expect it.

It has never happened before that a war lasted for a long time and it would be beneficial to the state... Therefore, anyone who does not fully understand all the harm from a war cannot fully understand all the benefits from a war.

The best of the best is to conquer the desired army without fighting... Therefore, the most best war– defeat the enemy’s plans; in the next place - to break his alliances; in the next place - to defeat his troops. The worst thing is to besiege a fortress.

In general, in battle, one engages the enemy in the right way, but wins by maneuver... Having set out where he will certainly go, oneself go to where he does not expect.

When they move forward and the enemy is unable to prevent it, this means that they are striking into his emptiness; when they retreat and the enemy is unable to pursue, this means that the speed is such that he cannot overtake.

All people know the form through which I won, but they do not know the form through which I organized the victory.

The form of the army is like water; shape near the water - avoid heights and strive downwards; the form of an army is to avoid fullness and strike at emptiness... Water sets its flow depending on the place; the army determines its victory depending on the enemy.

The difficult thing in fighting a war is to turn a roundabout path into a direct one, to turn a disaster into a benefit. Therefore, the one who, taking a movement along such a roundabout route, distracts the enemy with advantage and, having set out later than him, arrives before him, understands the tactics of the roundabout movement... He who knows in advance the tactics of the direct and roundabout route wins. This is the law of struggle in war.

Do not go against the enemy’s banners when they are in perfect order; not attacking the enemy’s camp when it is impregnable - this is change management.

If you surround an enemy army, leave one side open; if it's in a bind, don't press it.

In war, the most important thing is speed: one must master what he did not have time to achieve; to follow a path that he does not even think about; attack where he is not careful.

Sun Tzu. Treatise on the Art of War

The most complete and successful victory is to force the enemy to abandon his goal without harm to himself.

Belisarius

...by a crooked path we find the right path.

Shakespeare.
Hamlet, Act II, Scene 1

...the art of war consists of conducting a well-founded and thoughtful defense, followed by a quick and decisive offensive.

Napoleon

Reason is at the heart of warfare.

Clausewitz

A smart military leader will in many cases be able to take such defensive positions that the enemy will be forced to attack.

Moltke

These soldiers are brave guys: they always climb where the wall is thickest.

Admiral de Robeck(Statement at the Gallipoli landings on April 25, 1915)

B.H. Liddell Hart

STRATEGY: THE INDIRECT APPROACH

Homo Strategicus, or The Works and Days of Captain Liddell Hart

I said a lot
Yes, you don’t remember much;
your friend has become your enemy,
I see, friend,
lying on the ground
your sword, and it’s all covered in blood.
Elder Edda. Grimnir's speeches 1
Translation by V. Tikhomirov.

“Strategists are not born, they become strategists...”

The written tradition has preserved for humanity a certain - by definition small - number of works that, with careful study of them, make it possible, if not to become a strategist (this still requires innate talent), but to master the methodology and acquire the skills of strategic thinking. Of course, the term “strategic thinking” should be understood as broadly as possible, not at all limited to the field of military art - or politics, the continuation of which, according to the famous statement of K. von Clausewitz, is war. If we accept such an “all-encompassing” interpretation and take a mental look at all the variety of books written over three and a half thousand years of the existence of writing, it turns out that there are no more than a dozen “textbooks” of strategic thinking, with the majority created in the East (treatises “Sun Tzu” and “Wu Tzu”, stratagems, Book of Changes, etc.).

It should be noted here that it is precisely the Eastern mentality – to a much greater extent than the Western one – that is characterized by stratagem thinking, which, according to ancient Chinese teaching, is the art of psychological confrontation. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the classical Chinese canon of military-strategic works (“Wu-ching”) became known in Europe, the thoughts contained in it turned out to be in demand and are still used to this day both in everyday life and in the professional sphere - in politics, diplomacy, business and even in intelligence operations: as former CIA Director A. Dulles said, the authors of ancient Chinese treatises were the first to draw up recommendations for organizing intelligence activities, including counterintelligence methods, outlined the theory and described the practice of psychological warfare and the ability to manipulate the enemy, were the first to formulate a coherent concept of operations to mislead the enemy and ensure one’s own security.

The European tradition has given the world only two - two and a half, if you count Clausewitz's unfinished book - works that are recognized as classic instructions on the ability to think strategically and act accordingly; the first is the ageless “The Prince” by the great Florentine Niccolo Machiavelli, a reference book for politicians, diplomats, businessmen and all kinds of “management gurus”, and the second is “The Strategy of Indirect Action” by the outstanding English military historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart.

Perhaps, here we need to dwell on the biography of this man in order to understand why the theory he formulated had and continues to have such a noticeable influence on minds. The most important event in life for Liddell Hart himself and many, many representatives of his generation was the First World War, a tremendous upheaval in the foundations of a world that had hitherto seemed unshakable. After this war, nothing could remain the same as before; the time had come to rethink previous values - in particular, if we talk about the art of war, the values of analytical strategy, which resulted in colossal human losses at the fronts. (By the way, due to the inertia inherent in human thinking, in order for the analytical strategy to finally prove its inconsistency in new conditions, it took another world war, after which all doubts about the unacceptability of previous approaches disappeared.) The result of the rethinking for Liddell Hart was the book “ Strategy of Indirect Action", published in 1941.

It is curious that “Captain Liddell Hart,” as he usually signed his articles before being knighted in 1966, was suspected, if not of espionage for Nazi Germany, then of sympathizing with the Nazis and of involvement in the development of the Blitzkrieg plan - for the reason that that many of the provisions of this plan seemed to be copied from the articles and studies of Liddell Hart. Winston Churchill even demanded the arrest of the war columnist for The Times newspaper, but the MI5 secret service limited itself to establishing surveillance of Liddell Hart, listening to his telephone calls and censoring his correspondence. When the military archives of MI5 were opened over time in 2006, it turned out that Liddell Hart, three months before the Allied landings in Normandy, discussed - among decision makers - and criticized the General Staff plans for D-Day.

But let’s return to the “Strategy of Indirect Actions”. Based on the richest military experience of mankind - after all, in combat operations the presence of strategic thinking and its practical implementation is most obvious - Liddell Hart compiled a real encyclopedia of strategy and tactics, which the author himself characterized as “a set of indirect actions.” Liddell Hart wrote: “On deeper study I began to understand that the method of indirect action has much greater application, that it is a law of life in all areas, a philosophical truth. It turned out that its application serves as the key to a practical solution to any problem in which a person is the decisive factor, when conflicting interests can lead to conflict. In all such cases the direct onslaught of new ideas produces stubborn resistance, thus increasing the difficulty of changing views. A change of opinion is achieved more easily and quickly by the imperceptible penetration of a new idea or through an argument in which the instinctive resistance of the opponent is overcome in a roundabout way.” After the publication of Liddell Hart's book, the term "indirect action" became firmly established in the vocabulary of everyone who studies strategic thinking and uses the acquired skills in work and everyday life - from the military and politicians to methodologists, psychologists and marketing specialists.

At the same time, the very term “indirect actions” is often interpreted very broadly and often subsumes strategy as such under this definition, as if completely excluding from consideration a frontal strike (in the most general sense) as one of the methods of implementing strategy in practice. Such an approach can hardly be called correct, since indirect actions are still part of the strategy, and not the strategy as a whole, and despite the importance of indirect actions in any respect, strategy and tactics as a whole cannot be reduced to them. By the way, an illustrative example: if we turn to modern military experience (and the theory of indirect actions is directly related primarily to it), there is a clear distinction between the spheres of “direct” strategy, operating with traditional staff concepts dating back to the times of antiquity, and “indirect” strategy. , better known today as methods information war. The same can be observed in business, where practical, production activities and “indirect” information activities coexist, do not replace, but complement each other, stimulating the former and designed to undermine the positions of competitors. And success, not short-term, intermediate, but, if you like, global, both in military operations and in business and political ones, is possible only with a combination of those and other actions.

