Today in Ukraine there is the following version of events: “On August 18, 1941, in panic, Stalin’s troops retreating from Ukraine, occupied by the Bolsheviks since 1920, trying to stop the Wehrmacht’s advance to the East, despite the danger to civilians and possible thousands of casualties, cynically blew up the dam of a Ukrainian power plant Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, near Zaporozhye... As a result of the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station dam by the Bolsheviks, from the resulting giant Dnieper wave, about 100,000 (one hundred thousand) people of the innocent civilian population of Ukraine died. “The Soviet occupation authorities in Ukraine did not take into account the lives of the people of the Ukraine (UNR) they enslaved since 1920.”
Of course, this is nonsense. But the truth is the fact that the Dnieper dam exploded on that day... According to the order, the retreating troops of the Red Army disabled the turbines of the hydroelectric power station and blew up the dam. Today we can say with confidence that the destruction of the DneproGES turbines and the destruction of the turbine hall are one thing. And secondly, the explosion of the DneproGES dam. The first was completely justified. The equipment was damaged enough effective way, which, in particular, was admired by the German Minister of Armaments Albert Speyer. Switched the lubricant distribution mode when working on full power turbines, they became hot and very quickly turned into scrap metal. The Germans could no longer restore the turbines, so they installed their own. As for blowing up the dam, it was, by and large, great stupidity. Because the Germans sealed this gap in the dam anyway. And the DneproGES itself was operated. And as a result of the explosion of the dam, those Soviet soldiers who were crossing the dam at that moment were killed, plus Zaporozhye, which was still occupied by Soviet troops at that moment, was flooded, significant parts of the Soviet troops that were located downstream were flooded, or they were cut off by water and forced were to surrender. That is, it was senseless stupidity.
And the Germans quickly restored the dam. Naturally, by the hands of the local population. Rebuilt dam, 1942.
It must be said that when the Germans left, they also tried to blow it up. But the Red Army in 1943, as a result of a successful operation, managed to prevent such a course of events...
After the destruction of the Dnieper dam and the Dnieper hydroelectric station, the entire party leadership fled to the east. A week later, on the orders of Moscow, most of these unfortunate leaders returned back to Zaporozhye and for some time before the arrival of the Germans continued to “lead” and assure that Zaporozhye “will never be surrendered to the enemy”, that the enemy will not be allowed beyond the Dnieper. They explained the advance destruction of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station as “hostile sabotage”, “sabotage”...
After the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, the defense of Zaporozhye continued for another month and a half. In September, at least 620 wagons left the city every day to the east, and on some days - about 900. Only for the removal of one Zaporizhstal plant, 8 thousand wagons were required. 22 factories of Union importance and 26 light and food industry enterprises were removed. In addition, mechanical engineering, pedagogical institutes and other educational institutions, the theater named after. M.K. Zankovetskaya, a radio center, a film and film fund, valuable exhibits of the regional museum of local lore and much more. It was a heroic feat of Zaporozhye workers and engineers...
On October 4, workers and engineers who participated in the dismantling of the factories left the city. Only then did German troops enter Zaporozhye. They were met by fires and mines. Everything that could not be transported to the east was blown up or set on fire. What happened on August 18, 1941 at the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station and who gave the order to blow up the dam? Leonid Sosnitsky claims that the order for the destruction of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station was given by the commander of the South-Western direction Budyonny S.M... After the war, many involved in this tried to generally present the undermining of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station as an unauthorized and alarmist action...
The destruction of the hydroelectric station could have been much more monstrous if not for the heroic efforts of the scouts, divers and other fighters of the units of Major Bubentsov and Captain Soshinsky, if not for the active actions of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Hitler's invaders developed a plan for the complete destruction of the station. The size of individual charges for the destruction of individual structures of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station can be judged by a landmine discovered in one of the spans of the dam. 100 half-ton bombs and 3,500 kg of tola were planted here. This charge did not explode only because our scouts cut the electrical wires in time... December 29, 1943 Soviet army liberated the territory of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station from the fascist invaders. On February 23, 1944, a decision was made State Committee Defense on the restoration of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station.
“...The first thing was to establish a connection with the right bank through a through gallery in the body of the dam. We walked along it and even drove cars. And in order to get to the pattern, you had to cross a hanging bridge. I had to work a lot. They took on some task and worked until they finished it. It was a difficult time, but a good one.”
From the memoirs of the secretary of the party organization Gidrospetsstroy during the restoration period, Dneprostroy veteran K. Usanova. 1978
“The Dneprostroevites were faced with a seemingly impossible task. The difficulty was that at the start of work, the practice of Soviet and world hydraulic engineering had absolutely no experience in restoring large hydraulic structures. Neither our nor foreign textbooks on hydraulic engineering gave answers to complex questions about design methods and methods of restoration work, about restoration technology, etc. But the Dnieper construction workers did not wait for new textbooks on hydraulic engineering to be published... The experience of restoring the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station will be be studied by hydraulic engineers and students. And especially their attention will be attracted to solutions to those technical problems that are associated with the most exciting days at Denprostroy. I mean the struggle of the Dnieper construction workers for the passage of Dnieper water using the bottom holes we punched in the body of the dam, and then closing them with special shields, as well as the team’s fight with the flood of 1945.”
The damage caused to the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant's structures was estimated at 500 million rubles (not counting the damage caused to the national economy by the loss of the largest energy base). Of the 47 spillway spans, only 14 survived. About 65 thousand cubic meters of the dam's concrete masonry was completely destroyed, and 62 thousand cubic meters of masonry were more or less damaged by cracks and other deformations. The explosion caused the turbine room building to move to the side by 30-40 centimeters. Elements of reinforced concrete covering and wall filling were scattered hundreds of meters around by the force of the explosion. The frame of the building was severely deformed. All turbines, generators, overhead cranes, transformers were piles of mangled metal.
The waters of the Dnieper passed through holes formed after damage to several spans of the dam and the adjacent abutment. Water also flowed through the ruins of the switchboard room and the turbine room. 500-600 cubic meters of water per second passed through these places. To begin inspecting and eliminating damage to the hydroelectric station, dam and other structures of the junction, it was necessary to reduce the river level. To do this, it was decided to use explosions to punch through 15 through holes with a cross-section of 25 in the lower part of the dam. square meters. In a minimally short period of time - four months - by mid-May 1944, nine bottom holes were punched. As a result, the water level in the Dnieper decreased. The flood threat has passed. It became possible to carry out dismantling of concrete rubble, dismantling of metal structures and equipment along the entire front of pressure structures...
