03.03.2015 - 12:18
Before summing up the general results of the 2015 winter campaign, it is necessary to consider the results of the battle for Debaltsevo, which became the central battle of the campaign, which determined its results.
The campaign began after systematic shelling of the cities of Donbass by the artillery of the fascist junta, after which the “2nd truce” was disrupted and intensive hostilities resumed using all available means of fire.
The first stage of the campaign was associated with the battles for the Donetsk airport, which was taken by the VSN troops. The junta's counterattack on the airport failed disgracefully and resulted in heavy losses in manpower and equipment. Having repulsed the junta's counter-offensive, the VSN again went on the offensive and tried to break through the junta's defense line in the Peski - Opytnoye - Part of the Air Defense - Avdeevka section.
This offensive as a whole ended unsuccessfully for the VSN - having suffered serious losses, it was not even possible to solve the problem of capturing the village of Peski. It was not possible to gain a foothold in Avdeevka. Therefore, having captured objects north of the airport runway, the VSN gradually switched to defensive actions and repelled the junta’s counterattacks with the aim of capturing the village of Spartak.
Simultaneously with the battles for Peski and Avdeevka, active offensive operations of the VSN began in the Debaltsevo direction, which resulted in the battle for Debaltsevo, which lasted about a month from the 20th of January to the 20th of February.
The main objectives of the advancing troops were:
1. Cutting the M-103 highway in the Svetlodarsk area and encircling the Debaltsevo group.
2. Capture of Debaltsevo and restoration of control over the key transport junction of Novorossiya.
The offensive was carried out from several directions by troops of the DPR and LPR. This was essentially the first large-scale operation where serious coordination of the armies of the people's republics was established at the operational level, although there were attempts to carry out such coordination earlier; one can, for example, recall attempts to coordinate the actions of the DPR and LPR troops when finishing off the Southern Cauldron 1.0 and the unsuccessful “counteroffensive” » Bolotov, designed to alleviate the difficult situation after leaving the Lisichansky ledge.
The Debaltsevo salient was formed during the VSN counter-offensive in late summer and early autumn, when, after the junta’s failure in the battles for Shakhtersk, Miusinsk and Krasny Luch, an attempt to use Debaltsevo as a springboard from which attacks were launched to encircle Donetsk and the VSN group located there, which August led to heavy battles for Shakhtersk and Krasny Luch.
During the counter-offensive of the VSN, the junta troops here were forced to go on the defensive, holding the bridgehead until better times. In fact, since September 2014, a concentration of troops has been carried out here to resume offensive operations from the Debaltsevo bridgehead, and fortified areas have been created in the directions of the supposed attacks of the VSN. However, the group's configuration was not purely defensive; the junta was preparing for an offensive, and defensive measures ultimately proved insufficient.
The most interesting thing is that back in the fall of 2014, Tymchuk described possible attacks by the VSN, pointing out Troitskoye and Uglegorsk as the most threatening directions.
Directions of the main attacks of the NAF expected by the junta in October 2014.
In total, the junta group in the area of Svetlodarsk and Debaltsevo numbered about 9–10 thousand people, of which up to 6–7 thousand were in combat units. The composition of the group was heterogeneous - there were both brigades and separate units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as territorial battalions, punitive units like "Donbass", units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SBU.
The VSN threw about 5-6 thousand people in first-line units against them. The VSN also had a hodgepodge of various units - regular army units united in a corps, semi-autonomous Cossack detachments, special units of the security forces of the DPR and LPR. Subsequently, both sides actively put their reserves into action here. At the initial stage, the junta had an operational reserve of three BTGs in the Artemovsk area, one of which was used in battles in the Popasnaya area, and the other in the Troitsky and Krasny Plowman area.
The VSN offensive on Debaltsevo initially aimed to encircle the entire Svetlodar-Debaltsevo enemy group, so the main efforts were made to break through Troitskoye and Krasny Pakhar to Mironovka and the M-103 highway. The key goal was not even Svetlodarsk, which was located south of the highway, but the adjacent settlements (Mironovka, Mironovsky, Luganskoye), by occupying which it was possible to tightly intercept the communications of the troops located south of Svetlodarsk.
The attack on the neck of the Debaltsevo ledge was carried out from two sides. From the southwest and south, the offensive from Gorlovka got bogged down in battles in the area of Dolomitnoye, Travnevoye and Novoluganskoye, and here the enemy generally held the front. Here the VSN was unable to achieve significant success throughout the battle.
The offensive of the LPR troops developed more successfully. The attack was carried out both on Trotsikoy and Krasny Pakhar, and on Popasnaya to the north of the Debaltsevo salient. In addition to creating the threat of a breakthrough through Popasnaya to Artemovsk, this blow had the goal of disorienting the enemy, who for a long time could not determine where the main threat was coming from - from Popasnaya or Troitsky, and was forced to throw up reserves to both Popasnaya and Svetlodarsk.
After the capture of Krasny Plowman and the advance of the VSN to Mironovka, the enemy finally realized that the main blow was being delivered right here and hastily began to introduce its reserves into battle, moving 1 BTG to Svetlodarsk.
Having stopped the VSN offensive, the enemy here launched a counter-offensive and, with a blow from mechanized formations, recaptured Troitskoye and part of Krasny Plowman, in the area of which stubborn battles took place, which slowed down the development of the offensive to the west of the Mironovsky reservoir, and then completely led to its failure.
The VSN were able to hold Red Plowman in heavy battles, but the threat of a breakthrough of the VSN to the M-103 highway was stopped by the enemy, who by the end of January more or less successfully restrained the offensive actions of the VSN.
Simultaneously with the attack on Mironovka, actions developed along the perimeter of the Debaltsevo ledge. From the northeast, the LPR army, during stubborn battles, was able to capture the Sanzharovka area and advance to numbered heights from which it was possible to fire at the M-103 highway. Stubborn fighting in the Novogrigorovka area and the eastern outskirts of Debaltsevo and Chernukhino in January did not bring decisive results. Here the enemy’s defense was organized quite tightly, and during attempts to push through it, the VSN suffered serious losses. Also, offensive operations in the area of Nikishino, Uglegorsk and Orlovok initially failed.
By the end of January, it became obvious that the initial plan to encircle the Svetlodar-Debaltsevo group was failing. The advance of the VSN was accompanied by serious losses, and operational goals remained unachieved. The entire operation was in jeopardy.
The losses suffered both in the area of the Debaltsevo salient and in other areas led to the fact that reinforcements had to be raked out from the rear commandant’s offices and even some forces had to be withdrawn from the border. At the same time, in the LPR there were cases of some rear units refusing to move to the front, which was a continuation of internal conflicts between the LPR authorities and the All-Great Don Army, which has been going on since the fall. The heavy losses of the "August" battalion, the heavy losses in the "Ratibor" detachment, the arrest of "Bayker", the story of the wounding of "Almaz" - all this reflects the crisis phenomena that the VSN faced during the offensive.
These problems, on the one hand, are typical growing pains, when disparate militia learned to become a regular army directly in battle, and on the other hand, they reflect various internal conflicts in the DPR and LPR, which negatively affect the effectiveness of combat operations. All these mistakes had to be paid for in blood, especially since the enemy stopped forgiving many mistakes that went unpunished in the summer and even in the fall.
To the credit of the operation's leadership, they quickly became convinced that the original plan was not working and that it was necessary to move on to plan B.
Under the cover of the ongoing battles at Krasny Plowman and the offensive from the northeast, preparations began for an attack on Uglegorsk. There were already battles in the Uglegorsk area after the start of the winter campaign, but they did not bring much success to the VSN, and apparently the sector command decided that there was no direct threat here, otherwise it would be difficult to explain subsequent events. By and large, there were no reserves left for an attack on Uglegorsk, so a combined assault group was created from various units - from the special forces of the GRU DPR to small detachments of volunteers from various units stationed in quiet areas. The arriving fighters were equipped and prepared for the attack.
It started on January 30th. The tank attack on the checkpoint covering the entrance to Uglegorsk was crowned with success - having lost 3 vehicles to mines, the DPR tankers broke through the enemy’s defenses and went directly to Uglegorsk itself. As part of the development of success, the combined assault group in armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and trucks advanced through the captured checkpoint into the city, where it began fighting with the local garrison. The city itself was poorly prepared for defense (the negligence of the officer in charge of the defense of Uglegorsk and the sector command, which was not concerned about the situation, is evident).