Like The Prince, written four centuries earlier, The Strategy of Indirect Action is undoubtedly destined to long life. To some, perhaps, a comparison of Machiavelli’s treatise and the work of an “ordinary” military historian will seem unjustified, but, firstly, Sir Basil Liddell Hart is far from an ordinary military historian (for example, his “The Second World War” is considered one of the most authoritative books on the history of this period), and secondly, due to the difference in age, “The Sovereign” is simply more widely known and has managed to, as they say, recommend itself to the public. “Strategy...” is not so well known yet, but is in no way inferior to its predecessor.

Read it and see for yourself!

A. Laktionov

Author's preface to the 1954 edition

The hydrogen bomb does not provide the Western peoples with the fulfillment of their dream of a complete and final guarantee of their security. The hydrogen bomb is not a panacea for the dangers looming over them. It increased their striking power, but at the same time increased their anxiety and deepened their sense of uncertainty.

To responsible Western statesmen, the atomic bomb in 1945 seemed an easy and simple means of achieving quick and final victory and ensuring world peace. They thought, says Winston Churchill, that “bringing the war to an end, bringing about world peace, laying a healing hand on the suffering nations of the world by demonstrating overwhelming power with a few atomic explosions was, after all our troubles and misadventures, a miracle of deliverance.” However, the alarming state of the peoples of the free world at present is an indication that responsible leaders have not fully comprehended the problem of ensuring peace through such a victory.

They did not seek to go beyond their immediate strategic goal of “winning the war” and were satisfied, contrary to historical experience, with the assumption that military victory would lead to peace. The result was the latest of many lessons showing that purely military strategy must be guided by a more far-sighted and broader grand strategy.

In the conditions of World War II, the pursuit of triumph inevitably had to lead to tragedy and the realization of the futility of efforts. The complete military defeat of Germany inevitably had to clear the way for the dominance of Soviet Russia on the Eurasian continent and lead to a huge spread of communist influence in all countries. It is equally natural that the remarkable demonstration of atomic weapons, soon after the use of which the war ended, should have caused the development of similar weapons in Russia.

No world has ever brought so little security to peoples. And after eight very turbulent years, the creation of thermonuclear weapons further increased the feeling of insecurity among the “victor” peoples. But this was not the only consequence of the war.

The hydrogen bomb, even in the stage of still experimental explosions, more than any other weapon, clearly showed that “total war” as a method and “victory” as a goal of war are outdated concepts.

Would any responsible government dare to use the hydrogen bomb in response to indirect aggression or any other aggression of a limited nature? What responsible government would be the first to take such a step, which the leaders of the military- air force called "suicide"? Thus, it can be assumed that the hydrogen bomb will not be used in the event of any threat that does not entail more disastrous consequences than the bomb itself.

The faith of government officials in atomic weapons as a deterrent to aggression appears to be based on an illusion. It is likely that the threat to use these weapons may be taken less seriously in the Kremlin than in countries located on this side of the Iron Curtain, whose peoples are dangerously close to Russia and its strategic bomber aircraft. The threat to use atomic weapons to protect these peoples can only weaken their resolve to resist. The negative impact of such a threat has already caused great harm.

The hydrogen bomb is more of an obstacle than an aid to the policy of “containment.” It reduces the likelihood of general war, but at the same time increases the possibility of a “limited war” arising through indirect and widespread local aggression. The aggressor may use various methods, but in such a way as to achieve his goal and at the same time cause hesitation in the enemy regarding the use of hydrogen or atomic bombs as a countermeasure.

We are now becoming more and more dependent on "conventional weapons" to "contain" the threat. However, this conclusion does not mean that we should only use old weapons. On the contrary, it should give impetus to the development of new species.

We have entered a new era of strategy, very different from the strategy pursued by the proponents of nuclear aviation, who were the “revolutionaries” of the previous era. The strategy that our adversaries are currently developing has two goals: first to evade attacks from superior air forces, and then to paralyze them with retaliatory strikes. Ironically, the more we recognize the need for massive bomber strikes, the more we help perfect this new guerrilla-style strategy.

Our own strategy must be based on a clear understanding of this concept, and our military policy needs appropriate restructuring. Based on the enemy's strategy, we can effectively develop an appropriate counter-strategy. Here it can be noted in passing that the destruction of cities with hydrogen bombs would lead to the destruction of our potential ally - the “fifth column”.

The widespread belief that atomic weapons have abolished strategy is unfounded and misleading. By taking destructiveness to the extreme of “suicide,” atomic weapons stimulate and accelerate a return to the use of indirect action, which is the essence of strategy, since in this case war is fought intelligently as opposed to the brute use of force. Signs of such a return to the use of indirect action had already emerged during the Second World War, in which strategy played a more significant role than in the First World War, although there was no grand strategy. At present, atomic weapons, which do not allow direct action, tend to encourage aggressors to develop a more flexible strategy. Thus, it becomes increasingly clear that we must counter this with a corresponding development of our strategic art. The history of strategy is essentially the chronicle of the application and development of the method of indirect action.

My first work on the "strategy of indirect action" was published in 1929 under the title "Decisive Wars of the Past." This book is the result of further twenty-five years of research and synthesis, taking into account the experience of the Second World War in the field of strategy and grand strategy.

As I studied so many military campaigns and first realized the superiority of indirect over direct action, I simply wanted to more fully explore the essence of strategy. However, upon deeper study, I began to understand that the method of indirect action had much greater application, that it is a law of life in all areas, a philosophical truth. It turned out that its application serves as the key to a practical solution to any problem in which a person is the decisive factor, when conflicting interests can lead to conflict. In all such cases the direct onslaught of new ideas produces stubborn resistance, thus increasing the difficulty of changing views. A change of opinion is achieved more easily and quickly by the imperceptible penetration of a new idea or through an argument in which the instinctive resistance of the opponent is overcome in a roundabout way. The method of indirect action is as fundamental a principle in the field of politics as it is in the relationship between a man and a woman. Success in trading will be greater if there is an opportunity to bargain than when there is no such opportunity. And in any other field, it is well known that the surest way to achieve approval of a new idea by your boss is to be able to convince him that he himself is the creator of this idea. As in war, the goal is to weaken resistance before attempting to overcome it, and this is best achieved by luring the other side out of its defensive positions.

The idea of indirect action is closely connected with all problems of the influence of one mind on another - this is the most important factor in human history. However, this idea is difficult to reconcile with the other principle that true conclusions can be reached or approached only by following the path of truth, without regard to where it may lead and what effect the truth may have on the various parties concerned.

History bears witness to what important role"prophets" played a role in the progress of mankind, which proves how practically useful it is to speak the truth as you imagine it with complete frankness. However, it is also clear that the further fate of their revelations always depended on another category of people - on the “leaders” who had to be strategists in the field of philosophy, seeking a compromise between the truth and the ability of people to perceive it. Their success often depended on the extent to which they themselves grasped the truth, as well as on the practical wisdom they displayed in proclaiming it.

Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry

Indirect Action Strategy

Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry

Indirect Action Strategy

Publisher's abstract: The book examines the issues of the so-called strategy of indirect action. For example most important wars from ancient times to the twentieth century. inclusive, the author proves that indirect actions are the most effective way waging war. In a special section, the author outlines the theory and essence of strategy. The published book is intended for a wide range of readers, mainly officers and generals of the Soviet armed forces.