On March 3, 1947, the first restored unit of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station provided electricity to the industry of the Dnieper region...
anti-Sovietsky in Detonation of the DneproGES DamFrom the first months of the war, the Soviet leadership tried to use “scorched earth” tactics during the retreat. That is, to destroy the entire infrastructure without any concern for the future fate of the population who could not evacuate. One of the most brutal manifestations of this tactic was the mining of the Dnieper hydroelectric dam in Zaporozhye. On August 18, 1941, at about 20:00, after a breakthrough by German troops, it was blown up.
The detonation task was carried out by military engineers authorized by the General Staff of the Red Army with 20 tons of explosives - ammonal, as a result of which a gigantic hole was formed in the dam, which already provoked a wave 7-12 meters high, which practically washed away the coastal city strip, the floodplain of the island. Khortitsa and safely reached the neighboring Ukrainian cities - Nikopol and Marganets. No one was warned about the planned explosion of the Dnieper dam, either on the dam itself, along which at that time military transports and troops were moving, which were retreating to the left bank of the Dnieper, or the population and institutions of the city of Zaporozhye - 10-12 kilometers from the hydroelectric power station downstream of the Dnieper. Also, the military units located down from Zaporozhye in the Dnieper floodplains were not warned, although the telephone connection at that time on the Left Bank functioned normally. In the USSR, the version about “hostile sabotage by the German occupiers” was widespread.
Military transports and people who were moving along the dam at that time naturally died. As a result of the explosion of the bridge and dam on the island of Khortitsa, an infantry regiment, which was being transported at that time to the eastern shore, was cut off.
From the memoirs of the German architect Rudolf Wolters, who in 1932-33. took part in the industrialization of the USSR, and 10 years later returned to the occupied USSR to restore the economy: “...During the retreat, the Russians blew up a dam in the middle at a width of 175 meters. 3,000 refugees who were on the dam at that time were carried away by the current. Water masses 5-6 meters thick fall from a 15-meter height through a gap and lower the water level so that the pier in the upper reaches is on dry land, and there is not enough pressure to rotate the turbines. The locks also remain dry after the explosion, so shipping is paralyzed. Not only the dam, but the machinery was mostly destroyed. During the retreat, the Russians turned off the central lubrication system, so that the machines instantly overheated and caught fire. What then were the machine rooms, turbines and generators was a masterful work of destruction. And today the cracked ones are visible reinforced concrete walls, melted iron parts; everything is rendered unusable..."
An avalanche of water swept through the Dnieper floodplain, flooding everything in its path. The entire lower part of Zaporozhye with huge reserves of various goods, military materials and tens of thousands of tons food products and other property was demolished within an hour. Dozens of ships, along with their crews, perished in that terrible stream. The force of the wave generated by the explosion of the DneproGES dam was such that the Volochaevka monitor was thrown ashore and could then be used as a defensive structure only on land.
In the floodplain zone of the island of Khortitsa and the Dnieper floodplains, tens of kilometers to Nikopol and further, military units were in positions. The explosion of the dam sharply raised the water level in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where at that time the crossing of the troops of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, the 18th and 9th Armies, which were retreating near Nikolaev, began. These troops were “cut off” during the crossing, partly replenished the number of troops that were surrounded and captured, and partly managed to cross in incredibly difficult conditions, abandoning artillery and military equipment.
It is believed that approximately 20 thousand Red Army soldiers died in the floodplains at that time (there is no exact data). Local residents buried the bodies near the railway bridge on Khlyastikovy Street. In addition to the troops, tens of thousands of livestock and many people who were at work there at that time died in the floodplains.
According to a combat report dated August 19 from the headquarters of the Southern Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station dam was carried out by the head of the Military Engineering Department of the headquarters of the Southern Front, Lieutenant Colonel A. Petrovsky and a representative of the General Staff, the head of a separate scientific research military engineering institute (Moscow) military engineer 1 rank B. Epov. They acted according to the orders of the General Staff of the Red Army, having received permission to blow up the dam in case of emergency.
It is almost impossible to determine the exact number of deaths; available sources allow us to estimate only approximate losses of the warring parties. The German command claimed that it had lost 1.5 thousand of its soldiers.
On the Soviet side, most of the region’s 200 thousand militia were in the zone affected by the flood, rifle division(one of its regiments remained on Khortitsa Island), an NKVD regiment, two artillery regiments, as well as smaller units. The personnel of these units total more than 20 thousand soldiers. In addition, on the night of August 18, in a wide strip from Nikopol to Kakhovka and Kherson, the withdrawal of two combined arms armies and a cavalry corps began to the left bank. This is another 12 divisions (150-170 thousand soldiers and officers). In addition to the military, residents of the low-lying streets of Zaporozhye, villages on both banks of the Dnieper, and refugees suffered from the sudden flood. The estimated number of people in the affected area is 450 thousand people. Based on these data, the number of dead Red Army soldiers, militias and civilians on the Soviet side in historical studies is estimated from 20-30 thousand to 75-100 thousand.
The Germans, with the help of Wehrmacht engineers and the forces of Soviet workers, managed to restore the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station; they paid for the work in Reichsmarks. It is believed that in the late autumn of 1943, the Germans, during their retreat, also attempted to blow up the Dnieper Hydroelectric Dam. At the same time, the plan to destroy the dam was not implemented and it was not destroyed, since Soviet sappers managed to damage some of the wires to the detonators. And yet, either as a result of Soviet bombing or the Germans, the hydroelectric station, the roadway of the dam, the outer bridge and the connecting abutment on the right bank were destroyed. The Soviet leadership made the decision to restore the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station in 1944 - and it was mainly women who restored it, clearing the rubble of crushed concrete, which weighed a quarter of a million tons, manually in Soviet style. They had the same traditional Soviet tools - a wheelbarrow, a pickaxe and a shovel.
Sources:
1. Khmelnitsky D.S. Nazi propaganda against the USSR. Materials and comments. 1939-1945.
2. Central Archive Ministry of Defense Russian Federation. - F.228. - Op.754. - Ref.60. - Arc.95.
3. Moroko V.N. Dneproges: black August 1941.
4. Scientific works Faculty of History, Zaporozhye National University. - M.: ZNU, 2010. - VIP.XXIX. - P.200-201.
5. Rummo A.V. Tell people the truth.
6. Sociological research. - Moscow, 1990. - No.9. - P.128.
During the retreat on August 18, 1941, the fleeing Red Army blew up the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station dam, killing 100,000 Ukrainians in the abyss.
The advancing German soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, in a daze with horror, only watched through binoculars as the drama of the death of tens of thousands of people unfolded.
The Germans, with the help of Wehrmacht engineers and Ukrainian workers, managed to restore the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, and even paid for the work in Reichsmarks. But not having worked for a year, during the counter-offensive of Stalin’s troops, it had to be blown up again. Now during the German retreat. By the way, by the way, not a single Soviet, not a single German and not a single Ukrainian civilian died during this German operation...