As a result, in less than a day of fighting, the enemy was thrown back to the southeastern outskirts of Uglegorsk, while one of the territorial battalions defending the city was surrounded. The appearance of a large number of VSN troops in the city created a serious operational threat to the entire Debaltsevo group, and Zakharchenko’s visit to Uglegorsk had a serious demoralizing effect on Ukrainian society, since the enemy’s military propaganda continued to claim for several days after the loss of Uglegorsk that the city was holding, but personnel from Uglegorsk , where Zakharchenko gave interviews and the VSN assault infantry regrouped, spoke for themselves.
The day after the actual fall of Uglegorsk, the sector command finally became concerned about the situation in the city and organized a counter-offensive on Uglegorsk with units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Donbass punitive battalion located to the west of Debaltsevo. The junta's strike allowed them to reach positions on the outskirts of Uglegorsk and enter the city from the southeast, which saved the encircled territorial battalion, which jumped out of the encirclement. During this counter-offensive (which some in Ukraine even hastened to call “Semenchenko’s counter-offensive”) a well-known story happened when, having killed some of the people, the “Donbass” commander Semenchenko fell into panic and, while trying to flee to the rear, crashed into an armored personnel carrier, killing two of his colleagues, after which he fled to the Artemovsk hospital, pretending to be wounded, and from there wrote untrue reports from the front. Thus, in just a few days, Semenchenko virtually destroyed the remnants of his reputation among supporters of the junta.
Of course, the junta was unable to liberate the city (the counteroffensive was organized disgustingly), which led to further consequences. Repelling attacks from the junta from the southeast and holding Uglegorsk, the VSN began to push troops northeast of the city, trying to approach the M-103 highway from the south. Since the route from this direction was supposed to be covered by the garrison of Uglegorsk, thrown back to the southeast, the VSN had an almost free exit to the route, covered only by weak enemy barriers. Naturally, having gained a foothold in Uglegorsk, the VSN began to advance into this rarefied space.
After the capture of Kalinovka and the adjacent heights, there were no significant obstacles left between the VSN positions and the route. At the same time, the route itself was already subject to artillery shelling from the numbered heights near Sanzharovka and positions in the Lozovaya area, although it was still possible to drive along it. Simultaneously with the development of success at Uglegorsk, the VSN forces were finally able to push the enemy out of Nikishino and Redkodub, as well as start battles directly in Debaltsevo and Chernukhino, where the main centers of resistance of the Debaltsevo group were located.
Despite the threatening state of affairs, the enemy did not take timely measures to transfer reserves to Svetlodarsk and strengthen Logvinovo, which played a fatal role. Despite numerous statements about the closure of the boiler, until February 9, of course, there was no boiler; there was an operational bag with a shootable neck, through which, nevertheless, communication was carried out between the Debaltsevo and Svetlodar groups, which were supplied both through the army supply line and by volunteer organizations.
General configuration of the front on the eve of the fall of Logvinovo
On February 9, the Olkhon group goes directly to Logvinovo, where there is practically no enemy, and intercepts the M-103 highway, the shooting of enemy cars and armored vehicles begins on the highway, and while trying to get through Logvinovo, high-ranking officers from the leadership of the Debaltsevo group are killed.
The command of the encircled group had almost a week to take measures in case of an obvious attack on Logvinovo, but nothing was done. Only the heights adjacent to Logvinovo were occupied, from which it was supposed to keep Logvinovo itself under fire, and a piece of the highway passing near the populated area. The VSN quickly deployed GRU special forces to Logvinovo, which met the blow of the unblocking group, which tried to recapture Logvinovo and unblock the route.
During a heavy battle, enemy troops (including part of the Donbass battalion) were able to reach the outskirts of Logvinovo, where it came to close combat, but our special forces held out (solving, in general, tasks that were not typical for special forces to repel attacks from enemy mechanized formations), and the enemy , having lost 18 units of armored vehicles, rolled back from Logvinovo, which in the first couple of days after the occupation by the VSN forces was almost completely destroyed by massive artillery fire.
After repelling counterattacks on Logvinovo, VSN forces began to occupy adjacent heights, providing excessive control over the M-103 highway, thereby forming a full-fledged cover of the Debaltsevo cauldron, which stretched from Uglegorsk to Logvinovo. At the same time, fighting in the area of Novogrigorovka and the eastern outskirts of Debaltsevo led to the occupied key heights northwest of Debaltsevo. As a result, the Svetlodar-Debaltsevo group was cut into two parts and then agony ensued. Already by February 11, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had concentrated enough artillery to cover most of the route from Svetlodarsk to Logvinovo, as a result of which the Armed Forces of Ukraine had problems even reaching the attack lines. Attempts to relieve the blockade were extinguished even on the approaches to Logvinovo, and even the hasty arrival of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Muzhenko, who personally led the operation to rescue the encircled, could no longer change the catastrophic situation that had developed due to the fault of the General Staff and the sector command.
The fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to close the ring before the negotiations in Minsk played a very important role, since the persistence of Poroshenko and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who did not recognize the existence of a cauldron and sought to retain Debaltsevo for themselves, led to the creation of a kind of contractual conflict, when the Debaltsevo area was actually left out of the brackets Minsk agreements, and the VSN continued the destruction of the Debaltsevo group, hiding behind the fact that the status of Debaltsevo has not been determined. If they had not managed to create the boiler lid, it would have been much more difficult to do, and the Debaltsevo ledge could still exist.
Having thus bypassed the political problem, the VSN began to eliminate the encircled group. The plan was quite simple - holding the Logvinovo area and adjacent heights, preventing the release of the blockade of the encircled group and at the same time conducting an offensive directly on Debaltsevo and Chernukhino, simultaneously pushing the enemy from the south and southeast of the cauldron to the fortified area built by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Olkhovatka area.
If everything went quite well with holding the lid of the boiler, then in Chernukhino and Debaltsevo everything was much more complicated - the enemy’s defenses had to be broken into with great difficulty, gradually recapturing these settlements. Since, left without supplies, the Debaltsevo group could not continue resistance at the same level for a long time, the officers remaining in the cauldron (part of the command fled on February 9-11 to Artemovsk and Svetlodarsk - some died on the highway) began to work out ways to rescue those surrounded.
In order to escape from the encirclement, there were 2 possibilities:
1. An agreed withdrawal, according to which troops were released from the encirclement without weapons and equipment, which were surrendered to the VSN.
2. Breakthrough through fields and country roads between Logvinovo and Novogrigorovka.
One could not count on a centralized withdrawal and assistance from Svetlodarsk - Debaltseve was declared the heart of the “Ukrainian Stalingrad” and the “core of the Debaltsevo bridgehead”, which was being prepared for the fate of the Donetsk airport. The senior officers of the junta in the cauldron did not want to turn into “cyborgs”, and especially into dead “cyborgs”, and began to plan a breakthrough on their own. The decision to make a breakthrough was made by the commander of the 128th brigade, who took responsibility. As a result, some of the encircled were able to escape through fields and country roads north of Logvinovo, leaving up to 300 units of various equipment in the cauldron (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, MTLB, BRDM, artillery systems, MLRS, various trucks, etc.) . At the same time, leaving their positions in the cauldron, about 500 people were never able to leave it, and some of them are still being caught. About 500 more people were captured.
Debaltsevo boiler lid. This map clearly shows the road from Debaltsevo to Nizhneye Lozovoye, along which the remnants of the Debaltsevo group broke through, being subjected to shelling from numbered heights and from Logvinovo.
The total losses killed in the battles for Debaltsevo and surrounding areas amounted to up to 1,500 people for the junta; the junta lost up to 900–1,100 people in battles in the area of Logvinovo, Nizhnyaya Lozovaya, Sanzharovka, Dolomitnoye, Mironovka, Krasny Plowman and Troitsky. In general, according to preliminary data, the junta lost up to 2,400–2,600 killed and missing in the battle for the Debaltsevo salient (perhaps the number of those killed is somewhat less, since some of them may still be wandering somewhere in the area of the former Debaltsevo cauldron). about 4.5 thousand wounded, up to 650 people captured. VSN losses amounted to about 700–800 killed, up to 2–2.5 thousand wounded.
The bulk of the irretrievable losses of the parties came from artillery fire. If in the airport area the junta immediately took the lead in terms of losses, then in the Debaltsevo area the losses of the parties until the first week of February were quite comparable, and only when the beating of the encircled group began did the junta sharply take the lead in terms of losses in manpower and equipment, and if not for the initiative Ukrainian commanders who brought some of the people out of the encirclement (despite the criminal inaction of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the sector command), then the losses in personnel could have been much greater.
What worked in favor of those who broke through was that some of the areas between Logvinovo and Novogrigorovka were only under fire control, and a significant part of those who broke through were lucky to get through, although many remained lying in the fields. In general, the lid of the Debaltsevo cauldron was thinner and more pliable than the lid of the Ilovaisk cauldron, where the attempt to break through ended much more tragically for those surrounded.