Content

Part 1. Strategy of the period: V century. BC - XX century. ad

Chapter I. History as practical experience

Chapter II. Greek wars- Epaminondas, Philip and Alexander the Great

Chapter III. Roman Wars - Hannibal, Scipio and Julius Caesar

Chapter IV. Byzantine Wars - Belisarius and Narses

Chapter V. Wars of the Middle Ages

Chapter VI. XVII century - Gustav II Adolf, Cromwell, Turenne

Chapter VII. XVIII century - Marlborough and Frederick II

Chapter VIII. French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte

Chapter IX. 1854-1914

Chapter X. Conclusions from the experience of the past twenty-five centuries

Part 2. Strategy of the First World War

Chapter XI. Plans and their implementation in the Western Theater of Operations in 1914

Chapter XII. Northeastern Theater of Operations

Chapter XIII. Southeastern or Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Chapter XIV. 1918 Strategy

Part 3. Strategy of the Second World War

Chapter XV. Hitler's strategy

Chapter XVI. Hitler's successes at the beginning of World War II

Chapter XVII. The beginning of the fall of Hitler

Chapter XVIII. Fall of Hitler

Part 4. Basics of military strategy and grand strategy

Chapter XIX. Strategy theory

Chapter XX. The essence of strategy and tactics

Chapter XXI. State purpose and purpose of military action

Chapter XXII. Grand strategy

Notes

From the publisher

B. Liddell-Hart's book, the third in the "Biographies of Famous Battles" series, stands out in the sea of military theoretical treatises and memoirs for its encyclopedic nature.

"The Strategy of Indirect Action" is the last chapter of the unwritten textbook of European military science, the result of four thousand years of development of the art of war. This brief introduction into metastrategy, a discipline that studies “operators over strategies” - those general philosophical principles that give rise to the laws of the dynamics of antagonistic conflicts.

Already in the first, in 1946, edition of his work, B. Liddell-Hart provided an appendix in which a letter from Major General E. Dorman-Smith to the author was published, dedicated to some aspects of the North African campaign of 1940-1942. Later, the English historian added to his text an article by the chief of the Israeli General Staff Yadin, concerning the 1948 war in Palestine.

Both of these documents, reproduced in the Soviet publication "Strategies of Indirect Action", are included in this publication. If the work of Y. Yadin, even after fifty years from the moment of its writing, does not raise any complaints, then the work of E. Dorman-Smith required a detailed critical analysis.

As always, the editorial team strives to comment and expand on the author's intent.

Appendix 1, in addition to the letter from E. Dorman-Smith, who served as the preface to the first edition of The Strategy of Indirect Action, includes three articles, completely different in form, but united by a common theme: “Decisive Wars of the Past.” This is, firstly, an essay “The structure and chronology of military conflicts of past eras”, addressed to those who, reading B. Liddell-Hart, cannot, following the author, quickly reproduce in memory all the necessary details of the hundreds of battles mentioned by the English historian, movements of troops or political maneuvers. This essay also includes critical comments on those provisions of the doctrine of B. Liddell-Hart, which now, in the 90s, seem, if not erroneous, then at least not obvious.

The following is an analytical review " World War and the crisis of European military art", adjacent to the series of articles under the general title "The Fall of Ginerion". This review, like the entire cycle opened by the essay "The World Crisis of 1914" (in the book by B. Takman "August Guns"), is devoted to periodization the history of the first half of the 20th century and those paradoxes in the development of our civilization that led to the structural crisis of Europe and caused a gradual shift in priorities from the art of warfare to the science of exterminating people.

Finally, the commentary "Military Force Structure and Its Dynamics" provides factual information for research readers. Here you will find a short reference material, dedicated to the evolution of the structure of European armies.

Appendix 2 is devoted to the topic “Indirect actions in regional conflicts of the second half of the 20th century.” In addition to the already mentioned work by Y. Yadin, it contains an analytical article-classification “Arab-Israeli Wars”.

Appendix 3, entitled “The Teachings of B. Liddell-Hart,” consists of four short articles. Three of them - “Indirect actions in classical Chinese strategy”, “Ethics of war and indirect actions”, “Technical progress as a form of indirect actions” - are directly related to the main axes of the inclusion of military theory in everyday life: history - ethics - technology. The fourth commentary is dedicated to the fleet - a sign of expansion, a symbol of progress and, until recently, a sign of the coherence of the economy. This is an experimental article-reasoning about the applicability of the Liddell-Hart method to global world economic processes.

Despite the significant volume of applications, many important issues had to be ignored. Thus, we do not touch upon the topic of the third world war (information or cold), which will be the subject of one of the next books in the series.

We did not clutter the book with additional maps of countless battles. Actually, the editorial team does not see the need for those maps that had to be reproduced from the previous edition, so as not to violate copyright laws.

Maps are necessary when studying strategy, because strategy generally relies on geography as its basis. But metastrategy, the science of the birth and destruction of private strategies, is abstract and relies on philosophy and mathematics. So the best illustration for B. Liddell-Hart would probably be White list, where the researcher will put the level of understanding of the theory at which he is currently located.

The editorial team wishes you to enjoy reading this unique strategy textbook and perhaps expand your knowledge on this topic by reading the proposed Bibliography, detailed Biographical Index and Appendices to the text.

To responsible Western statesmen, the atomic bomb in 1945 seemed an easy and simple means of achieving quick and final victory and ensuring world peace. They thought, says Winston Churchill, that “bringing the war to an end, bringing about world peace, laying the healing hand upon the suffering nations of the world by demonstrating overwhelming power with a few atomic explosions was, after all our troubles and misadventures, a miracle of deliverance.” However, the alarming state of the peoples of the free world at present is an indication that responsible leaders have not fully comprehended the problem of ensuring peace through such a victory.

In the conditions of the Second World War, the pursuit of triumph inevitably had to lead to tragedy and the realization of the futility of efforts. The complete military defeat of Germany inevitably had to clear the way for the dominance of Soviet Russia on the Eurasian continent and lead to a huge spread of communist influence in all countries. It is equally natural that the remarkable demonstration of atomic weapons, soon after the use of which the war ended, should have caused the development of similar weapons in Russia.

MILITARY THOUGHT 09/2006, pp. 2-10

The strategy of indirect action in a new form

Retired Major General I.N. VOROBYOV,

Colonel V.A. KISELEV,

Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor

THE IDEA of conducting military operations through indirect physical destruction (defeat) of the enemy, in a roundabout way, appeared at the dawn of the emergence of the art of war. Sun Tzu expressed the essence of such “indirect actions” quite clearly in his “Treatise on the Art of War.” “War is a path of deception,” he wrote. “The best of the best is to conquer someone else’s army without fighting.”

In his classic work “The Strategy of Indirect Action,” the English historian and military theorist B. Liddell Hart traced how such a strategy was used from ancient times over four millennia: in the Greek wars by Epaminondas, Philip and Alexander the Great; in the Roman wars - by Hannibal, Scipio and Julius Caesar; in the Byzantine wars - Belisarius and Narses; in the wars of the Middle Ages: in the 17th century. - Gustav II Adolf, Cromwell, Turenne, in the 18th century. - Marlborough and Frederick II, in the XVII - early XIX V. - Napoleon Bonaparte, as well as during the First and Second World Wars.

“The history of strategy,” notes Liddell Hart, “is essentially the record of the application and development of the method of indirect action.” This conclusion is confirmed by Hart's predecessors in revealing the art of commanders who used the strategy of indirect actions (IDA) in their activities. Such a predecessor, in particular, was the Roman historian Frontinus in ancient times. In his work “Strategems”, he reviewed all types of military tricks used in the past and known to him from historical works. Frontin grouped all these military tricks by elements of combat, as well as by individual types of military operations (defense of fortresses, their siege, etc.).