Ukraine needs to make a disaster film about this.
On August 18, 1941, in panic, Stalin’s troops retreating from Ukraine, occupied by the Bolsheviks since 1920, trying to stop the Wehrmacht’s advance to the East, despite the danger to civilians and possible thousands of casualties, cynically blew up the dam of the Ukrainian power plant DneproGES, near Zaporozhye... As a result When the Bolsheviks exploded the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station dam, the resulting gigantic Dnieper wave killed about 100,000 (one hundred thousand) innocent civilians of Ukraine. - The Soviet occupation authorities in Ukraine did not take into account the lives of the people of the Ukraine they had enslaved since 1920 (UNR).
Only with the restoration of Ukraine's independence from the USSR did the Cossacks begin to slowly commemorate their fellow countrymen who died at the hands of Stalin's fleeing army on August 18, 1941.
On August 18, 1941, hastily leaving the city, Soviet soldiers blew up the main strategic facility - the DneproGES - with 20 tons of explosives - ammonal, which resulted in a giant hole in the dam, which already provoked a wave several tens of meters high, which practically washed away the coastal city strip, melt about. Khortitsa and safely reached the neighboring Ukrainian cities - Nikopol and Marganets. The Soviet command did not even warn the civilian population and their OWN troops about the danger! That is why the USSR preferred not to talk about the tragic events in Zaporozhye associated with the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station.
It was the same with Chernobyl, the death of Kursk, Nord-Ost, Beslan... - the Russian-Soviet fascist management tradition continues to rule over us even now.
Then, to justify themselves, they came up with the version of “hostile sabotage by the German occupiers.” But now, with access to the archives of the USSR, Ukrainian historians have received documentary evidence that lifts the curtain on the inhumanity of this terrible tragedy. The Dnieper wave then swallowed up about a hundred thousand people: in the abyss of the man-made water element, 80 thousand Cossacks, refugees from neighboring regions, and about 20 thousand retreating Soviet soldiers choked and died.
The irony was that the man-made Soviet tsunami did little harm to the advancing German army, but killed 100,000 ordinary Ukrainians. - German soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, in a daze with horror, only watched through binoculars as the unfolding drama of the death of tens of thousands of people - Soviet civilians and military personnel.
Happy “Great Victory Day” - “I remember! I'm proud!"
DECLASSIFIED SOVIET DATA:
In response to your letter No. 19760/09-38 dated 08/17/2011 regarding the provision of information we inform you as follows.
1. “The explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station was organized by the NKVD, which led to the death of 100 thousand people.” According to a combat report dated August 19 from the headquarters of the Southern Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station dam was carried out by the head of the Military Engineering Department of the headquarters of the Southern Front, Lieutenant Colonel O. Petrovsky and a representative of the General Staff, the head of a separate scientific research military engineering institute (Moscow) military engineer 1 rank B.Epov [Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. - F.228. - Op.754. - Ref.60. - Arc.95]. They acted according to the orders of the General Staff of the Red Army, having received permission to blow up the dam in case of emergency.
It is almost impossible to determine the exact number of deaths; available sources allow us to estimate only approximate losses of the warring parties. It is known about the probable death of 1,500 German soldiers [Moroko V.N. Dneproges: black August 1941 // Scientific works of the history department of Zaporozhye National University. - M.: ZNU, 2010. - VIP.XXIX. - P.200].
On the Soviet side, most of the region’s 200 thousand militia, an infantry division (one of its regiments remained on Khortitsa Island), an NKVD regiment, two artillery regiments, and smaller units were in the zone affected by the flood. The personnel of these units total more than 20 thousand soldiers. In addition, on the night of August 18, in a wide strip from Nikopol to Kakhovka and Kherson, the withdrawal of two combined arms armies and a cavalry corps began to the left bank. This is another 12 divisions (150-170 thousand soldiers and officers). In addition to the military, residents of the low-lying streets of Zaporozhye, villages on both banks of the Dnieper, and refugees suffered from the sudden flood. The estimated number of people in the affected area is 450 thousand people. Based on these data, the number of dead Red Army soldiers, militias and civilians on the Soviet side in historical studies is estimated from 20-30 thousand (F. Pigido, V. Moroko) to 75-100 thousand (A. Rummo) [Moroko V.N. Dneproges: black August 1941 // Scientific works of the history department of Zaporozhye National University. - M.: ZNU, 2010. - VIP.XXIX. - P.201; Rummo A.V. Tell people the truth // Sociological research. - Moscow, 1990. - No.9. - P.128]. By the way, the impetus for A. Rummo to study the issue was also a personal motive: his grandfather was among the Soviet citizens who died on the island. Khortitsa. So, the demolition of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station was carried out by military engineers authorized by the General Staff of the Red Army. Estimates of the number of victims by various researchers range from 20,000 people (F. Pigido, V. Moroko) to 75-100 thousand (A. Rummo).
P.S. At the moment, it is not known for sure whether direct descendants of the Soviet military men responsible for this atrocity occupy senior government positions in Ukraine, which is already independent from the USSR.
Crimes of the NKVD. Explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station on August 18, 1941
On August 18, 1941, the Soviet leadership, in panic, ordered the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station dam, along which refugees and retreating Soviet troops were walking at that time. The explosion created a giant wave that killed several thousand more Soviet citizens and military personnel.
This myth is used to “illustrate” the inhumanity of the Soviet leadership and its disregard for the lives of its own citizens.
Examples of using
Option 1“By order of the commander of the South-Western direction, Semyon Budyonny, sappers of the 157th NKVD regiment undermine the Dnieper hydroelectric station. The explosion only partially destroyed the dam, but a huge wall of water rushed downstream. According to eyewitnesses, the wave height was several tens of meters. It destroyed not only German crossings and a relatively small number of enemy troops.
Option #2
Giant whirlpools cut off and literally sucked in our two retreating combined arms armies and a cavalry corps. Only a few scattered groups were able to swim out, then they were surrounded and captured. The wave hit the Zaporozhye coastal strip and columns of refugees.
Option #3
In addition to troops and refugees, many people who worked there, the local civilian population, and hundreds of thousands of livestock died in the floodplains and coastal zone. Dozens of ships and their crews perished in the catastrophic flood.
Option #4
“Then, during the retreat of our troops, it was decided to blow up the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station. Only a few knew about secret encryption. But the operation did not go as planned. The charge was not calculated; as a result, a gap was formed in the body of the dam 5 times larger than the calculated one. A powerful stream of water rushed into the lower reaches of the Dnieper. A gigantic wave washed away all coastal villages with local residents, and destroyed the pontoon crossings of our troops. As a result of the flood, the soldiers of two combined arms armies and a cavalry corps, for the most part, were surrounded and captured.