As a result of the battle for Debaltsevo, the enemy's Debaltsevo group was eliminated. It was partially destroyed, and the surviving units that broke through from the cauldron will be ineffective in the short term, plus most of the equipment was lost. Significant supplies of ammunition and ammunition were also lost. As a result of the fighting, the so-called Svetlodar arc was formed, which is under the same threat of encirclement when attacked by Troitsky, Krasny Pakhar and Dolomitny. This configuration of the front creates a serious hook for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the resumption of hostilities, since it is possible to repeat the encirclement attempt north of Svetlodarsk (in this case, up to 3-4 thousand Armed Forces troops could fall into the cauldron) in a more advantageous front configuration.
Of course, we cannot help but touch upon the issues of “Voentorg” and “North Wind”. During the campaign, Voentorg worked at full capacity, providing the flow of ammunition and fuels and lubricants necessary for combat operations, although in terms of logistics and distribution, the increased scale of combat operations and the consumption of ammunition and fuels and lubricants caused certain problems with the timely supply of units on the front line; modify.
Despite the junta’s statements that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were fighting not with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but with the Russian army, the “north wind” practically did not blow, although in January it was expected that the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine would receive larger-scale direct support, as in August 2014. Therefore, speaking about the winter campaign, we can confidently say that it was, first of all, a battle between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The second level of war, associated with the hidden confrontation between the Russian Federation and the United States in Ukraine, remained largely in the shadows in this campaign, which, as shown by statements by American officials, does not quite suit the United States, which wants to take this confrontation into a more obvious direction, which Russia evades in every possible way. The information campaign was won militarily by the Russian Federation, since after 1.5 months of fighting, the junta was unable to clearly demonstrate that it was fighting with the Russian army, and the Americans’ arguments did not work out either.
It was the defeat in this information component of the battle for Debaltsevo that led to a whole set of censorship restrictions against Russian media in Ukraine and the creation of “information troops.” The junta is trying to hastily stop the consequences of its information defeat, which, as at the front, manifested itself in the collapse of two modern myths about “cyborgs” and about “Ukrainian Stalingrad.”
By mid-February, the answer to the question “Cauldron or bridgehead” became obvious.
With the capture of Debaltsevo, the VSN gained control over the most important transport junction, which will facilitate maneuvering of troops and free up significant forces for operations in the area of Svetlodarsk, Popasnaya and Gorlovka. The captured trophies will significantly compensate for the losses of the VSN in the material part, which they suffered during the month and a half of fighting.
The defeat at Debaltsevo put an end to the winter campaign, which ended successfully for the VSN. The junta’s attempts to go on the offensive were parried, and the VSN, in a month and a half of fighting, solved two important operational tasks - the Donetsk airport was completely captured and the Debaltsevo salient was eliminated. Therefore, we can safely say that the operation ended successfully, although we should not forget about the unsuccessful offensives on Krymskoe, Avdeevka and Peski. The enemy, where he could, offered very stubborn resistance, and where the enemy command did not make obvious mistakes, we were not able to achieve decisive success. The mistakes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces command in the area of the airport, Uglegorsk and Debaltsevo were skillfully used, which led to positive results that overcame the tactical failures of the end of January.
Based on the results of the campaign, we can safely say that despite the continuing growing pains and structural military-political problems, the militia is in fact an army, and it can, on an equal footing, conduct a large-scale attack on a regular army that has had many months of combat experience. Of course, not everything was smooth and some losses could have been avoided, but one cannot help but pay tribute to the command and soldiers of the VSN, who, in difficult conditions, were able to conduct a very difficult campaign and win it.
The withdrawal of Ukrainian military units from Debaltseve, which began on Wednesday night and ended only on Thursday evening, caused a stormy reaction in the Western press, which is mostly pessimistic. The authorities’ initiative to invite UN peacekeepers to Donbass, which followed the retreat from a strategically important point, also received disappointing reviews.
Many Ukrainian military personnel greeted the news of the start of the retreat operation with joy, adding that it should have been started a long time ago, The Washington Post writes. “But for many (military personnel - ed.), the retreat was also a huge obstacle and a turning point due to disappointment with military commanders, who, according to the soldiers, failed to cope with the siege,” the publication writes.
With his visit, Poroshenko failed to answer the key questions of most soldiers: what next?
The Washington Post
“The Russians are advancing, and this is my Ukraine. Ukraine or death,” the newspaper quotes a sniper from the “Lvov” battalion with the call sign Trukhan. “But our commanders abandoned us. And the Ukrainian media repeated what they (the commanders - Ed.) They said in Kiev that we had everything, that we were not surrounded. It was all a lie."
"As soldiers left the front lines, they described the retreat as a tactical move, a term shared by Ukraine's political leadership. But the scale of the retreat has caused many to lose faith in their leaders' ability to fight in the future or even negotiate a respectable peace agreement," the article said.
“Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko tried on Wednesday to somehow restore the favor (of the military - Ed.), urgently going to Artemovsk, where he met with commanders and greeted soldiers at a military base,” the newspaper writes. “But he did not make his visit was able to answer the key questions of most soldiers: what next? And why they should believe that future battles will be more successful."
The appeal to UN peacekeepers is a clear admission that Poroshenko no longer believes that Ukraine is capable of defending itself.
The Washington Post
The Washington Post also commented on Petro Poroshenko’s decision to seek help from the UN peacekeeping contingent, calling it “a clear admission that he (Poroshenko - Ed.) no longer believes that Ukraine is capable of defending itself.”
The Battle of Debaltsevo was one of the most fierce battles of the entire conflict.
The Financial Times
"The battle for Debaltseve - a railway junction of enormous importance to the separatists because of its links with Russia - was one of the fiercest battles of the entire conflict," writes The Financial Times. "The siege and fears of possible carnage prompted German Chancellor Angela Merkel to the start of negotiations that culminated in a ceasefire agreed in Minsk by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France last week."
German media: Debaltsevo as a defeat for Europe
Even if the separatists do not immediately launch a further offensive, “senior Ukrainian officials are concerned that the fall of Debaltseve could be a major political blow to Poroshenko,” the British publication writes. “This destroys faith in the state, in its ability to be effective and in its ability to protect its people,” the newspaper quotes one of them as saying.
The withdrawal of Ukrainian troops was a humiliation for Poroshenko’s forces
The Financial Times
At the same time, "morale among the Ukrainian military remained at a high level," the newspaper writes, citing Viktor Kovalenko, a 43-year-old journalist who fought in Debaltseve.
“The withdrawal of Ukrainian troops on Wednesday was a humiliation for Poroshenko’s forces, but, moreover, the separatist attack on the city, which led to their (military - Ed.) retreat, is called by Western diplomats a blatant violation of the ceasefire agreement. Western capitals were again taken by surprise, and plunged into thought about how to deal with Putin,” the publication writes.
The fiasco that took place in southern Ukraine this week will be among the most humiliating in the chronicles of the “truces.”
The Wall Street Journal
"In the regretful chronicles of the 'truce', the fiasco that occurred in the south of Ukraine this week will be among the most humiliating. For Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, who was forced by his friends to accept it (the ceasefire agreement - Ed.). And for Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande and President Obama, who put pressure (on Poroshenko - Ed.) and then allowed Vladimir Putin to violate the agreement with impunity. Ukraine is paying with large territorial losses, but NATO may also pay the price quite soon," writes The Wall Street Journal.
The number of deaths in Debaltseve itself and near the city is an issue with political overtones
The New York Times
“The death toll in and around Debaltseve is a politically charged issue, reflected in widely varying estimates: according to pro-Russian separatists, there are thousands of victims; according to preliminary government estimates, at least 13 soldiers were killed, 157 were injured, more “90 were captured and at least 82 are listed as missing,” writes The New York Times, adding that “eyewitnesses say the death toll is likely to rise significantly.”
An initiative with peacekeepers will likely encounter stubborn resistance or even an open veto from Moscow in the UN Security Council
Foreign Policy
“If Russia is truly interested in peace, as it claims, it should support this resolution, which authorizes the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Ukraine,” Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Alexander Motsik told Foreign Policy.
“This step, the implementation of which requires a UN Security Council resolution, will most likely encounter stubborn resistance or even an open veto from Moscow. Motsik called this hypocrisy,” the publication adds.