To a certain extent, elements of the SND were also reflected in the work of the ancient Roman historian Onisander, “Instructions for Military Leaders,” where he recommended masking the true goals of the war. In this work, for the first time, recommendations were found for developing a hidden war plan.

A study of the methods of misleading and deceiving the enemy by various commanders in wars was carried out quite fully in the famous work of Vegetius “ Summary Fundamentals of Military Affairs", in which, for the first time in the history of the development of military thought, an attempt was made to give a systematic presentation of all branches of military affairs, in-depth for that time Ancient Rome and instructions were given to military leaders on how to skillfully conduct battle.

The military theoretical work of the Byzantine historian Pseudo-Mauritius “Strategikon” deserves special attention. In this work, the subject of consideration was the organization, armament and training of troops, the construction of marching and battle formations, combat support. Exploring the nature of armed struggle among different peoples, the author highlights the art of suppressing the enemy’s will to resist, issues of achieving surprise, seizing the initiative, maneuver during the period of preparation and during pursuit.

During the Middle Ages, an important role in the development of military strategy and tactics, and in particular the SND, was played by the treatise “On the Art of War” by the Florentine politician and historian Nicolo Machiavelli. Outlining general rules, used in military affairs, he wrote: “The best plan is the one that is hidden from the enemy,” “Any surprise stuns the army,” “The desire to fragment the enemy forces is perhaps the most important task of the commander.”

The great master of the strategies of “direct” and “indirect” actions was Napoleon. “It is very advantageous,” he noted, “to suddenly rush at an enemy who has made a mistake, unexpectedly attack him and burst into thunder over him before he sees the lightning.”

Henri Jomini and Carl Clausewitz made a significant contribution to the development of the theory of indirect action strategy. Jomini wrote: “Maneuver so that the main forces act only against parts of the enemy army.” Let us note that maneuver by troops was at that time the main expression in practice of “indirect” actions that were unexpected for the enemy.

Clausewitz considered surprise and speed to be among the most important principles of strategy. “Surprise,” he wrote, “plays a much greater role in strategy than in tactics: it is the most effective beginning of victory. Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick II, Napoleon owe the brightest rays of their glory to speed of action.”

The principles of Clausewitz's strategy were developed in the works of Moltke, Schlichting, Goltz, Schlieffen and other German military leaders and theorists of the time. Thus, Von der Goltz, developing forms and methods of using a mass army at the beginning of the 20th century, developed the idea of a total, all-encompassing war, and Hannibal’s Cannes was a constant example for Schlieffen - the desire to defeat the enemy with powerful enveloping flank groups. “Success,” he noted, “is not a narrow front, but a broad front that makes coverage possible.”

Peter I, P.A. skillfully applied the principles of “direct” and “indirect” actions in their military leadership. Rumyantsev, A.V. Suvorov, M.I. Kutuzov. A certain contribution to the development of the theory of such a strategy was made by Russian military researchers N. Medel, M.I. Bogdanovich, F.P. Goremykin, N.P. Mikhnevich, V.A. Cheremisov, A.A. Neznamov, A.P. Astafiev, GA. Leer, A.G. Elchaninov and others.

So, N.P. Mikhnevich in his work “Strategy” (1899) for the first time quite fully and clearly formulated principles of strategy, among which he included: the principle of superiority of forces; the principle of private victory; the principle of economy of forces (skillful grouping of forces depending on the importance of points); the principle of the relationship between moral and material forces; principle of chance; principle of surprise (suddenness of technology and actions, depending on secrecy and speed).

In the capital work of V.A. Cheremisov’s “Fundamentals of Modern Military Art” (1910) was developed strategy for action on internal and external operational lines . “The main condition for the success of actions along internal operational lines,” he wrote, “is speed of action. We must rush at one enemy army and defeat it before the other approaches.” Emphasizing the role of the initiative of “private bosses” in the execution of orders, Cheremisov noted that they are required to have reasonable initiative, “artistic creativity, and not handicraft skills.”

The works of A.A. had a significant influence on the development of strategic thought before the First World War. Neznamov, especially his work “Modern War” (1911), in which the author systematically and comprehensively expressed his views on the conduct of war. “In war they “fight” for weeks, “wait out” for months,” he wrote, “the whole war is thus presented in the form of separate leaps of one advancing forward and defending backward.” Analyzing an offensive operation, he identifies three forms of maneuver: seizing messages, breaking through, and enveloping the enemy’s flank. Of these, “the most frequent and natural for large masses,” he concluded, “will be an offensive operation involving one or another flank of the enemy.”

The essence of the SND was quite clearly expressed by the GA. Leer: “Strive to be strong in what the enemy is weak in - substitute strong point and avoid the weak.” He considered an important principle “unity in action as a high ideal in strategy and tactics - to conduct an operation and battle in the spirit of their internal integrity, unity of action.”

The wars of the machine age brought a lot of new things into the development of methods of military action. They acquired a colossal spatial scope, which resulted in process of globalization strategy, which was expressed in the spread of armed struggle to all continents, seas, oceans and airspace, in the creation of a unified system of command and control of the armed forces. “Indirect actions” found their manifestation in the development of methods of maneuverable actions by large forces (armies and fronts), increasing the role of surprise and the time factor in achieving success, the use of new forms of cutting and flanking attacks, the increasing role of mobile formations with high mobility and great striking power and formations capable of rapidly developing tactical success into operational success, increasing the depth of simultaneous fire impact on the enemy, conducting operations to pursue and defeat large groups.

Positional forms of combat, frontal strikes, protracted operations of attrition, which prevailed in the First World War, increasingly gave way in the Second World War to decisive forms of operational maneuver: a rapid envelopment, a double enveloping strike with the simultaneous release of mobile strike groups deep into the enemy’s rear in order to encirclement and subsequent defeat in parts.

Even more clearly, indirect sudden enveloping actions began to prevail over frontal clashes in local wars and armed conflicts of the second half of the 20th - early 21st centuries. Operations such as Resolute Force in Yugoslavia (1999), Desert Storm (1991) and Shock and Awe (2003) in Iraq can be considered milestones in terms of the development of the indirect action strategy. This strategy became dominant in wars.

There is reason to conclude: the development of military art at the present stage has reached a level where an ever deeper transformation of ideas about the methods of conducting operations, battles, and battles in their “classical” forms is necessary, observing the principle of dialectical continuity of combat experience accumulated in the past. Nevertheless, a decisive departure from the canons of strategy, operational art and tactics developed in the two world wars is necessary. The manifestation of new strategic, operational and tactical thinking among military personnel is an urgent imperative of the time.

In this regard, it is appropriate to quote the words of the outstanding Russian military theorist A.A. Svechin, who back in 1907, characterizing the routine thinking of some military men, wrote: “You cannot remain with the old patterns. If our concepts do not change in accordance with the progress of military affairs, if we stop at the freezing point, then, worshiping unchanging laws, we will gradually lose sight of the entire essence of phenomena. Deep ideas will turn into harmful prejudices: our symbols will lose their inner content; there will remain an outer empty shell, a lifeless idol.”

The era of modern technological wars requires a radical reassessment of values in the art of war. No matter how impressive the successes of the Soviet troops were in such operations of the Great Patriotic War as Stalingrad, Kursk, Korsun-Shevchenkovsk, Yassy-Kishinev, Belorussian, Vistula-Oder, they can only be an inexhaustible storehouse of military wisdom, the initial basis for daring advancement in developing a new strategy. The deep two-dimensional operation developed by Soviet military thought in the 30s of the last century, which was the standard of military art in the Second World War, is now becoming qualitatively different in content and form - multidimensional, volumetric. If in the past a military leader, assessing the situation, operated with two spatial dimensions - width and depth, then in modern conditions the horizon of his strategic vision should extend far beyond the boundaries of the demarcation lines of the defense (offensive) zones of the association, taking into account many new factors, including space.