Option #5
All work to prepare the explosion was carried out in secret from the front command, since the Front’s Military Council did not give permission for this.
Option #6
A breakthrough wave about 25 meters high rushed down the river bed. The gigantic stream destroyed all coastal villages along its path, burying several thousand civilians. Two combined arms armies and a cavalry corps were cut off during the crossing. Some of the soldiers managed to cross the Dnieper in difficult conditions, but most of the military personnel were surrounded and captured.”
Option #7
“No one was warned about the planned explosion of the Dnieper dam, either at the dam itself, along which at that time military transports and troops were moving, which were retreating to the left bank of the Dnieper, or the population and institutions of the city of Zaporozhye - 10-12 kilometers from the hydroelectric power station downstream of the Dnieper . Also, the military units located down from Zaporozhye in the Dnieper floodplains were not warned.
Option #8
Military transports and people who were moving along the dam at that time naturally died. An almost thirty-meter avalanche of water swept through the Dnieper floodplain, flooding everything in its path. Dozens of ships, along with their crews, perished in that terrible stream.
Option #9
The explosion of the dam sharply raised the water level in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where at that time the crossing of the troops of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, the 18th and 9th Armies, which were retreating near Nikolaev, began. These troops were “cut off” during the crossing, partly replenished the number of troops that were surrounded and captured, and partly managed to cross in incredibly difficult conditions, abandoning artillery and military equipment.
Option #10
They said that approximately 20,000 Red Army soldiers died in the floodplains at that time - no one thought to count exactly how many. In addition to the troops, tens of thousands of livestock and many people who were at work there at that time died in the floodplains.”
Option #11
“Then, from the huge wave caused by the explosion, from 75 to 100,000 unwarned residents and about 20,000 Red Army soldiers, forgotten by the command and not evacuated, died.”
Option #12
“On August 18, 1941, in panic, Stalin’s troops retreating from Ukraine, occupied by the Bolsheviks since 1920, trying to stop the Wehrmacht’s advance to the East, despite the danger to civilians and possible thousands of casualties, cynically blew up the dam of the Ukrainian power plant DneproGES, near Zaporozhye... As a result of the explosion Bolsheviks dammed the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, from the resulting giant Dnieper wave, then about 100,000 (one hundred thousand) people of the innocent civilian population of Ukraine died. German soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, in a daze with horror, only watched through binoculars as the unfolding drama of the death of tens of thousands of people - Soviet civilians and military personnel.”
Reality
It is better to divide the analysis of this myth into several parts, and we can start with the fact that supposedly no one knew about the impending explosion of the dam, including the command of the Soviet troops defending it.The explosion of the DneproGES dam was carried out on the basis of a code from Stalin and the chief General Staff Red Army Shaposhnikov to the command of the Southern Front. To carry out this operation the chief engineering troops General Kotlyar sent an experienced demolitionist, Lieutenant Colonel Boris Epov, to the Red Army. To communicate with the front engineering department, he was paired with a technical department specialist, Lieutenant Colonel Petrovsky. This is what former Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars M.G. writes in his memoirs. Pervukhin: “In the afternoon, when the laying of explosives was almost completed, a representative of the front headquarters arrived, who handed the representatives of the military command at the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Direction, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, specifying the date of the explosion. It stated that in case of danger of the dam being occupied by the Germans, it should be put out of action.
It was getting dark, and the soldiers crossed the turna to the left bank, since it was no longer possible to pass along the dam from above, because it was under heavy enemy artillery fire. The moment came when the commander of the military unit defending the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station closed the contacts battery, a dull explosion shook the dam.”
photo taken May 5, 1942
And here is what the direct organizer of the explosion, Lieutenant Colonel Epov, writes in his memoirs:
On August 14, the chief of the engineering troops, General L.Z., called me. Kotlyal and offered to give considerations on the decommissioning of the Dnieper hydroelectric station by destroying the dam, the bridge across the fore-chamber and the turbine room and the materials necessary for this, and also ordered me to fly in the morning by a special plane to Zaporozhye to prepare the planned destruction, giving me two junior lieutenants and giving the necessary instructions to the chief of the engineering troops of the Southern Front, Colonel Shifrin.
Arriving in Zaporozhye and making sure that by another plane necessary materials delivered and are at the airfield, I reported to the commander of the front and the member of the military council of the front, T. Kolomiets, who was in Zaporozhye, and then, with the help of the mentioned junior lieutenants and the allocated one battalion, began to prepare for the execution of the received task. At that time, the head of DneproEnergo was preparing and evacuating the station’s generators. Security preparatory work led the NKVD regiment.
The chief of staff of the front, General Kharitonov, who arrived along with commander Shifrin, gave instructions to carry out the destruction after the Germans reached the right bank of the Dnieper. The right to carry out the task will be the departure of the NKVD security regiment and Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Petrovsky, specially allocated for communications.
By the end of the day on August 18, the Germans reached the right bank of the Dnieper and began shelling the left bank; The NKVD regiment also retreated to the left bank and the regiment commander, retreating along with his liaison Lieutenant Colonel Petrovsky, gave the command to carry out the destruction, which I, together with the attached junior lieutenants, carried out. As a result of the explosion, about 100 meters along its length were torn out in the body of the dam (from total length dam equal to 600m).
The head of the political department of the front, General Zaporozhets, had to report on the execution of the destruction, since the entire composition of the Military Council of the front was in the troops and at the front headquarters.
Zaporozhets was the senior officer; but he was in a panicky mood, since he was located with the front headquarters on the left bank, while the Germans had already reached the right bank, and, in addition, he was not aware of the GOKO decision on the removal of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station from operation. Therefore, his reaction was: “Hand over your weapons.” The idle adjutant, having taken the revolver from me and not knowing what to do with me, in view of the order that had already been received to redeploy the headquarters deep into the defense, transferred me to the jurisdiction of front-line counterintelligence (employees of the 3rd Directorate of NPOs in war time, from April 19, 1943 SMERSH). Counterintelligence officers, not knowing about the GOKO order, charged me with treason and for ten days questioned me about whose sabotage task I was carrying out; and then, having understood the true state of the matter, they did not know how to get out of the created incident. At this time, General Kotlyar received an appointment with Comrade Stalin and reported to him about this incident; Stalin immediately gave instructions in the evening, and in the morning at 6 o’clock I was already released from arrest; the head of front-line counterintelligence apologized to me and took measures to put me in order and transfer me to the headquarters of the front engineering troops, and from there I returned by plane to Moscow on September 20.