Conflict in eastern Ukraine (Donbass)
At the beginning of April 2014, fighting began between representatives of the DPR/LPR, who do not share the views of Euromaidan representatives and the policies of Kyiv, and the armed forces of Ukraine. Later, the Ukrainian side declared the conflict an Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), and volunteer battalions joined the Ukrainian army. On September 10, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who was then NATO Secretary General, said that Russian military personnel and the regular army of the Russian Federation were seen among the rebels. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has repeatedly reported on the supply of heavy equipment and weapons for Donbass combat formations from Russia. In turn, on September 28, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that only volunteers from the Russian Federation are fighting on the side of the DPR and LPR.
Today, the government of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic is based in the territory. The official administration of the Donetsk region is located on the territory of three cities of the Donetsk region -
Since April 2014, Debaltseve has been controlled by the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic. However, at the end of July 2014, Ukrainian troops recaptured the city. Debaltseve was of great strategic importance as one of the largest railway junctions in Ukraine. In addition, the city was deeply wedged into the territory of the DPR and was considered a possible springboard for an attack on Donetsk.
"Dear Life"
The truce after the first Minsk agreements in September 2014 ended with the resumption of war in January 2015. The Democratic Party recaptured the Donetsk airport, but the largest-scale hostilities began in the area of the Debaltsevo ledge.
As a result, Debaltseve, from a springboard for the offensive of a large Ukrainian Armed Forces group on Donetsk, turned into a trap-cauldron for the Ukrainian military.
On January 22, 2015, the offensive of the combined forces of the DPR and LPR began, the infantry was supported by tanks, multiple launch rocket systems and heavy artillery. Debaltsevo and the settlements around it came under fire. Fierce fighting took place simultaneously with preparations for the second round of the Minsk agreements. The militia, in a conversation with Gazeta.Ru, admit that the command’s task was to take the city before signing documents in Minsk. However, it was not possible to implement it - the militia continued the offensive even after the conclusion of the agreements on February 12.
In early February, after a short respite at the front and the evacuation of some civilians, the operation resumed. On February 5, DPR forces took Uglegorsk near Debaltseve, and later the Ukrainian military retreated from the villages of Redkodub and Logvinovo, near the M103 highway. This highway connects the Ukrainian Artemovsk with Debaltsevo, in fact - the “road of life” for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Since February 14, Ukrainian forces have been engaged in undermining railway tracks and preparing the evacuation from the city. The retreat was seriously hampered by severe frosts.
Adding to the problems was the actual non-recognition on the part of Kyiv of the operational environment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces group, as a result of which the Ukrainian military retreated not along the “green corridor”, but under heavy enemy fire.
On February 17, DPR fighters entered the city and took control of most of Debaltseve, capturing more than a hundred prisoners. On February 18, the Democratic Party reported complete control over the city. The Ukrainian General Staff spoke about the withdrawal of 2.4 thousand military personnel and dozens of pieces of equipment from Debaltsevo, as well as about 200 dead and wounded. Their opponents announced the destruction and capture of most of the soldiers of the National Guard and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Kyiv accused parts of the Russian army of participating in the operation on the part of the LDPR, Moscow denied this.
“God forbid we go through what we went through”
In Ukrainian units, veterans of the battles in Ilovaisk and Debaltsevo are of special importance. They are known and their opinions are followed. A local legend is a sniper from the 37th separate battalion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Bogdan with the call sign “Beztoshenny”. He received a bullet in the stomach and underwent long and difficult treatment. With a grenade I went to the military registration and enlistment office to demand that they take me back into the army. He has been fighting for two years now. He says that they entered Debaltsevo through holes in the encirclement to save comrades from the 40th motorized infantry battalion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, who were blocked.
“They started calling us back. We went there with all our equipment in passenger cars. Over the course of two years, the area was studied thoroughly. There are few troops on both sides and it is impossible to plug up all the holes and country roads. And our people were pulled out,” Bogdan recalls sparingly.
The 40th motorized infantry battalion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces held positions from the east of Debaltseve. Part of the battalion at two strong points “Moisha” and “Kopye” was surrounded on February 15 and surrendered two days later by order of the battalion commander. On the 15th, a ceasefire was announced and they could no longer be supported by artillery.
90 people were captured and exchanged within three days. Then Chief Victor accused them that the battalion fighters had given up their positions and allowed the cauldron to be created.
The 40th battalion was disbanded. Since then, the defense of the Moisha and Kopye strongholds has been a sad page in recent history, around which there is controversy in Ukraine. It was this episode that most seriously hit General Muzhenko’s authority among the troops.
“He came out (from the encirclement)... In one piece. And God forbid you go through what the guys and I went through,” Vitaly Ovcharenko, a soldier of the Artemovsk special police battalion, left a message on his Facebook page a year ago.
“We came to the Artemovsk battalion from the very beginning,” says comrade Ovcharenko with the call sign “Kuznets”. — Lectures, four days of training for a teaching staff member, and some shooting with the Makarov. The battalion was assembled immediately after Ilovaisk (there, in the summer of 2014, large parts of the Ukrainian Armed Forces fell into the cauldron. - Gazeta.Ru), vehicles arrived at the training ground, cut by shrapnel and bullets. They lined us up in Dnepropetrovsk and asked us again:
“Did you think well? Doesn’t anyone want to leave the service?”
“They didn’t come in very calmly. There were shellings, at the entrance we came across a shot-up ambulance, everything was covered in blood,” Ovcharenko recalls. — And then there were roadblocks. It was scary, dangerous, but mostly cold. It was cold raining on the first day, and it is very cold to ride on armor in February.
Vitaly Ovcharenko
Dmitry KirillovIn a house destroyed by a shell with the roof blown off, they saw blankets under bricks and took them. And suddenly a car of our journalists drives by and takes photographs: they say, looters! They should have seen the mess we found these blankets in!
Now I give lectures to journalists on how to behave correctly when writing and filming the army, I always remember this incident.”
Vitaly Ovcharenko is a graduate of the Faculty of History of Donetsk National University, Candidate of Sciences. He defended his dissertation before the war and gave lectures. With a smile, he recalls his topic: “Political, economic, cultural relations between Ukraine and the Scandinavian countries in 1991-2011.” Now he is deputy editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian magazine “Peacemaker”. At the same time, Vitaly comes from the ultras of Shakhtar Donetsk and took part in all Donetsk pro-Ukrainian rallies in the spring of 2014.
On the Ukrainian side, the fighters believe that they were fighting a war primarily with the Russian army.
“They hit the city mercilessly, in squares, especially in the last days. There were all fatalists there, everyone understood that they could die any day, that they were surrounded, but somehow everything was calm. They were no longer afraid of the Russian army; they just wanted to grab at least one. It can’t be compared with the Ilovaisk boiler,” says Ovcharenko. “Then in September, stories about Russian tactical groups sounded completely different, almost with horror. In Debaltsevo, we perceived the enemy as something impersonal and had no intention of going into captivity. This was contraindicated for Donetsk and Galicians. And in our battalion there were 30% Galicians, 30% from Donetsk and Lugansk, and the rest from Central Ukraine. True, the “Lvov” battalion acted in conjunction with us; everyone there was from Western Ukraine.
Why was captivity ruled out? We saw enough videos about Motorola at the Donetsk airport and his abuse of prisoners, and were frightened by the programs of the Russian central channels. You see, there was a real smell of hatred there.
But we still don’t have hatred towards Russians; otherwise we wouldn’t communicate with our relatives. I have them in St. Petersburg, for example. But there is a great resentment towards Russia, and this, in my opinion, is stronger for generations.”
According to him, the worst days in Debaltsevo were those one and a half days when the soldiers lay at their post in the cold under fire.
“On Friday, February 13, we had three killed, two more in the “Lvov” battalion. My group was supposed to go on a mission, but due to shelling at the checkpoint, we didn’t get there. We finally went to the outskirts to rescue our people, and there was an ambush. There, my friend Seryozha Karpo, call sign “Malek,” lay down, Vitya Logovsky from Zhitomir died - his granddaughter was born in January, Dima Strelets was killed, he took his youngest daughter to first grade on September 1, and the eldest was 11 years old.”
The attitude towards the locals was “difficult”. Many, according to Ovcharenko, helped, prepared food and told how “it was good and calm” under Ukraine.
“On February 15, we took a position in the city council. There were 7 of us, and rumors had already spread that the separatists had entered the city. Well, we crossed ourselves and went to the loopholes. And they began to check the rooms and found food - boxes of pasta, cereals, canned food, someone's humanitarian aid. And then a young couple came with the question: “Is there any food?” Well, we loaded them with as much as we could carry. They thanked me. And then we saw them in the story, they talked about “looters and rapists from the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” he says.