The strategy of indirect action, which in the past played a sort of “secondary role”, since the dominant one was the “strategy of force”, which consisted in achieving the defeat of the enemy by creating a numerical superiority in forces and means, is now coming to the fore - becoming an indispensable condition for military leadership. You can have an army of many millions, a mountain of modern weapons and military equipment, and yet completely lose the battle. This is exactly what happened during the war in the Persian Gulf, where Iraq had a four-fold superiority over the coalition forces in divisions, an equal number of tanks (more than 5 thousand on both sides), a two-fold superiority in the number of guns, and yet was defeated . This was inevitable: the outdated, inflexible strategy of positional confrontation of the Iraqis could not withstand new forms and methods of warfare.

The strategy of indirect action in its new technological appearance is primarily characterized by a wide variety of used forms and methods of military action, including the conduct of information, remote (non-contact) confrontation, segmented, polycentric, electronic fire, land-sea, air-space strike, and in the near future, anti-satellite operations. It is precisely this asymmetric strategy that the United States is implementing today.

As the experience of local wars and analysis of military concepts show, the United States strives to achieve disarmament of the enemy without the use of weapons primarily through information superiority. Information, broadly understood as deceiving the enemy, achieving surprise, using military cunning, intimidating the enemy through a demonstration of force, has been used by military leaders in waging wars since ancient times. But the methods of using such techniques in battle were mainly “side” and often did not go beyond the tactical framework.

It's a different matter now. The means of information influence have now reached such a development that they are capable of solving strategic problems. In modern local armed conflicts, strategic information warfare plays a vital role in the disorganization of military and government controlled, air defense systems, in misleading the enemy.

The military command had at its disposal information-psychological weapon - a special weapon based on the use of destructive information-psychological and information-control effects on the human psyche to control his behavior and activities or to destroy him. These types of weapons include: mass media(MASS-MEDIA weapon), energy-information-psychological, psychotropic-information, bioenergy-information, information-energy, virtual information-psychological, somatropic-psycho-information, as well as computer telecommunication networks, etc.

The effectiveness of information influence in an operation is achieved by the fact that it is used, as a rule, in combination with other forces and means - fire, radio-electronic - and is accompanied by the massive deployment of previously unknown types of weapons and new tactical techniques. At the same time, techniques tested since ancient times are used in full force - deception of the enemy, military cunning, deception, etc. This method of information and psychological warfare was used, for example, in Operation Desert Storm. In addition to massive radio propaganda, dropping leaflets on combat positions of Iraqi troops, and carrying out measures to misinform the Iraqi command regarding the directions of strikes, a variety of ultra-modern types of weapons and ammunition were used on a massive scale, including high-speed, long-range systems of the new generation military-technical weapons: the Jisak-type missile launcher , ATASM missiles, Tomahawk SLCMs, AN-64 Apache helicopters, the latest electronic warfare aircraft EU-13ON, EF-III, EA-6B, Tornado, F-15, F-16, Jaguar aircraft, " Harrier" and other highly effective combat weapons. Disinformation in the press, psychological treatment and “relaxation” of the enemy, demonstrative concentration of forces on the wrong direction of strikes, careful operational camouflage - all this taken together played a role in achieving a bloodless victory. And, as it turned out, it was the informational and psychological impact on the personnel that played the decisive role in this. According to press reports, 80-85% of the soldiers were demoralized, lost their fighting capacity and surrendered, succumbing to massive propaganda, while as a result of 38 days of continuous air bombing, Iraqi combat losses amounted to only 30-35% of the total. In other words, psychological losses were two to two and a half times higher than combat losses.

Focusing on the strategy of indirect action, the US command does not discount the impact of force on the enemy. Fire, strike, maneuver, as always, constitute the main content of the operation. The fundamental document of US military development, the Common Vision 2020, places special emphasis on four priority areas of aircraft development:“dominant maneuver”, “precision combat”, “targeted logistics support” and “all-encompassing defense”.

It should be noted that the principle of maneuver is, as it were, raised to a degree - called “dominant”, which brings it to the fore. If we analyze the concept of reforming the armed forces carried out in the United States in recent decades, then the idea of increasing their maneuverability and strategic mobility is precisely the dominant one. The first major step in this direction was the creation of powerful rapid deployment forces (RDF) as an advanced super-mobile echelon. In the “transcontinental strategy” he is assigned a special role. The RRF includes selected elite formations with high air mobility, fire and strike power, and operational independence.

The RRF are the first to be sent to a crisis area (mainly to overseas territories) in order to seize a bridgehead, ensure the retention of the strategic initiative and the subsequent transfer of the main forces. By the end of the 20th century, the number of RRF in the United States amounted to 120 thousand people - this is 24% of the strength of the ground forces. By the way, a similar program to increase the mobility of units is being implemented in other NATO armies. For example, in Germany, RRFs make up 21% of the 235,000-strong contingent of ground forces, in France - 16%.

At the current stage, the United States is setting the task of radically transforming the appearance of the ground forces as a whole, first of all, increasing their maneuverability, ease of control, and the ability to transport by air and sea. As noted in the program document "Army Perspective - 2010", the ground forces must be able to more quickly respond to changes in the situation and achieve superiority over any enemy.

The specific plan for the reorganization of the Army is set out in the so-called “Transformation Road Map”, where it is planned, in order to give the Army greater flexibility and mobility, to build their organizational structure around the so-called “modular brigades” with a gradual abandonment of the divisional system. By 2007, it is planned to create 43 army brigades instead of the current 33. A similar reorganization is taking place in the National Guard, where divisions will be transformed into 34 brigades. By the end of 2008, it is planned to create transitional formations - six mechanized Stryker brigades, one of which will be part of the National Guard. Subsequently, after the adoption of a fundamentally new armored vehicle, developed on the basis of promising technologies, the US Army plans to begin forming formations of a qualitatively new type in 2010.

Thus, the principle of “dominant maneuver”, which forms the basis of the strategy of “indirect action”, acquires a new organizational and technological basis. Maneuver becomes not only dominant in armed struggle, but also all-encompassing, transcontinental, one of the main ways to achieve global superiority over the enemy and transfer strategic efforts from one theater of military operations to another.

Here we see a logical connection with the new concept of conducting fast-moving armed struggle, expressed by the formula “10-30-30”, in overseas territories, which is currently being developed by the Pentagon. The essence of this concept is to transport armed forces by air and sea to anywhere in the world in a very short period of time (10 days) and begin military operations. Over the next 30 days, American troops must defeat the enemy and deprive him of the opportunity to resume organized resistance in the foreseeable future. Within another 30 days, the troops must regroup and be ready to carry out a new combat mission and be transferred to another region of the planet.

Summing up some of the results discussed, we note that the concept of the strategy of indirect actions from one local war to another is increasingly enriched, the methods of deception and the use of military tricks are becoming more and more sophisticated. This is especially evident in the structure of the operation. If the stunning thing in the Gulf War (1991) was the conduct of a long (38-day) air-fire campaign without the participation of a ground group of troops, then in Operation Shock and Awe (2003) the ground phase of the operation began simultaneously with air strikes .

The main efforts were concentrated in different ways: in Operation Desert Storm - on the priority disabling of the air and missile defense system, and in the 2003 war - on the beheading of the military-political leadership of Iraq. In each operation, new elements of operational structure appeared: in Operation Desert Storm, in addition to the strike and fire echelons, a blocking and isolation echelon was created, in Operation Shock and Awe - a reconnaissance aviation group and a space support group.