Photo taken May 8, 1942
Thus, as we see, the command of the Southern Front was not only aware of the impending explosion, but also actively took part in its preparation. By the way, the memories of direct witnesses of the explosion also put an end to the chilling story about the crossing troops and refugees blown up along with the dam.
Now let's consider the fate of two armies and a cavalry corps, allegedly washed away by the resulting wave.
Photo taken May 8, 1942
Crossing 9th. and the 18th Army across the Dnieper.
On August 17, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Direction authorized the withdrawal of troops from the Southern Front to the Dnieper in order to organize a strong defense at the line of this major water barrier. On the evening of the same day, combat order No. 0077/OP was issued by the commander of the Southern Front troops, which determined the procedure for the withdrawal of troops of the two armies from the line of the Ingulets River beyond the Dnieper. The 2nd Cavalry Corps was supposed to retreat to the Nikopol - Nizhny Rogachik area. The 18th Army was withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Dnieper with the task of taking up defense in the Nikopol - Nizhny Rogachik - Kakhovka sector. Accordingly, the 9th Army is in the Kakhovka-Kherson sector. The withdrawal was to be covered by strong rearguards and air operations. After the crossing, the newly formed 30th Cavalry Division was transferred to the 18th Army, and the commander of the 9th Army was ordered to subordinate the 296th Infantry Division. Thus, all the armies of the front one way or another received secondary divisions under their command.On the section from Nikopol to Kherson, the width of the Dnieper is on average about one and a half kilometers. Cumbersome pontoon parks were lost on the roads and in battles during the retreat. For example, the 2nd Cavalry Corps was forced to leave its pontoon park on the Southern Bug River to cross the retreating units of the 18th Army. The remains of the pontoon-bridge property preserved in the armies could only be used for the construction of light ferries. The ships of the Dnieper River Shipping Company came to the aid of the troops. Barges and floating piers were quickly adapted for ferries; everything that could be used for the crossing was mobilized.
As a result, three ferry crossings were built:
1) for the 2nd Cavalry Corps - three ferries on wooden boats near Nizhny Rogachik (for the 5th Cavalry Division, horses had to be transported by swimming), a towing steamer with a barge - near Bolshaya Lepatikha (for the 9th Cavalry Division);
2) for formations of the 18th Army - a ferry on barges and two ferries on improvised means in the Kochkarovka area;
3) for formations of the 9th Army - two ferries in the Western Kairy area, three ferries on barges in the Kakhovka area and two ferries near Tyaginka.
Please note that the ferry crossing is not a floating bridge. Made up of a pontoon fleet or improvised means, the ferry was forced to move from one shore to another, each time transporting a relatively small number of people and equipment. At the same time, the average duration of the ferry voyage was about one hour. The troops of two armies and a cavalry corps began crossing on the morning of August 18. Strict timing, precise organization of loading and unloading, and round-the-clock operation of tugboats made it possible to transport the bulk of the troops to the eastern shore by the morning of August 22. At the same time, I note that the crossing took place after the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station.
It should be noted that this entire operation could not have taken place if the ferries were attacked from the air. It would have been enough for enemy aviation to smash the ferries, and the troops would have been pinned to the shore of a wide and deep (especially after the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station) river. Fortunately, there were no serious enemy air raids along the entire front of the crossing of the 18th and 9th armies.
It is not surprising that the order of the 9th Army headquarters dated August 21 states:
ORDER
TROOPS OF THE 9th ARMY
August 21, 1941
№ 00173
Forced to retreat from the Dniester to the Dnieper, the 9th Army by August 21 successfully crossed the Dnieper in difficult conditions and consolidated on the left bank of the latter.
The task of the army in this period is to put its combat units, its rear, headquarters and command and control facilities in order.
Having replenished its ranks, the army must be ready for decisive blows to defeat and destroy the presumptuous enemy.
…
Commanders of the 9th Army
Colonel General Cherevichenko
Member of the Military Council 9A
Corps Commissar Kolobyakov
Nashtarm 9
Major General Bodin
This is also evidenced by the directive of the command of the Southern Front:
Directive
commander of the troops
Southern Front
No. 0083/op
for defense
on the left bank
R. Dnieper
(21 August 1941)
…
Fifth. 18 A- composition of 176, 164, 169 rifle divisions and 96 civil divisions and 30 cd.
The task is to defend the east. bank of the river Dnieper, firmly hold the crossings and Nikopol district in your hands, prevent a breakthrough in the direction of Nikopol, Melitopol.
Have at least one infantry division in reserve, closer to the right flank.
The border on the left is (legal) Bereznigovata, (legal) Gornostaevka, (legal) Melitopol.
Sixth. 9 A- composition of 51, 150, 74, 30 and 296 rifle divisions.
The task is to defend the east. bank of the river Dnieper, firmly hold the tete-de-pont at Berislav and Kherson, prevent a breakthrough in the direction of Perekop.
Have at least one rifle division closer to the right flank in reserve.
The border on the left is Sokologornaya, farm. Askania Nova, Skadovsk.
Apparently, the basis for rumors about “armies washed away by the wave” was the fate of the 6th and 12th armies, which died two weeks earlier in the Uman cauldron.
Now let's look at the map. The distance from the DneproGES dam to the village of Nizhny Rogachik, where the 2nd Cavalry Corps crossed, is approximately 125 km, and to the village. Velikaya Lepetikha - approximately 145 km. To Kachkarovka, where the 18th Army was crossing, this distance is approximately 160 km. Cairo, Kakhovka and Tyaginka, where units of the 9th Army crossed, are located even further along the Dnieper. Any person familiar with physics as part of at least a school course will easily understand that there can be no talk of any “thirty-meter waves” at such distances.
Let us carefully consider the photographs of the dam destroyed by this explosion, taken from a German military aircraft.
Photo after the explosion of the DneproGES
Photo after the explosion of the DneproGES
The height difference at the DneproGES is 37 meters. The volume of the pressure reservoir is 3.3 cubic meters. km. The height of the dam is 60 meters, the pressure front of the reservoir is 1200 meters. Immediately after the explosion, the breakthrough wave, 12 meters high and with a maximum width of 110 meters, begins to dissipate radially across the 1200 meter wide floodplain at an approximate speed of 70 to 90 km/h. After about 20 seconds, when the wave reaches the shores of Khortitsa Island, it is 1.5 meters, decreasing even more with time and downstream. The approximate speed of water rising downstream is 4 to 5 centimeters per minute.
Elementary calculations show that the maximum wave height after 20 seconds was 1.5 meters. But not 30 meters. The rapid rise of water towards the floodplains amounted to a maximum of 1 meter, and was more like a flood. As a result, from the point of view of the science of physics, the statement of some “historians” about a thirty-meter tsunami is delirium of an inflamed consciousness. Considering the fact, who is promoting this latest horror story, we are dealing with inflammation of the brain, craving any sensation.