The frosts came almost immediately - they saved us later. The columns were able to move across the frozen fields and reached their own.
“We were a company, 36 people, one tank and two BRDMs. I ended up joining the 128th Brigade.”
Vasya “Kuznets” recalls the last day in Debaltsevo: “We fought together with the 128th brigade. And her commander seemed to say that if we don’t leave before three in the morning, there will be a Khan! Well, it goes - 7 pm, 8, 9... And somewhere at 10:30 p.m. they hear: “There is an order to leave!” Everyone got on the transport and drove off. We wandered through the fields at night. There were ambushes, shelling, “Grad” was heard, it was dark. Five times I jumped from a BRDM during ambushes and fired back. They fire at us, and we try to pass at speed. The initially united column split into several parts during its retreat. The first ones passed without firing at all, the second and third ones already had problems, and we are somewhere in the middle of this stream. Then they said that if it dawned and we “blukanem” (get lost), then that’s it. But by 10 am we reached Artemovsk. Let's go!"
Other fighters who visited Debaltsevo, but asked not to indicate their last names, scold their generals. Especially goes to the generals of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Ruslan Khomchak for Ilovaisk and Viktor Muzhenko for Debaltsevo. “How was it possible to drive so many troops into such a narrow neck? — one of the interlocutors is indignant. “The map doesn’t show that there’s a bag there or a single natural obstacle on the ground!”
“In a word, the people there don’t like us”
Debaltsevo resident Victor is engaged in the funeral business. He managed to leave at the very peak of the fighting and returned back on February 25th. He says that after the fighting the city was terrible: no people, no light, no water. The roads are impassable due to craters, fallen trees and iron fragments from shells. People huddled alone in basements. Victor counted about 300 civilian deaths. Bodies were dug up in craters, vegetable gardens, houses, and under trees. They found it by smell and tips from neighbors. “The city is broken, there is not a single intact building, abandoned dugouts and trenches are everywhere,” adds one of the participants in the Debaltsevo operation on the part of the DPR, let’s call him Pavel. “All the fields and surrounding areas are strewn with shrapnel and destroyed equipment, unexploded Hurricanes and Grads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and militias are sticking out everywhere.”
According to him, the Ukrainians held out, but did not survive morally, although they had opportunities.
“They threw so many shells there that when we had nothing to do, we blew them up. In addition to shells, a lot of other goods were found in dugouts and trenches. Ukrainians fled in panic, abandoning everything. I remember finding a bunch of children’s drawings and letters. Drawings on the theme “will or death” (slogan - “Gazeta.Ru”),” recalls Pavel, calling opponents “insane because of propaganda.”
Drawings on the wall at the location of the 131st battalion
Dmitry KirillovThe soldiers of his detachment stood at the positions of the Kyiv-2 battalion, in an abandoned house, the owners of which had left for Kyiv. By that time, Ukrainian soldiers were living outside Debaltseve in Novogrygorovka, 10 km from Svetlodar, to which the main forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces had retreated. After the liberation of Debaltsevo, the situation remained tense.
“Innumerable Ukrainian sabotage groups (DRGs) were constantly walking there, and that’s why we didn’t go out one by one at night. There was a case when a DRG passed not far from us. They were conducted by a local, and the locals there are very rotten and happily helped and continue to help the “dill”.
The task was to mine the road from the second battalion. They planted three landmines and were blown up on the fourth. Eight died on the spot, four survived.
Our doctors saved them. The local guide also survived - I think he was shot. It was fun, in a word,” recalls another militia member.
He admits that the main destruction was caused by the militias. During the liberation, the city was destroyed by their artillery.
“If you take a closer look, walking around the city, you will notice that all weekend there are flights from our side. The locals told us about this more than once, and I got caught too: in the store the Debaltsevo women gave me a good scolding,” he says. “They didn’t like us there, just like we didn’t like them.” Once we were returning to our positions through the village, and suddenly our car was blown up - the behu (BMP) opened up like a rose. It turns out that it was a local who planted an anti-tank mine. Thank God that there were no troops in the vehicle and only the driver died. This freak was not found; he managed to go to the “dill”. It turns out that his son serves there.”
The militia, like the Ukrainian fighters, are also dissatisfied with the planning of the operation, which led to heavy losses. They associate this with the desire of the command to take Debaltsevo before the signing of Minsk-2.
Why do the militias scold their command? One of the former DPR commanders speaks for the “chaos and carnage” that took place during the capture of Debaltsevo. His detachment took Uglegorsk.
“We entered it from both sides. While we were entering from one, our own artillery hit us from the other,” he almost curses. “They probably thought they were hitting the dill.” Often they fired on their own people in the field, there was no connection with the headquarters: 90% of the calls were made on mobile phones, and then it was the Kyivstar operators that were turned off. There were no plans, except that it was necessary to quickly take Debaltsevo to Minsk-2, since there was nothing specifically about this city in the agreements. DPR units did not coordinate their actions with the people’s militia and other LPR units; it was often completely unclear who was subordinate to whom. Once our sniper climbed onto a house, and our tank hit it by mistake. It was unclear how the doctors worked, they did not write reports about the dead, and many remained unidentified. If the Russian army had fought on our side, there would not have been so many primitive mistakes and “friendly” fire.”
The commander claims that the same chaos occurred on the Ukrainian side. He watched as some parts of the Ukrainian Armed Forces agreed to leave, and on the other hand, their own began to pour fire on them. Sometimes Ukrainian soldiers blew themselves up on their own tripwires, placed by the first fighters to retreat against the militias. The militia claim that they took up to 150 tanks (Kharkov T-64) as trophies from Debaltsevo. They were abandoned during a hasty retreat by Ukrainian troops, who simply did not have enough crews.
“The hardest thing was to break through the defenses of Uglegorsk and Logvinovo. And despite the rebuilt defenses, they entered Debaltsevo itself in a day and a half,” the commander recalls. — Most of the Ukrainian military have already retreated from there. And those who remained were demoralized or simply did not receive orders from the center due to lack of communication. The incident in Logvinovo was most striking.
When the Ukrainian Armed Forces retreated, their KrAZ took 30 wounded on board. The car stalled, the driver and commander got into the UAZ and drove away, but the KrAZ with the three hundredths remained in place.
During this day, almost everyone died, only the private and the officer remained, they huddled together so as not to die from the cold.
The officer died, but the private survived. He screamed when we pulled him out from under the pile of bodies. The day before the official exchange, we handed him over to the Ukrainian side, otherwise he would have simply died, since we did not have enough doctors even for our own.”
The main mystery remains the number of losses. The official figures on both sides are similar. In the self-proclaimed republics they say that about a hundred of their fighters were killed and about 3 thousand of the enemy. The Ukrainian command says the same about its own losses of dozens of people and about 3 thousand of the enemy.
A militiaman, call sign “Murz,” who participated in the battles for Debaltsevo, says that both sides will hide the real numbers at least for the duration of the life of the current generation of military men who, on both sides, received ranks and awards for this operation.
“We all know that each militiaman killed 10 “ukrops” before his death, and they are all sure that each “cyborg” killed 10 “separators” before his death,” Murz sneers. He and several other militia commanders believe that about 1.5 thousand soldiers died for the LDPR. According to their estimates, the Ukrainians suffered comparable losses. According to the US representative to the UN Samantha Power, 500 bodies of civilians who died as a result of shelling were found in Debaltseve.
An article by a US Army major about military operations in the area of the Debaltseve bridgehead in the winter of 2015 in the ATO zone in Eastern Ukraine. Interesting views, analysis of the operation, some conclusions, especially from the side of a country that is always at war in different parts of the world, with its powerful and equipped army.
While some in the military say Russia poses no direct threat to the United States, our political and military alliances require an understanding and assessment of how Russia uses force near its borders.
The U.S. Army European Command's Strong Europe campaign, Operation Atlantic Resolve, and joint exercises such as Anaconda, which featured cooperation between the U.S. Army and Eastern European countries, clearly point to the need to clearly understand and visualize how Russia conducts modern combat operations. Finally, the study of emerging threats is fundamental to any professional army or training organization and therefore requires an examination of Russia's conduct of modern warfare.
Russian military operations in Eastern Europe since 2008 have highlighted an innovative approach to warfare that incorporates Information Age technologies into exploiting vulnerabilities in modern warfare. Whether this approach is called Hybrid Warfare, New Generation Warfare, Unclear Warfare, or any other term that may be used, Russia has changed the paradigm in modern warfare, creating new dilemmas and challenges for the US military.