Characteristic of both military campaigns was an increase in the depth of simultaneous and sequential fire (energy) destruction of the enemy and the coverage of the entire depth of the operational formation of his groupings by active combat operations; dominance of station (non-contact) actions over close combat; a variety of tactical techniques used (precision selective strikes of high-tech weapons, raid operations behind enemy lines by airmobile detachments and groups); increasing influence on the outcome of armed confrontation by special operations forces carrying out sabotage and terrorist actions behind enemy lines.

But the strategy of indirect action is not the priority of one side. The other side, if it is not committed to a passive defensive doctrine, can find ways to counter even a technically superior enemy, wrest the initiative from his hands, and impose his will on him. His maneuver can be neutralized by a more skillful counter-maneuver, a blow by a more decisive counter-blow, surprise by counter-surprise.

Since ancient times, military leaders have tried to find ways to psychologically (reflexively) control the enemy’s behavior, using such techniques of military cunning, as “lure and strike”, “seduction by imaginary benefit”, “demonstration of imaginary weakness” or “imaginary strength”, “intimidation by unacceptable damage”, causing distrust of true actions and forcing one to believe in false, demonstrative actions (“double deception”) and etc.

Historical analogies are not always appropriate. And yet one cannot help but give credit to the Russian and Soviet commanders: they found ways out of the most seemingly hopeless situations, could turn the tide of military events, and impose their will on a strong enemy. Thus, in the conditions of a stable positional front in the First World War, with an equal ratio of forces and means with the enemy, the commander of the Southwestern Front, General A.A. Brusilov in 1916 achieved a surprise strike using new forms of operational maneuver, thanks to which a breakthrough of fortified positions was successfully carried out through a simultaneous offensive on a wide front “with an assault on four sectors with a total length of 60-80 versts.” The depth of the front's advance was about 100 km.

Particularly high military leadership was required from Soviet military leaders during the Great Patriotic War in order to stop the wave of fascist aggression that had reached the banks of the Volga and achieve the defeat of the strongest enemy. The fascist German command’s reliance on “tank mobility” and “Schlieffen Cannes” brought strategic results to the Germans until the corresponding counter-strategy of active offensive actions was developed by the Soviet side. Reflective control of the enemy’s behavior was achieved by the Soviet command carrying out a set of measures interconnected in purpose, place and time, aimed at thwarting the enemy’s plans, through disinformation, camouflage and deception, false demonstrative actions, and keeping secret plans to carry out an operation to impose its will on the enemy.

Such art was not comprehended immediately. In the initial period of the war (1941-42), in order to mislead the enemy, the fronts usually delivered a large number of crushing blows (in the Battle of Smolensk: Western Front- four - six, Reserve - three-four, Bryansk - four-five strikes; in the counteroffensive near Moscow: Kalinin Front - three to five, the right wing of the Southwestern Front - three to four, Western Front - up to 10 strikes). However, this led to the opposite result - the scattering of forces and resources, and the enemy often managed to reveal the plan of the operation.

The situation changed after the release of a directive letter from the Supreme Command Headquarters on January 10, 1942. Number of beats per offensive operations fronts were reduced: in the summer and autumn of 1942 - to two or three, and in 1943 - to one or two strikes. For example, in the counteroffensive near Kursk, the Western, Central and Steppe fronts delivered one blow each, the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts - two blows each.

In the operations of 1944-1945, the fronts usually delivered one or two, and sometimes (1st Belorussian Front in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations) three strikes. When breaking through defenses in two or three directions, the form of operational breakthrough was frontal strikes followed by bilateral envelopment and bypass of a certain enemy group and the development of a strike by part of the forces or the main forces in depth (Bobruisk, Lvov-Sandomierz operations) or frontal strikes to the entire operational depth in for the purpose of fragmenting the opposing enemy group (1st Belorussian Front in the Vistula-Oder operation).

In strategic offensive operations carried out by a group of fronts, as a rule, a series of strikes were launched simultaneously (Stalingrad - seven, Belorussian - six, Vistula-Oder - four, Berlin - six). A series of strong blows made it difficult for the enemy not only to parry them with existing reserves, but also to determine the location and significance of each of them. The experience of the war showed that the destruction of the enemy’s defense front in a strategic direction was achieved in a zone of 450-700 km or more by delivering several powerful strikes, which captured from 15 to 30% of the active front of the armed struggle, which did not allow the enemy to maneuver. The defeat of a large enemy group in one of the strategic directions led to the mastery of his forces in others, which made it possible to successfully carry out a series of successive operations, thereby crushing a huge part and even the entire strategic front of the enemy’s defense.

Of course, the US armed forces have now reached such a level of development that they are capable of solving problems of global scope. And yet, their desire to dictate their will everywhere contains elements of strategic adventurism aimed at intimidating a potential enemy. The calculation is made by analogy with the conduct of two anti-Iraqi military campaigns, where the other side was technically weakened by prolonged isolation and blockade. But there are states in the world that have considerable military potential and the ability to mobilize their defense efforts in order to adequately confront a strong enemy, as has happened more than once in the past.

N.I. Conrad: Sun Tzu. Treatise on the art of war. M.-L., 1950. P. 5.

Garth B. Liddell: Indirect Strategy. M: TERRA FANTASTIKA. 1999.

Right there. P. 14.

Herald ancient history. 1946. № 1.

Right there. 1940. No. 1.

Mauritius. Strategikon. Bulletin of ancient history. 1941. No. 1.

Nicolo Machiavelli. About the art of war. M.: Military Publishing House. 1939. P.208-210.

Napoleon. Selected works. M.: Military Publishing House. 1956. P. 637.

Jomini. Essays on the art of war. M.: Military Publishing House. T.1. 1939. P. 90.

Clausewitz. About war. M.: Voenizdat, 1941. P. 390.

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Mikhnevich N.P. Strategy. St. Petersburg, 1911. Book. 1. pp. 47-50, 59-60, 63.

Cheremisov V.A. Fundamentals of modern military art. Kyiv., 1910. P. 21.

Right there. P. 21.

Neznamov A.A. Modern war. Actions of the field army. St. Petersburg, 1911. P. 12.

Right there. P. 22.

Leer G.A. Method of military sciences. St. Petersburg, 1894. S. 53, 54. Strategy. St. Petersburg, 1898. Part 1. P. 203, 204.

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Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry
Indirect Action Strategy

Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry

Indirect Action Strategy

Publisher's abstract: The book examines the issues of the so-called strategy of indirect action. Using the example of the most important wars from ancient times to the twentieth century. inclusive, the author proves that indirect action is the most effective way of waging war. In a special section, the author outlines the theory and essence of strategy. The published book is intended for a wide range of readers, mainly officers and generals of the Soviet armed forces.

Content

Part 1. Strategy of the period: V century. BC – XX century. ad

Chapter I. History as practical experience

Chapter II. Greek Wars – Epaminondas, Philip and Alexander the Great

Chapter III. Roman Wars – Hannibal, Scipio and Julius Caesar

Chapter IV. Byzantine Wars – Belisarius and Narses

Chapter V. Wars of the Middle Ages

Chapter VI. XVII century – Gustav II Adolf, Cromwell, Turenne

Chapter VII. XVIII century – Marlborough and Frederick II

Chapter VIII. French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte

Chapter IX. 1854-1914

Chapter X. Conclusions from the experience of the past twenty-five centuries

Part 2. Strategy of the First World War

Chapter XI. Plans and their implementation in the Western Theater of Operations in 1914

Chapter XII. Northeastern Theater of Operations

Chapter XIII. Southeastern or Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Chapter XIV. 1918 Strategy

Part 3. Strategy of the Second World War

Chapter XV. Hitler's strategy

Chapter XVI. Hitler's successes at the beginning of World War II

Chapter XVII. The beginning of the fall of Hitler

Chapter XVIII. Fall of Hitler

Part 4. Basics of military strategy and grand strategy

Chapter XIX. Strategy theory

Chapter XX. The essence of strategy and tactics

Chapter XXI. State purpose and purpose of military action

Chapter XXII. Grand strategy

Notes

From the publisher

B. Liddell-Hart's book, the third in the "Biographies of Famous Battles" series, stands out in the sea of military theoretical treatises and memoirs for its encyclopedic nature.