The article by Vladimir Linikov generally says that the drainage spans were opened on August 18, before the explosion. The power plant employees drained water from the reservoir, which means the water level was even lower, which means the wave height at Khortytsia was definitely no more than 1.5 meters. In addition, due to the release of water from the reservoir at the beginning of the day on August 18, the water level below the dam was already elevated - estimated at 0.5 meters. And the spans were blown up around 20-00. So everything speaks about the artificiality of the tsunami and the number of victims - which were sucked out of State Department grants...
And motorized troops, with the goal of suddenly capturing the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station and the dam along which they hoped to break into the city, broke through the defenses west of Zaporozhye on a narrow section of the front. Former Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces F. Halder describes the events in the Zaporozhye region as follows: “August 19, 1941. 59th day of the war. Situation at the front: Army Group “South”: The enemy continues to resist the Romanian units advancing on Odessa. In the Ochakov area, the enemy launched a counterattack on the sector of the 50th division.
A large number of enemy ships are observed in the Kherson port. The 11th Army tonight began crossing the troops of the 11th Army Corps across the Bug. Enemy aircraft are intensively attacking our advanced advancing units in the Dnieper bend. The 9th Panzer Division reached the area 1 km west of the dam near Zaporozhye. The 14th Panzer Division broke into the enemy bridgehead near Zaporozhye.”
Using the bridge over the old bed of the Dnieper, the enemy managed to break through to Khortitsa, approach the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station and begin shelling its defenders with guns and mortars.
The defending units, following the “order of Comrade Stalin of July 3, 1941”, switching the hydroelectric power station generators to self-immolation, retreated to the Left Bank.
Former construction manager of Dneprostroy F.G. Loginov says: “It was August 18, 1941. That day, the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station was operating at full capacity, although shells were flying through the dam and the power plant's turbine room. In the event of a retreat of our troops, it was decided to disable the station equipment and the dam and not give the enemy the opportunity to use the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station. The difficult but necessary operation was entrusted to the chief engineer of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant, Grigory Shatsky...”
The Germans subsequently also confirmed the destruction of the turbine room by station workers. In the memoirs of Speer, who from September 1930 was the head of military development of the Reich, and from February 1942 - the Reich Minister of Armaments, it is reported: “...I also visited the power plant in Zaporozhye blown up by the Russians. German turbines were installed in it, after a large construction unit managed to close the gap in the dam. During their retreat, the Russians disabled the equipment in a very simple and remarkable way: by switching the lubrication distributor while the turbines were in full operation. Deprived of lubrication, the machines became hot and literally ate themselves, turning into a pile of unusable scrap metal. Very effective remedy destruction and everything - with a simple turn of the handle by one person!
But the turbines were not the main target of destruction. The dam itself should have been blown up. German troops were still on the right bank of the Dnieper, in the area of Nikopol and Krivoy Rog. No one was warned about the planned explosion of the Dnieper dam, either on the dam itself, along which at that time military transports and troops were moving, which were retreating to the left bank of the Dnieper, or the population and institutions of the city of Zaporozhye - 10-12 kilometers from the hydroelectric power station downstream of the Dnieper. Also, the military units located down from Zaporozhye in the Dnieper floodplains were not warned, although the telephone connection at that time on the Left Bank functioned normally.
A study of the available documents of the 157th regiment of the NKVD troops for the protection of especially important industrial enterprises, which guarded and defended the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station until the last minute, allows us to establish the time of the dam explosion with an accuracy of hours: 20.00-20.30 on August 18, 1941.
It was at this time that the Dnieper hydroelectric station, the Dnieper dams, and the railway bridge across the Dnieper were blown up.
Military transports and people who were moving along the dam at that time naturally died. As a result of the explosion of the bridge and dam on the island of Khortitsa, an infantry regiment, which was being transported at that time to the eastern shore, was cut off.
A large gap appeared in the body of the dam, and active water discharge began. As a result, a vast flood zone arose in the lower reaches of the Dnieper. The giant wave washed away several enemy crossings and sank many German units that had taken refuge in the floodplains. But the water that broke free did not divide people into “us” and “strangers”.
Water flooded the entire lower part of Zaporozhye with huge reserves of various goods, military materials and tens of thousands of tons of food products and other property. The force of the wave generated by the explosion of the DneproGES dam was such that the Volochaevka monitor was thrown ashore and could then be used as a defensive structure only on land.
In the floodplain zone of the island of Khortitsa and the Dnieper floodplains, tens of kilometers to Nikopol and further, military units were in positions. The explosion of the dam sharply raised the water level in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where at that time the crossing of the troops of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, the 18th and 9th Armies, which were retreating near Nikolaev, began. These troops were “cut off” during the crossing, partly replenished the number of troops that were surrounded and captured, and partly managed to cross in incredibly difficult conditions, abandoning artillery and military equipment.
They said that approximately 20,000 Red Army soldiers died in the floodplains at that time - no one thought to count exactly how many. In addition to the troops, tens of thousands of livestock and many people who were at work there at that time died in the floodplains.
This is how eyewitnesses describe the event:
“And suddenly the earth shook. Mishka looked to the west and gasped: there, somewhere near the Dnieper, a huge, enormous black mushroom was silently growing, rising... A dam! They blew up the dam!
- Mom, open your mouth wider!!
- What?
- Open it! Wider! Mouth!
And it exploded! Oh, how it exploded! Our pride, our love, our handsome Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, our dear Dnieper, what pain your pain, your mortal wound echoed in our hearts, that oh how it will not heal soon! How many more such wounds are ahead?
“...on August 18th...when I got to the pier, I saw that the entire Oak Grove and coastal houses were flooded with Dnieper water, because on the night of the 17th ours blew up the dam (lintel) of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, and the water poured out in a strong surge and destroyed everything in its path. And in the floodplains below the city there remained a lot of livestock and people. There was an ominous silence and desolation in the city; the Germans were expected from hour to hour - the people, on occasion, robbed mills and shops. The authorities came to their senses and after a couple of days order was restored in the city.”
Mark Troyanovsky: “Suddenly on the morning of the 17th, the Germans appeared in the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station area. Almost all employees of the political department were sent to help the units guarding the approaches to the dam. Explosions of mines and shells. An armored car and regimental guns are installed at the entrance to the dam. Reinforcements are being sent across the dam, and without rifles...
Soon we witnessed how this replenishment ran back. Shots began to force him into battle again. And after another hour, everyone without rifles was allowed to leave. Such confusion also relaxed the resistant parts. We filmed a little of all this outrage at the dam. They filmed a huge fire that broke out on the other side of the military plant.