The battlefield of the Russo-Ukrainian War is not only home to cutting-edge cyber and electronic warfare, but also appears to be the site of exceptionally exciting information operations aimed at manipulating the media and society. Just below the surface of the dazzling veneer of sophisticated cyber-electronic and information operations lies a traditional military campaign that is no less unique than Russia's superior hybrid approach. Far from the eyes of the casual observer or the mainstream media, the battlefields are more reminiscent of the battles of the First World War than what one would expect in the 21st century.
The Russian-Ukrainian battlefields are dotted with trenches, destroyed cities, the remains of destroyed armored vehicles and the graves of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and citizens. The battlefields of the Russo-Ukrainian War are characterized by the indiscriminate use of rockets and artillery, in which civilian casualties are a mere by-product. Russo-Ukrainian battlefields are characterized by tank warfare in open and urban terrain. Finally, Russian-Ukrainian battles are home to modern siege warfare. Many of the battles that embody these characteristics are unknown to the US Army. Major battles such as Ilovaisk, Donetsk airport, Lugansk airport, Mariupol, Slavyansk, Debaltsevo and others made conventional military operations invisible for some time. This article examines the Battle of Debaltsevo to understand how the Russian way of warfare lurks beneath the surface of hybrid warfare. Additionally, this article aims to identify patterns or emerging trends in Russian operations and examine these patterns or trends in more detail.
The Battle of Debaltsevo was chosen for study because:
It is the last major battle of the Russo-Ukrainian War, and its significance lies in the fact that the battle reflects the general lessons of traditional warfare learned by the Russian army throughout the conflict.
Likewise, the battle reflects the nature of Russia's response to Ukraine's actions after more than 18 months of fighting in the country.
A special feature of the Battle of Debaltsevo is the close connection between Russian intelligence and indirect fire weapons, creating an almost instantaneous detection and fire system.
Additionally, the battle demonstrates the disintermediation of Russian operations, further accelerating the watch-and-fire system by removing the middle layer of control and fire authorization.
The battle also demonstrates how changes in organizational structure allow formations to operate at the tactical and operational levels of war.
Finally, the Battle of Debaltsevo illustrates the return of siege warfare.
An analysis of the Battle of Debaltsevo may suggest that Russia's use of "old" forms and methods of warfare has little to learn from the battle (or the study of any conventional battles of the Russo-Ukrainian War). However, this position, which suggests that Russia's traditional way of fighting is unjustified or unimportant because aspects of it may be perceived as “old,” is unnecessary and counterproductive for an organization such as the U.S. Army. The modern, Russian approach to war is very important for understanding, which is so little in the US military. Especially at the level of the brigade, combat group and below, where they are little familiar with such forms and methods of combat.
Russian-Ukrainian War: Strategic and Operational Context
Historian Lawrence Friedman, analyzing German Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke's position that political leaders should avoid interfering in warfare, states: "The idea of military strategy separated from political strategy is not only misleading, but also dangerous." Lawrence's position - correctly refuting Moltke's opinion, one can say that this is no less applicable today than during the wars of German unification. Therefore, in studying the Russo-Ukrainian War, it is instructive to briefly consider Russian policy, strategy, and operational context.
Historian Sarah Payne, who writes about Russian politics, says: “Russian strategy requires surrounding itself with weak neighbors and destabilizing those who threaten to become strong. This is a logical strategy for a large continental empire." Russian policy regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War is controversial, however, it appears that Russian policy is indeed similar to Payne's position, seeking to weaken Ukraine by creating a buffer between Russia and Western Europe.
Russian actions indicate that this buffer is linked to territorial and weapons capabilities. Moreover, Russian policy supports separatist actions in the Donbass to create breakaway governments, embodied in the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People's Republic (LPR).
Russian strategy in the Russo-Ukrainian War is focused on preserving the DPR and LPR and defeating Ukrainian forces that threaten the territorial integrity and/or continued existence of the DPR and LPR. Russia accomplishes these tasks through the use of limited hybrid warfare conducted by a combination of the Russian Armed Forces and trusted forces. Russia has reportedly armed over 9,000 people in conventional and non-conventional forces to achieve its strategic goals, including in this collaboration separatists, guerrillas and other proxy forces.
Russia's main operational objective is the territorial integrity of the people's republics in Donetsk and Lugansk. Preservation of critical transport hubs and communication lines, including roads and railways connecting the DPR, LPR and Russia, are subordinate operational goals. Other operational targets include areas of Donbass that have infrastructure (electricity, hydroelectric power, water treatment) that allows the people's republics to function independently of Ukraine. These operational objectives led to large-scale hostilities in various locations throughout the Donbass.
Russia's operational approach hovers around a strategy of attrition and attrition. The battles imposed by the Russians are focused on trapping Ukrainian ground force formations and slowly beating them up through the successive use of indirect fire and armored fighting vehicle strikes. The purpose of delaying the destruction of Ukrainian forces - rather than quickly destroying them - is that it: 1) Forces a desperate Ukrainian government to come to the negotiating table to make a deal to end the carnage, while... 2) It exhausts Ukrainian resources as they continue to waste their strength in protracted battles.
The battles of Ilovaisk (August 7-September 2, 2014) and Debaltseve demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach, as they led to the signing of the Minsk Protocol and the Minsk Agreement, respectively. Operational coverage and climax are controversial issues due to the proximity of Russian troops to their logistical bases in Russia and control of communications with the Southern Military District (SMD), which conducts resupply operations to forward Russian units as needed.
Russia’s hybrid war is well articulated in the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine”. Pundits argue that Gerasimov's ideas represent a new mental model of war or a new approach to war, but Russian actions indicate the effectiveness of the “Gerasimov Doctrine” in guiding Russian operational art, planning and tactical actions.
One of the important points of the “Gerasimov Doctrine” is that the levels of war have been compressed by modern and new technology. Thus, there is little distance (physical or temporal) between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war (Figure 1). Thus, there is an overlap between the levels of war and their associated battlefield activities. Such overlap can be seen in Russian actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War, as operational art and tactical actions are so intertwined that it is often difficult to find seams or differences between them.
The Russian Army, like many armies in recent years, has eliminated divisions and leveled out its expeditionary capabilities across its brigades and regiments. The Southern Military District serves as the headquarters of the field army of Russia's current security structure, from which Russian brigades are directly drawn. The field army directorate of the Russian Southern Military District is the main practitioner of operational art in this model. However, the field army is not alone in the exercise of operational art.
Russia has changed its force structure to operate within this paradigm, and the battalion tactical group (BTG) is the physical embodiment of this adjustment (Figure 2). The BTG is a tactical formation that has fire and air defense capabilities, allowing it to have one leg at the tactical level of war while the other leg can operate and influence the operational level of warfare. The operational-grade weapons most commonly found in Russian BTGs are the BM-21 Grad and 9A52-4 Tornado, which are stacked missile systems (MLRS) that fire 122mm rockets with a range of more than 20,000 meters and 90,000 meters respectively.
The BTG commander, as a result, is not only a tactician, but also a practitioner of operational art. However, this idea contradicts the doctrine of the US Army, which states: “Corps headquarters in the field army is the main headquarters at the operational level.” However, the BTG's ability to achieve operational results and hit operational-level targets brings it to the operational level of war.
The value of BTGr cannot be ignored. The BTG demonstrated its versatility, resilience, and overall usefulness in the Russo-Ukrainian War and, as a result, became the exclusive combat formation used by Russia in Ukraine. In light of the effectiveness of BTGs in the Russian-Ukrainian war, Russia is doubling down on its investment in their formation, aiming to increase the number of BTGs in the Russian army from 66 to 125 by 2018 and staff BTGs exclusively with professional soldiers.
Battle of Debaltsevo
The Battle of Debaltsevo began in the windswept snow of a cold Ukrainian winter on January 14, 2015. Ukrainian troops, both professional soldiers and volunteer battalions, decided to regain control of Debaltseve. The city, home to 25,000 residents, lies at the junction of several highways and railroads that are critical to both sides of the conflict (Figure 3). The significance of Debaltsevo lies in the fact that it is the nail that holds both halves of Donbass together, connecting the DPR and LPR with Russia (Fig. 4).
In turn, the city is vital for Ukraine because its ownership deprives Russia and its allies in the Donbass of a key line of communication. In addition, ownership of the city allows Ukrainian troops to freely advance into the separatist Donbass. Finally, Debaltsevo is a critical line of communication between soldiers on the front lines of the conflict with the forward tactical headquarters of Ukrainian troops in Artemovsk.
Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists took control of the city during the initial phase of Russia's hybrid campaign in April 2014, but their forces in the city were negligible. Ukrainian forces retook the city in July 2014 and maintained control of the city until January 2015, when Russia launched a comprehensive effort to retake the city, destroy Ukrainian Army forces, and send a message to local residents that the Ukrainian government would not be able to protect them.