"The Strategy of Indirect Action" is the last chapter of the unwritten textbook of European military science, the result of four thousand years of development of the art of war. This is a brief introduction to metastrategy, a discipline that studies “operators on strategies” - those general philosophical principles that give rise to the laws of the dynamics of antagonistic conflicts.

Already in the first, in 1946, edition of his work, B. Liddell-Hart provided an appendix in which a letter from Major General E. Dorman-Smith to the author was published, dedicated to some aspects of the North African campaign of 1940-1942. Later, the English historian added to his text an article by the Chief of the Israeli General Staff, Ya. Yadin, concerning the 1948 war in Palestine.

As always, the editorial team strives to comment and expand on the author's intent.

What follows is an analytical review, “The World War and the Crisis of European Military Art,” adjacent to the series of articles under the general title “The Fall of Ginerion.” This review, like the entire cycle opened with the essay “The World Crisis of 1914.” (in the book “August Guns” by B. Takman), is devoted to the periodization of the history of the first half of the 20th century and those paradoxes in the development of our civilization that led to the structural crisis of Europe and caused a gradual shift in priorities from the art of warfare to the science of exterminating people.

Finally, the commentary "Military Force Structure and Its Dynamics" provides factual information for research readers. Here you will find a brief background on the evolution of European army structure.

Appendix 3, entitled “The Teachings of B. Liddell-Hart,” consists of four short articles. Three of them - “Indirect Actions in Classical Chinese Strategy”, “Ethics of War and Indirect Actions”, “Technical Progress as a Form of Indirect Actions” - are directly related to the main axes of incorporating military theory into everyday life: history - ethics - technology. The fourth commentary is dedicated to the fleet - a sign of expansion, a symbol of progress and, until recently, a sign of the coherence of the economy. This is an experimental article-reasoning about the applicability of the Liddell-Hart method to global world economic processes.

Maps are necessary when studying strategy, because strategy generally relies on geography as its basis. But metastrategy, the science of the birth and destruction of private strategies, is abstract and relies on philosophy and mathematics. So the best illustration of B. Liddell-Hart, perhaps, would be a blank sheet of paper on which the researcher would write down the level of understanding of the theory at which he is currently located.

To responsible Western statesmen, the atomic bomb in 1945 seemed an easy and simple means of achieving quick and final victory and ensuring world peace. They thought, says Winston Churchill, that “bringing the war to an end, bringing about world peace, laying the healing hand upon the suffering nations of the world by demonstrating overwhelming power with a few atomic explosions was, after all our troubles and misadventures, a miracle of deliverance.” However, the alarming state of the peoples of the free world at present is an indication that responsible leaders have not fully comprehended the problem of ensuring peace through such a victory.

The hydrogen bomb, even in the stage of still experimental explosions, more than any other weapon, clearly showed that "total war" as a method and "victory" as a goal of war are outdated concepts.

Would any responsible government dare to use the hydrogen bomb in response to indirect aggression or any other aggression of a limited nature? What responsible government would be the first to take such a step, which the leaders of the air force themselves call "suicide"? Thus, it can be assumed that the hydrogen bomb will not be used in the event of any threat that does not entail more disastrous consequences than the bomb itself.

The hydrogen bomb is more of an obstacle than an aid to the policy of "containment." It reduces the likelihood of general war, but at the same time increases the possibility of a "limited war" arising through indirect and widespread local aggression. The aggressor may use various methods, but in such a way as to achieve his goal and at the same time cause hesitation in the enemy regarding the use of hydrogen or atomic bombs as a countermeasure.

Our own strategy must be based on a clear understanding of this concept, and our military policy needs to be restructured accordingly. Based on the enemy's strategy, we can effectively develop an appropriate counter-strategy. Here it can be noted in passing that the destruction of cities with hydrogen bombs would lead to the destruction of our potential ally - the “fifth column”.

The widespread belief that atomic weapons have abolished strategy is unfounded and misleading. By taking destructiveness to the extreme of "suicide," atomic weapons stimulate and accelerate a return to the use of indirect action, which is the essence of strategy, since in this case war is fought intelligently as opposed to the brute use of force. Signs of such a return to the use of indirect action had already emerged during the Second World War, in which strategy played a more significant role than in the First World War, although there was no grand strategy. At present, atomic weapons, which do not allow direct action, tend to encourage aggressors to develop a more flexible strategy. Thus, it becomes increasingly clear that we must counter this with a corresponding development of our strategic art. The history of strategy is essentially the chronicle of the application and development of the method of indirect action.

History bears witness to the important role "prophets" have played in the progress of mankind, which proves how practically useful it is to tell the truth as you know it with complete frankness. However, it is also clear that the further fate of their revelations always depended on another category of people - on the “leaders” who had to be strategists in the field of philosophy, seeking a compromise between the truth and the ability of people to perceive it. Their success often depended on the extent to which they themselves grasped the truth, as well as on the practical wisdom they displayed in proclaiming it.

Prophets are inevitably stoned, this is their fate, and this is the criterion of the extent to which they have fulfilled their purpose. But a leader who is stoned proves that he failed in his task due to lack of wisdom or because he confused his functions with those of a prophet. Only time can tell whether the results of this sacrifice will justify the obvious failure of the leader, a failure that does him credit as a man. At least he avoids the more common sin of leaders - sacrificing truth to expediency without any benefit to the cause. For anyone who is accustomed to suppressing truth for the sake of tact produces a monster from the depths of his mind.

Is there a practical way to combine the process of understanding the truth with the process of accepting it? A possible solution to this problem is suggested by certain strategic principles, which point out the importance of constantly keeping a definite goal in mind and applying the means to achieve it, judging by the circumstances. Opposition to the truth is inevitable, especially if the truth takes the form of some new idea, but the force of resistance can be reduced by paying attention not only to the goal, but also to the method of approach. Avoid a frontal attack on a long-fortified position; try to outflank it so that the more vulnerable side is exposed to the onslaught of truth. However, whenever choosing such a roundabout path, one must be careful not to deviate from the truth, for nothing can be more destructive to its affirmation than to slide into lies. The meaning of all this reasoning can become clearer if you look at your own experience. Looking closely at the stages through which various new ideas passed before they gained acceptance, we are convinced that this process was facilitated in cases where the ideas were able to be presented not as something completely new, but as a revival in a modernized form of time-honored but forgotten principles or practices. To do this, there was no need to resort to deception, it was only necessary to take the trouble to discover such a connection, for “there is nothing new under the sun.” For example, objections to mechanization became easier to overcome when it was proven that a mobile armored vehicle, i.e. The fast tank is essentially the successor to the knightly cavalry and is therefore a natural means of restoring the decisive role played by cavalry in past centuries.

B. H. Liddell-Hart

Liddell Hart, Sir Basil (Henry) - English military theorist and military historian.

At the outbreak of the First World War, 19-year-old Liddell-Hart left his studies at Cambridge and joined the army. Already in 1920, he published the textbook “Infantry Training,” which included several of his own developments. During the interwar period, Liddell-Hart actively put forward ideas for restructuring the British army through the primary development of aviation and tank forces, since it was these types of troops that most closely corresponded to his ideas about “indirect actions.”