Everything is under fire, no one knows exactly where everything is. While we were deciding where to go, the city streets began to come under intense shelling. Mines and artillery. The enemy is nearby, on the other side. It was creepy to watch how the women rushed about, not knowing what to do. They live on the other side, working on this one. In the morning, as if nothing had happened, we went to work. Everything was fine, trams were running. And now shells are raining down on the other side. Large residential buildings are burning. People are desperate.
An alarming night began from August 17 to 18. Fires were burning on the other side. The political department was preparing vehicles for evacuation. The headquarters moves at night. We waited for our people to arrive at night. What if something interesting happens!!!
We spent the night near the cars on the street. Several large explosions were heard. They didn't know what it was. We thought heavy shells were exploding. At night at 12 o'clock we learn terrible news - the Dnieper Hydroelectric Dam and the railway. the bridge is blown up. They were blown up unnecessarily, prematurely, when our units remained on the other side. They say they are now looking for the culprits. And they did it as if the NKVD workers were panicking.”
Indeed, there was panic. But was the explosion of the Dnieper hydroelectric station arbitrary?
Unfortunately, the commander of the Southern Front Tyulenev I.V. He mentioned this fact very sparingly in his memoirs: “We were in Zaporozhye, when suddenly the earth shook under our feet - an explosion of enormous force shook the air. A twelve-ton tola charge destroyed the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, the pride of the Soviet people.”
The situation with the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, which is open for research, is also slightly clarified by the operational documents of the headquarters of the Southern Front:
In pursuance of the indicated order of the command of the Southern Front, on September 3, 1941, units of the 274th Infantry Division of the 12th Army, with the participation of the Zaporozhye people's militia, under cover, crossed the Dnieper and, in three days of fierce battles, defeated the enemy on the island of Khortytsia. After the liberation of Khortytsia, the artillery shelling of factories and the city weakened significantly, which contributed to the acceleration of the dismantling and evacuation of equipment and people.
After the destruction of the Dnieper dam and the Dnieper hydroelectric station, the entire leadership fled to the east. A week later, on the orders of Moscow, most of these unfortunate leaders returned back to Zaporozhye and for some time before the arrival of the Germans continued to “lead” and assure that Zaporozhye “will never be surrendered to the enemy”, that the enemy will not be allowed beyond the Dnieper. They explained the advance destruction of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station as “hostile sabotage” and “sabotage.”
"Series G"
DIRECTIVE No. 0083/OP
HEADQUARTERS OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT POKROVSKY.
21.8.41 15 h. 45 m.
Card 500,000
...In the Zaporozhye direction, the pr-k, consisting of one TD and one or two MDs, reached the line of the river. Dnieper, is conducting reconnaissance and preparations for crossing the river. Dnepr...
The pr-k, acting with superior forces, had the goal of occupying the entire right bank of Ukraine and inflicting isolated defeats on the front armies defending west of the river. Dnieper, in particular the Nikolaev region. Having brought a significant number of tank and motorized divisions into battle, the pr-k immediately tried to seize crossings across the river. Dnieper districts of Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Nikopol, Kherson and at the same time take possession of Odessa...
….The stubbornly defending units of the Southern Front did not allow the project to capture Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Kherson, Odessa, and inflicted heavy losses on it at Nikolaev, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk...
...Zaporozhye group: composition - 274, 226, 270 SD, NKVD regiment. I entrust the management of the group to the 48th infantry commander, Mr. Malinovsky and his headquarters, who will immediately leave for Zaporozhye and take command of the group. The task is to capture the island of Khortitsa and, firmly defending itself in the east. bank of the river Dnieper, hold Zaporozhye in your hands.
Commander of the Southern Front Tyulenev
Member of the Military Council Zaporozhets
Our Southern Front Romanov"
After the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, the defense of Zaporozhye continued for another month and a half. In September, at least 620 wagons left the city every day to the east, and on some days - about 900. Only for the removal of one Zaporizhstal plant, 8 thousand wagons were required. 22 factories of Union importance and 26 light and food industry enterprises were removed. In addition, mechanical engineering, pedagogical institutes and other educational institutions, the theater named after. M.K. Zankovetskaya, a radio center, a film and film fund, valuable exhibits of the regional museum of local lore and much more. This was a heroic feat of Zaporozhye workers and engineers.
N.S., who was at that time a member of the Military Council of the Southern Direction. Khrushchev later very briefly “remembered” the battle for Zaporozhye: “We evacuated many machine tools from Zaporozhye, literally under the nose of the enemy. We entrusted Korniyets with carrying out this operation. In those days he was either a member of the Military Council of the Southern Front, or, it seems, a representative of the Ukrainian government. The Cornish played a big role in the evacuation of the equipment, and this equipment immediately went to the east, which had a very positive effect on the creation of a defense industry in a new place."
On October 4, workers and engineers who participated in the dismantling of the factories left the city. Only then did German troops enter Zaporozhye. They were met by fires and mines. Everything that could not be transported to the east was blown up or set on fire.
Leonid Sosnitsky claims that the order for the destruction of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station was given by the commander of the South-Western direction S.M. Budyonny. “Even in the afternoon of August 18, Semyon Budyonny was seen in Zaporozhye (all known historical sources are silent about this), and it was probably he who decided to undermine the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station. By that time, the Nazis were already masters of the situation on the island of Khortitsa and deployed artillery. They got to the island “for company” - absolutely peacefully, together with the surrounded, militia, evacuated civilians and collective farm livestock. According to recollections, no one interfered with anything; the Germans also behaved “culturedly.” So the bridge across the Old Dnieper fell to the enemy, and the bridge across the New Dnieper (the second branch of the river that washes Khortitsa - near the left bank) was blown up. This was done so hastily and fussily that the troops, abandoning their equipment and weapons, crossed a very significant water obstacle on some planks or barrels. As a result, some veterans are still confident today that the explosion was carried out by German saboteurs dressed in Soviet uniforms.”
Somewhat later, the bridge over the Old Dnieper was blown up by political instructor M.Z. Bocharov.
After the war, many involved in this generally tried to present the undermining of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station as an unauthorized and alarmist action.