Debaltsevo was a visible Ukrainian-controlled intrusion into separatist territory (Fig. 5). Russian BTGs, equipped with the latest T-80 and T-90 tanks, BMP-2 and BM-21 Grad, went into battle on the morning of January 14, 2015, with the support of separatist mechanized brigades. They attacked to pin down and destroy the Ukrainian forces defending Debaltseve. The offensive quickly took the form of a siege, as Russian and separatist forces sought to exact a heavy price from the Ukrainian army and the civilian population of Debaltseve in their pursuit of the city.
Ukrainian troops numbering approximately 8,000, belonging mainly to the 128th Mechanized Brigade and the Donbass Volunteer Battalion, were in trenches and fighting positions throughout the city, controlling critical infrastructure in Debaltseve.20 In the early hours of January 14, Ukrainian soldiers heard the ominous buzzing of Russian intelligence drones overhead before artillery and rocket fire rained down on their positions. Russian armored attacks were accompanied by artillery and missile strikes. Ukrainian forces sought refuge in their trenches, trying to understand the situation.
Russian and separatist attacks continued in a similar manner throughout the week - the siege was characterized by indiscriminate shelling of the city by BM-21 and 9A52-4 fire, mixed with artillery fire and tank attacks on Ukrainian positions. Russian drones patrolled overhead, searching for targets, while special forces, Main Intelligence Directorate operators and field troops assisted in target acquisition and local reconnaissance.
Aware of the Ukrainian predicament outside the village and the impact on civilians in the city, Russian troops began to relentlessly shell Debaltseve, further tightening their grip on the city. In an effort to further aggravate the situation, Russian and separatist forces reduced access to electricity, heat and water in the vicinity of Debaltseve on January 22, leading to a rapid decline in living conditions for the city's civilian population21. Within days, 8,000 civilians fled the city, and another 6,000 civilians were killed during the fighting for Debaltseve.
Russian and separatist forces controlled the base of the wedge on both sides and, on February 1, 2015, were on the verge of encircling the salient. The 128th Mechanized Brigade, Donbass Battalion and other Ukrainian troops still had access to their highest headquarters and support base in Artemovsk, northwest of Debaltsevo along the M03 highway. Low-intensity fighting continued from the beginning of the month until February 9, when separatists captured Logvinove, the last remaining supply route for Ukrainian troops to Debaltseve.
The battle for Debaltsevo intensified between 10 February and the end of the battle on 20 February. On February 10, Russian forces launched two concentrated attacks on the city, seeking to complete the encirclement of Ukrainian forces, resulting in 19 Ukrainian soldiers killed and 78 wounded. Ukrainian forces in Debaltseve were surrounded.
Russian troops then blocked traffic on the M03 motorway, the artery from Debaltseve to government-controlled territory and the operational headquarters in Artemovsk. The Russians began firing rockets from Debaltsevo at government and military headquarters buildings in Kramatorsk on February 11. Russian troops have deployed missile launchers and artillery to disrupt the movement of Ukrainian troops into or outside the city. At this point in the battle, the Ukrainian forces truly found themselves isolated and physically unable to escape their encirclement.
Russia, seeking to capitalize on the success of its recent offensives, deployed two more armored personnel carriers from the Southern Military District on the same day, consisting of more than 100 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and MLRS. The II Minsk Agreement, which was supposed to stop hostilities in Debaltseve, was signed on February 12. However, Russia ignored this agreement and its troops continued to mercilessly attack Ukrainian troops holding their defensive positions around Debaltseve.
On February 13, Russian troops began firing rockets from Debaltseve at Ukrainian positions in Artemovsk. Outside the city, supported by PDO fire, Russian armored personnel carriers and separatist mechanized brigades and battalions continued to accumulate over Ukrainian defensive positions. In addition, Russian BTGs fired salvo after salvo of missiles at Debaltsevo, destroying the city. Between 13-17 February, Ukrainian forces made minor breakthroughs from their encirclement, but were unable to strike hard enough to break through the Russian positions. Moreover, Russian control of the M03 highway, which linked the Ukrainian forward tactical headquarters in Artemovsk with Debaltseve, denied the Ukrainian government the ability to relieve its encircled forces in the city.
Russia, feeling the hopelessness of the Ukrainian situation, initiated its “blow of mercy” (coup de grace). Russian troops and their separatist allies launched a full-scale offensive on the city on February 17, 2015. Ukrainian troops, weakened by a month of constant fighting in harsh winter conditions, had reached a breaking point and could no longer maintain their grip on the city. With the approval of the Ukrainian government, Ukrainian troops began withdrawing from the city. By the night of February 18, about 2,500 Ukrainian troops had left Debaltsevo, but about 4,500 soldiers were still in and around the city. By the evening of February 19, 90 percent of the Ukrainian troops had already left and by the middle of February 20, 2015, Debaltsevo officially fell to Russia and the DPR/LPR.
The withdrawal of hostilities from Debaltsevo was not supposed to involve fighting, but rather be a peaceful exit along a pre-prepared corridor. Similarly, in the Battle of Ilovaisk, Russian troops did not comply with the agreement on a peaceful withdrawal. Instead, they attacked Ukrainian troops in the corridor. Ukrainian troops were forced to flee from the roads, abandon their vehicles and flee on foot. As a result, Russian troops destroyed a lot of Ukrainian military vehicles and captured about 100 Ukrainian soldiers.
The battle for control of Debaltsevo destroyed the 128th Mechanized Brigade and the Donbass Battalion as combat formations. Ukrainian losses amounted to 300 killed and 700 wounded. Russian and separatist casualties are much more difficult to determine as Russia continues to deny any involvement in the battle.
Reflections on the battle
The Russian victory in Debaltsevo is important because of what it gives Russia. Military analyst Hugo Spalding writes: "The collapse of Ukrainian defenses at Debaltseve has put Russia in a stronger position to coordinate future offensive operations, the basis of its military strategy in Ukraine." In addition, the victory cemented the connection between the DPR and LPR, ensuring further cooperation between the two Donbass states.
Russian intelligence
Russian operations at the Battle of Debaltsevo, as throughout the war, illustrate the Russian predilection for using unmanned aerial vehicles, special forces, GRU and partisan forces in combination with each other to provide intelligence support to the BTG and the headquarters of the Southern Military District. Speaking about the effectiveness of Russian intelligence, military analyst Philip Karber argues: “The Russians have broken the system at the intelligence-fire complex, at least at the tactical and operational level.”
Once a target is identified, this information is transmitted to the firing units, which fire the requested ammunition. This see-shoot cycle, which does not involve air support, is very sensitive and extremely effective. The Battle of Debaltsevo clearly demonstrates the Russian penchant for using rocket and artillery fire; The best example is the July 11, 2014 missile attack on Zelenopolye. As a result of the joint actions of Russian troops, reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles and cyber capabilities to detect Ukrainian formations, their communication was disrupted, after which they were hit by fire from BM-21 Grad and 9A52-4 Tornado troops of the Southern Military District. The strike, perhaps the apogee of Russian missile and artillery doctrine, resulted in the death of 30 Ukrainian soldiers, more than 100 wounded and the destruction of two battalions as a fighting force.
The Russian intelligence model is alien to the US Army model. The Russian army does not have reconnaissance formations similar to the US cavalry formations that provide reconnaissance for its ground forces. The Russian model combines unmanned aerial vehicles, special forces and guerrilla forces to conduct deep operational reconnaissance. BTGs use their units for local tactical reconnaissance. The purpose of this organizational structure is to speed up the flow of information into the formation it belongs to.
It is also important to understand that Russian intelligence services, primarily Spetsnaz and the GRU, do not operate or organize in the same way as US SOF forces. Russia's special forces are integrated into the ranks of regular Russian army formations and report directly to the commanders of these bodies. They do not operate in a parallel command structure with conventional forces such as U.S. Army Special Command commands. Thus, the commander of the notional force directs the actions of the special forces and the GRU, achieving a high level of cooperation within the Russian ground forces.
Russian fire superiority
The use of missiles and artillery dominates Russia's approach to ground warfare. The overwhelming use of artillery and missiles is not new to the Russian military mind; This is deeply rooted in the Russian way of war. Red Army doctrine in World War II was built around the idea of the "artillery offensive", in which ground combat formations such as tank and infantry units supported the advance of artillery and rockets, taking advantage of the success achieved through massive artillery fire. As historian John McGrath writes, "artillery fire was intended to destroy or suppress enemy defenses, with mobile forces maneuvering, using its results to occupy territory or otherwise realize the results of the fire."