In 1924, Liddell-Hart fell ill and became unfit for work. military service, and in 1927 he retired with the rank of captain. In 1925-1935 he is a war correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, and in 1935-1939. - "Time". In 1937-1938 Liddell-Hart becomes an adviser to the Minister of War and tries to carry out some of the reforms he had previously conceived. However, his efforts to mechanize the army and equip it with air defense systems met resistance from most senior officers.

In 1941-1945, Liddell-Hart again became a war correspondent, this time for the Daily Mail. After the war, he criticized the idea of using strategic nuclear weapons, believing that there could be no winning side in a nuclear conflict.

In 1966 he was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain.

Works of B. Liddell-Hart, translated into Russian:

1. Basics of infantry tactics. – M., 1923.

2. New ways modern armies. – M., L., 1930.

3. The truth about the war of 1914-1918. – M., 1935.

4. Colonel Lawrence. – M., 1939.

5. Revolution in war. – M., 1947..

6. Strategy of indirect actions. – M., 1957.

7. Intimidation or defense. – M., 1962.

8. Second World War. – M., 1976.

Besides:

9. Greater Than Napoleon: Scipio Africanus. – London, 1926; 1971.

10. Foch: The Man of Orleans. – London, 1931; 1980.

11. Reputations, Ten Years After. – London, 1928; 1968.

War is the path of deception. Therefore, even if you can do something, show your opponent that you cannot; if you use something, show him that you don’t use it; even if you are close, show that you are far away; even if you are far away, show that you are close; lure him with benefits; upset him and take him; if he has plenty of everything, be ready; if it is strong, avoid it; by arousing anger in him, bring him into a state of frustration; Having assumed a humble appearance, arouse conceit in him; if his strength is fresh, tire him out; if he is friendly, separate him; attack him when he is not ready; perform when he doesn't expect it. It has never happened before that a war lasted for a long time and it would be beneficial to the state... Therefore, anyone who does not fully understand all the harm from a war cannot fully understand all the benefits from a war. The best of the best is to conquer the desired army without fighting... Therefore, the best war is to defeat the enemy’s plans; in the next place - to break his alliances; in the next place - to defeat his troops. The worst thing is to besiege a fortress. In general, in battle, one engages the enemy with the right kind of combat, but wins by maneuver... Having set out where he will certainly go, oneself go where he does not expect. When they move forward and the enemy is unable to prevent it, this means that they are striking into his emptiness; when they retreat and the enemy is unable to pursue, this means that the speed is such that he cannot overtake. All people know the form through which I won, but they do not know the form through which I organized the victory. The form of the army is like water; shape near the water - avoid heights and strive downwards; the form of an army is to avoid fullness and strike at emptiness... Water sets its course depending on the place; the army determines its victory depending on the enemy. The difficult thing in fighting a war is to turn a roundabout path into a direct one, to turn a disaster into a benefit. Therefore, the one who, taking a movement along such a roundabout path, distracts the enemy with advantage and, having set out later than him, arrives before him, understands the tactics of the roundabout movement... Whoever knows in advance the tactics of the direct and roundabout path wins. This is the law of struggle in war. Do not go against the enemy’s banners when they are in perfect order; not attacking the enemy’s camp when it is impregnable - this is change management. If you surround an enemy army, leave one side open; if it's in a bind, don't press it. In war, the most important thing is speed: one must master what he did not have time to achieve; to follow a path that he does not even think about; attack where he is not careful.

Sun Tzu, Treatise on the Art of War

The most complete and successful victory is to force the enemy to abandon his goal without harm to himself.

Belisarius

Through a crooked path we find the right path.

Shakespeare. Hamlet, act II, scene 1.

The art of war is to conduct a well-founded and thought-out defense, followed by a quick and decisive offensive.

Napoleon

Reason is at the heart of warfare.

Clausewitz

A smart military leader will in many cases be able to take such defensive positions that the enemy will be forced to attack.

These soldiers are brave guys: they always climb where the wall is thickest.

Admiral de Robeck

Part one.

Strategy of the period: V century. BC – XX century. ad

History as practical experience

"Fools say they learn from their own experiences. I prefer to learn from the experiences of others." This aphorism, attributed to Bismarck but by no means his own, has a special significance for military problems. Unlike people of other professions, a career soldier cannot continuously perform his service. Indeed, one could even argue that, in the literal sense, the military profession is not a profession at all, but just an occasional job, and, paradoxically, it has ceased to be a profession since mercenary troops, used and paid only in time of war, were replaced regular armies, which continued to be paid even when there was no war.

If the assertion that, strictly speaking, there is no “military profession” is not fair in relation to most modern armies from the point of view of their permanent employment, it is still not without foundation, given that wars are fought less frequently now compared to past times, although their scale has become larger. Even the most intensive training in peacetime is more theoretical than practical.

However, Bismarck's aphorism helps us approach the decision more correctly practical problems. It enables us to understand that there are two types of practical experience - direct and indirect - and that indirect experience can be much more valuable because it is infinitely broader. Even in the most rewarding fields of work, especially in the military, the scope and opportunities for gaining direct experience are extremely limited. Unlike the military, the medical profession has a large practice. However, the greatest advances in medicine and surgery have been the work of researchers rather than practitioners.

Direct experience is by its nature too limited to serve as a sufficient basis for both theory and practice. At its best, it creates an atmosphere that is valuable for scientific generalizations. The greater value of indirect experience lies in its great variety and breadth. “History is a universal experience,” the experience not of one person, but of many people acting in a variety of conditions.

Feasibility of use military history as a basis for military education is explained by its outstanding practical value in the training and development of the soldier. However, the value of this experience, like any other, depends on how closely it approaches the above definition, and also on the method of studying it.

Generals usually recognize the truth of Napoleon's oft-quoted aphorism that in war "the moral factor is to the physical as three to one." Whether this arithmetic relation is correct is difficult to say, for morale will decline if the weapons do not meet the requirements, and the greatest willpower will be of little use if its owner turns into a corpse. But, despite the fact that the moral and physical factors represent a unity and cannot be separated from each other, this provision is extremely valuable, since it expresses the idea of the predominant influence of the moral factor in all military actions. The outcome of the war and battle depends on it. In military history it represents the most constant factor, varying only to a small extent, while the physical factor varies in almost every war and in every military situation.

Understanding this circumstance will help the study of military history from the point of view of its practical use. In the past, military training and military theory were built on the careful study of just one or two campaigns. On such a limited basis, the constant changes in military means which took place in every war created a danger that our views would be too limited and our conclusions erroneous. In the physical field, the only constant factor is that the means and conditions are constantly changing.

In contrast, people react to danger in much the same way. Some people, due to natural abilities, hardening and special training, are less sensitive than others, but the difference between them is not too great. The more specific the setting and the more limited our analysis, the more difficult it is to determine the moral factor. In this case, it may be difficult to determine exactly how much resistance the troops will offer in any particular situation, but this does not prevent the conclusion that they will offer less stubborn resistance if they are surprised or if they are tired and hungry. The more complete the psychological analysis, the better basis it provides for conclusions.

Superiority psychological factor over the physical and its greater constancy lead to the conclusion that the basis of any military theory should be as broad as possible. A thorough study of one campaign, if it is not based on good knowledge throughout military history may lead to incorrect conclusions. But if a certain pattern is noticed, characteristic of different eras and in different conditions, there is every reason to include this pattern in military theory.

The thesis advanced in this book is the product of precisely such in-depth research. In fact, it may be defined as the cumulative consequence of certain experiences acquired by the author of this book during his work as military editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Whereas the author had previously studied various periods of military history at random, the task assigned to him in the encyclopedia forced him to undertake a general survey of all periods. The topographer, even the tourist, if you like, has a wider perspective before his eyes and can form a general idea of the terrain, while the miner sees only the face in which he works.

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