From the testimony of the former assistant to the head of the Political Directorate of the Southern Front for the Komsomol B.S. Melnikova:
“...On the night of August 17-18, the situation in the Zaporozhye direction of the Southern Front changed dramatically. The enemy broke through our defenses and the city, in fact, remained uncovered. This is what the Political Directorate of the Southern Front reported about the current situation in a report addressed to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Comrade. Mehlisa: -...On the morning of August 18, the enemy, with up to an infantry division with tanks, launched an attack on the city of Zaporozhye. The poorly armed 274th Rifle Division, which defended the Zaporozhye bridgehead and had just been brought into battle, began to retreat under enemy pressure... To restore order, Major General Kharitonov was sent to the division by the Military Council (at that time he was the deputy chief [alnik] of the front headquarters...), and by the political department of the front - 20 political workers, who were divided into two groups of ten people. One group acted under the leadership of the assistant to the head of the political department of the Southern Front for the Komsomol, battalion commissar Comrade. Melnikova, the other under the leadership of the head of the political department, battalion commissar Comrade. Usova. ...On August 19, 20 and 21, political department employees took an active part in organizing the battle, supplying the division with ammunition and food, and evacuating the wounded...
Our group, a member of the Military Council, Comrade Zaporozhets, and the leadership of the Political Directorate, Comrade Mamonov and Brezhnev, were given the task: to contain the disorderly retreating units through the island of Khortitsa at any cost, to create a hasty defense of them along the old bed of the Dnieper, reliably covering the bridge. Stop the enemy's advance and hold out until reinforcements arrive. The second group was supposed to operate in the area of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Dam.
A few minutes later we dismounted from the truck on the bridge connecting the city with the island of Khortitsa, since it was no longer possible to drive the car further. The bridge was clogged with an avalanche of people: cars, carts and cattle. It took superhuman efforts from each of us to hold back those fleeing in panic under enemy fire and turn them towards the enemy...
Here we met with Major General Kharitonov, who approved our actions and personally helped form combat detachments and clarified combat missions for them. The enemy was stopped. Three enemy tanks were knocked out on the bridge. Everyone perked up, cherishing the hope that reinforcements would soon approach us.
But after some time, the situation on the island of Khortitsa became simply critical and, it seemed, hopeless. There was a stunning explosion, and soon another. The lintel of the dam was blown up and the bridge connecting the island with the city of Zaporozhye was undermined. The bridge over the old riverbed remained intact and, in fact, became open to the fascist evil spirits.
...The enemy broke through to the island and occupied its southern part. Continuing to provide fierce resistance to many times superior enemy forces, our forces weakened, some began to flee to the Dnieper.
The authenticity of the critical situation that has developed on the island of Khortitsa and our doom is confirmed... by a telegram from the head of the political department of the Southern Front, Comrade. Mamonov addressed to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Comrade Mekhlis, dated August 20, 1941. It says: -...On the left sector of the army [as a result of repeated attacks by enemy tanks and engine units, the Zaporozhye bridgehead was abandoned. Lieutenant Colonel Petrovsky - head of the engineering department of the front headquarters and head [head] of the Epin department (research and testing institute) - representative of the general staff, without the knowledge of the Military Council of the front, blew up a dam and a bridge... The explosion of a dam and a bridge put about 3,000 people on the island in a difficult situation Khortytsia... “In this telegram you will read that the perpetrators of this explosion were arrested and tried by a military tribunal.”
But the Komsomol assistant does not tell the whole truth. And could he know this truth?
This is what former Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars M.G. said in his memoirs. Pervukhin: “By the beginning of August 1941, the Dnieper regions found themselves in the war zone. The question arose about the evacuation of the pearl of Soviet energy - the Dnieper hydroelectric power station named after V.I. Lenin... The Supreme High Command ordered the Soviet troops of the Southwestern Front to strengthen themselves at the line of the Dnieper River and detain the enemy. For these purposes, in as a last resort blow up the dam of the Dnieper hydroelectric station so that enemy troops could not immediately move to the left bank of the river and occupy an important industrial center.
I was instructed to ensure that everything at the hydroelectric station was prepared for the explosion, and the explosion itself was carried out when our retreating troops crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper. Together with employees of the People's Commissariat of Power Plants and Dneprenergo, I discussed how best to carry out this important and difficult task, especially for us, power engineers. It was necessary to arrange such an explosion so that it would prevent German troops from using the dam to transfer their forces and equipment, and on the other hand, leave the possibility of quickly restoring the hydroelectric station after the end of the war. It was decided to plant explosives in the upper turna (a tunnel in the body of the dam connecting the right and left banks). Separate the explosives placement site on both sides with sandbags so that the blast wave goes in the right direction and destroys only a few spans of the drainage part of the dam, and with it the bridge crossing...
The Dnieper Hydroelectric Station had strong military security and anti-aircraft defense. On the eve of the fateful day, when the dam had to be blown up, the city of Zaporozhye was heavily bombed by German planes, but the anti-aircraft defense did not allow the enemy to accurately throw bombs at the power plant and the dam. In the evening of the same day, after another air raid, shelling of the power plant area unexpectedly began with mortars. This was completely unexpected, since Soviet troops were holding the enemy several tens of kilometers to the west. It turned out that during a diversionary bombardment of the city, an enemy airborne assault landed on the island of Khortitsa, about three kilometers from the dam. Obviously, the command of the German troops wanted to occupy the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station undamaged and wanted to do this with the help of paratroopers...
In the afternoon, when the laying of explosives was almost completed, a representative of the front headquarters arrived, who handed the representatives of the military command at the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Direction, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, specifying the date of the explosion. It stated that in case of danger of the dam being occupied by the Germans, it should be put out of action.
It was getting dark, and the soldiers crossed the turna to the left bank, since it was no longer possible to pass along the dam from above, because it was under heavy enemy artillery fire.
Suddenly the shelling stopped and there was an oppressive silence, which, given the uncertainty of the situation, got on the nerves of our people worse than the shelling...
The moment came when the commander of the military unit defending the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station closed the contacts of the battery, a dull explosion shook the dam... The explosion... destroyed several spans of the drainage part of the dam. The explosion killed not only the Nazis who were on the dam, but also with the rapid rise of water below the power plant, in the Dnieper floodplains of the right bank, a lot of troops and weapons of the enemy, who were preparing to cross to the left bank, were flooded... With pain in the heart and hope for a soon returning to the banks of the Dnieper, the power plant workers left for the East in the dead of night...
During the day, I checked the situation at the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station several times by phone. In the evening, at about five o'clock, I called the secretary of the regional committee. He told me that German tanks appeared on the right bank of the dam and the dam was blown up... Late at night I was at the Central Committee and reported to I.V. Stalin that the Dnieper Hydroelectric Dam was blown up. He replied that they did it on time and thereby stopped the advance of the Germans on this section of the front.”
The Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Colonel General A.V. Khrulev, later also confirmed that the sanction for the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station was given in Moscow: “In the period from August 2 to August 4, 1941, the rear headquarters was directly entrusted with the delivery of sappers and explosives by plane to Zaporozhye.”
Igor Zalizyaka