What's new about the Russian approach to missile and artillery fire is how they detect targets and how they build the loop between observer and shooter. The ability of Russian forces to detect and lock on to the enemy, beyond the ability of their adversaries to do the same, cannot be set aside, especially given the associated ability to deliver massive amounts of missile and artillery fire almost instantly.
Lack of complex combat operations
The critical point to remember about Russian operations in Ukraine is that they are not complex - there are no aircraft of the Army Aviation and Russian Aerospace Forces in the air, which is hampered by the ownership of the airspace. This means that requests for fire support are more timely than they would otherwise be. While the US military prides itself on its cooperation, the Russians are of little concern, at least as far as the fighting in Ukraine is concerned.
In the Russian-Ukrainian war, the lack of complex actions of the armed forces is an advantage for the Russian ground forces, since their surveillance and shooting system is almost instantaneous, due to the lack of overhead aircraft to prevent indirect fire. In addition, most fire units are part of the BTGr. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that Russian forces are not constrained by the targeted use of strike capabilities and are not limited by collateral damage.
Return of siege warfare
Russian forces appear to be practicing trench warfare, using tactical actions to initiate desired responses, stimulating expected Ukrainian reactions. This is illustrated by many examples during the Russian-Ukrainian war; one of them is the Battle of Debaltseve, but it also includes the Battle of Lugansk Airport, as well as the first and second battles of Donetsk Airport and the Battle of Ilovaisk. Siege warfare is aided by Russia's penchant for suppressive fire to slowly erode Ukrainian combat power and political will, allowing Russia to pursue its associated operational goals.
Russian siege warfare also exploits the Ukrainian habit of “seizing the initiative,” quickly imposing a Russian provocation on the enemy before he has adequately assessed the situation to determine the best course of action. The reaction of Ukrainian forces in response to Russian offensives at the airports of Lugansk and Donetsk and in Ilovaisk are examples of how Russia lured Ukrainians into unintentional isolation, followed by siege. While the conditions that led to the Battle of Debaltsevo are somewhat different from those in Lugansk, Donetsk or Ilovaisk, each battle unfolded essentially in a similar way.
The point is that a force rushing to attack in the name of seizing the initiative can quickly find itself at a disadvantage against a nimble enemy seeking to capitalize on opportunities that often manifest themselves through the opponent's mistakes or actions.
Likewise, Russian siege warfare appears to be associated with its mixed operational approach focused on attrition and attrition. In each of the major battles in Ukraine, Russian forces had the ability to destroy Ukrainian troops, but they chose not to do so. Russian forces are not seeking a quick, decisive victory in Ukraine. Instead, they want to bleed the Ukrainian army clean, both in terms of personnel and combat vehicles such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery. The purpose of the siege, combined with the ubiquitous use of PDO fire, is to slowly destroy Ukrainian equipment and personnel. Further, the slow attrition of soldiers is likely to have a psychological impact on the Ukrainian people, making them less likely to volunteer for or support the Ukrainian armed forces or volunteer battalions that have taken part in much of the fighting in Ukraine.
The Russian siege is eroding public confidence in the ability of the government and military to coordinate the war. Both of these conditions, when connected with each other, can create national apathy in the Ukrainian population. This strategically weakens the Ukrainian government's ability to influence a positive outcome.
CONCLUSIONS
Today, the Russian army is not the same as the Soviet Army of the Cold War. However, it is important to remember that the Russian army is also not the same force that the US army faced in the deserts of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 1991 or in Iraq in 2003. The Russian Army is a formidable ground army that has proven itself to be a modern “conventional” war. This in itself requires respect and analysis. The Russian-Ukrainian war provides an insight into the modern doctrine of the Russian army. Hybrid warfare in Ukraine, saddled with its cyber-electronic and information-operational overtones, dwarfs the conventional combat campaign waged just below the visible surface.
The Battle of Debaltsevo represents the totality of the experience of the Russian army during the Russian-Ukrainian war. The main features of the battle associated with the Russian army include the close cooperation of Russian intelligence with the indirect fire forces and the creation of a highly sensitive surveillance and fire system. Moreover, the battle demonstrates the lack of intermediate links to Russian operations in the Russian-Ukrainian war, which paradoxically makes the Russian army more lethal than they otherwise could be.
The battle is another example of Russian siege warfare being used not only to dilute forces at the tactical and operational levels, but also to strategically exhaust the reserves of the Ukrainian army and government in order to gain major victories in information operations regarding the interaction of the Ukrainian government with its people. Finally, the battle demonstrates the usefulness of BTGs, which are the byproduct of thoughtful innovation, to find the best combination of capabilities at each echelon of command and fit the modern type of warfare.
(c) Amos S. Fox
Taken from Facebook page (Alexander Gelfand)
Exactly a year ago these days, the battles for Debaltseve, a large and strategically important railway junction in the Donetsk region, were in full swing. By this day, the militia had actually surrounded the Ukrainian military - the road to Artemovsk, along which the Ukrainian Armed Forces were supplied, was cut off on February 10, and then the final stage of the Debaltsevo Cauldron tragedy began.
The offensive of the militias did not stop even after the signing of the Second Minsk Agreement on February 12 - surrounded Ukrainian soldiers, often left without commanders, continued to resist. However, a week later it was all over: on February 18, the DPR and LPR militias announced the establishment of complete control over the city.
Strangely enough, despite the seemingly complete victory of the army of the self-proclaimed republics, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine spoke about the battle for Debaltsevo as almost their own achievement, saying that the battles “exhausted the strength” of the militias, who were unable to continue the offensive. By the way, in part, this may be true, only in Ukraine for some reason no one congratulated the generals on this “success”.
Until now, no one knows exactly how many soldiers died near Debaltseve and in the city itself. Naturally, each side counts the enemy’s losses in the thousands, and their own in the tens or, in the worst case, hundreds. At the same time, the command of both the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the militia of the self-proclaimed republics claims that the numerical superiority was, of course, on the side of the opponents, and they, they say, fought “not with numbers, but with skill.”
The Ukrainian side also still says that the militias were heavily supported by the Russian military. “We have confirmed facts of the participation of Russian troops in the battles for Debaltsevo - this is unambiguous,” said Viktor Muzhenko, Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, just yesterday. “There is no doubt that everything was done with the knowledge of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” he added.
The participants in these events, who today share their memories, could not say anything about the “Russian military” - they did not have a chance to meet. In their units there were only locals, natives of the Lugansk region, to be more precise. It is clear that they cannot “account” for the entire war, talk about this battle from beginning to end, like professional military historians, and that their assessments cannot be completely objective. After all, this is the view of people “from this side”, for whom the Ukrainian Armed Forces fighters at that time were not “unfortunate boys abandoned by their commanders”, but the enemies who shot at them - no more, no less. But this is a story about what Debaltsevo was like for them - about their war.
The deputy commander of the patrol service battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the LPR, now a lieutenant colonel, Yuri Vyraskov retired from the police with the rank of captain before the war. However, there was no need to rest for long. Nine months after his dismissal, former colleagues knocked on his door, among them was the current battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Mushta. The conversation was not easy. We talked about the situation in the country, about the Maidan, about the fact that you can’t sit at home. So, the “retired captain” returned to duty. By the way, not all retired policemen followed his example.
On January 28 last year, as part of a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the LPR, Yuri went to a military review in Stakhanov, where the soldiers learned that they were being sent to the front. Even the commanders did not know where and why they were going. As a result, we arrived in the village of Kalinovo. The detachment was tasked with holding positions near that same “Debaltsevo cauldron.”
“We ended up in the village of Kalinovo. This was the front line in front of Troitsky and Popasnaya, Debaltsevo was a little to the left of us. Our task was not to miss help from the enemy from Troitsky and Popasna, and also not to allow the Ukrainian soldiers who found themselves in the “Debaltseve Cauldron” to escape through us,” the deputy battalion commander recalls. - Chernukhino was not far from us, and we should not have allowed the enemy to move from there either. To the left of us, 1.5-2 km, stood the “Berkut”, employees of the Lugansk regional police departments, the “Don” unit, the sixth company of the Ministry of Defense.”
Yuri Valentinovich initially hid his location from his wife. Only the daughter, who also serves in the BPS, knew this “secret”, but a week later she still had to confess. Other fighters also tried to “keep it secret,” because everyone already knew very well what “Debaltsevo” was. The policemen who became soldiers spoke on the phone with their relatives no more than once a week - they were afraid of radio intelligence, and they didn’t want to disturb their relatives again, especially since they had enough of their own problems - there was no time to talk.