To use presentation previews, create a Google account and log in to it: https://accounts.google.com
Slide captions:
Socio-economic development of the country at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th centuries. A. National and social composition. B. Industry and banking system. Agriculture. 2. Domestic and foreign policy. A. Nicholas II and his political intentions. B. Autocracy and estates: nobility, bourgeoisie, peasantry, working class, Foreign policy: Russian-Japanese war,
Dominant elite -3% Middle strata - 8% Peasantry and Cossacks - 70% Proletarians - 18.5% and lumpen elements 0.5% Marginals. What is the difference between the concepts “social structure and social stratification”? Can we say that stratification existed in Russia?
Increase in industrial enterprises by 2 times. Industrialization. But in terms of production volume it ranks 5th in the world. Monopolization (cartels, syndicates, trusts and concerns) Formation of a financial oligarchy. Foreign capital in industry.
Community Peasants are isolated from capitalist relations. Development system.
The nobility is the support. The bourgeoisie is financially influential, but not politically. Peasants - land issue. Workers are the problem with strikes.
Attempt by the security department in 1901-1903. take over government custody
Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905
P.1,2 Definitions: modernization, monopoly, trust, syndicate, cartel, concern, Zubatovism, CER. Table “Russian-Japanese War. Date of. Event.
On the topic: methodological developments, presentations and notes
A history lesson in 8th grade on the topic "General repetition: Russia in the first half of the 9th century", contains test tasks, historical problems...
General characteristics of the foreign policy of the Russian autocracy
The autocratic form of government was a characteristic feature government controlled in Russia from the end of the 15th century until the establishment and approval Soviet power. At the same time, when characterizing the foreign policy of the Russian tsars and emperors, it should be emphasized that the corresponding activities, in the most general view, was implemented in three main directions:
- establishment and development of external relations;
- maintaining territorial integrity and repelling external aggression;
- expansion of the territory of the Russian state.
Of course, activities within each of these areas were characterized by many features in the leadership process of each of the Russian rulers. Moreover, the corresponding differences were both subjective in nature, associated with the personality characteristics of the autocrat, and objective in nature, independent of him - most often, they were predetermined by manifestations of external aggression.
Foreign policy of the first autocrat of Russia Ivan III
Note 1
Within the framework of the presented article, in the process of analyzing the foreign policy of the autocracy, it seems appropriate to consider the main directions and features of the foreign policy of the first Russian autocrat - Ivan III.
Historical literature emphasizes that throughout the entire period of Ivan III’s reign (from 1462 to 1505), the main goal of foreign policy was the unification of the territory of northeastern Rus' into a single state. In addition, great importance was attached to achieving the independence of Rus' from the Mongol-Tatars, as well as resolving foreign policy contradictions. In particular, during the reign of Ivan III, relations between Rus' and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were particularly acute, for which Ivan III’s desire for the unification of Russian lands was unfavorable, which, coupled with frequent border skirmishes, did not contribute to the reconciliation of states.
Let us consider the above directions of the foreign policy of the first Russian autocrat in more detail.
As noted above, from the very beginning of his reign, Ivan III demonstrated his own desire to unite Russian lands and expand their territories. The main activities that contributed to the implementation of this task can be named:
- Confirmation of previously existing agreements with neighboring principalities (for example, with Tver, Belozersky, Ryazan);
- Annexation of the Yaroslavl principality, which lost its independence in 1471;
- Transfer of the Dmitrov Principality in 1472;
- The end of the process of annexing the Principality of Rostov, which was actually part of it, to the Moscow Principality;
- Transfer of the Vologda principality, after the death of Prince Andrei in 1481;
- The establishment of the status of Tver as an appanage principality of Moscow, as a result of open armed confrontation, which ended with the conclusion of a peace treaty in 1484.
Note 2
However, it seems fair to note that the process of unification and expansion of the territory of the Moscow Principality was not completely peaceful and recognized by all. In particular, active opposition to the foreign policy measures carried out by Ivan III was provided by the Novgorod principality, since the actions of the Moscow prince openly posed a threat to the independence of Novgorod.
The result of long-term confrontations, including those expressed in open military clashes, was the decision of the Novgorodians to yield to the demands of Moscow at the beginning of 1478.
In addition, significant changes in the foreign policy arena during the reign of Ivan III occurred in relations with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The once friendly relations, in the context of Ivan III’s indicated desire to subjugate all Russian lands under the rule of Moscow, caused direct opposition from Lithuania. There were multiple border disputes, armed skirmishes and open confrontation ended only in 1494, as a result of the conclusion of a corresponding peace treaty.
Thus, one of the main results of the foreign policy activities of the first Russian autocrat, and, at the same time, one of the prerequisites for the establishment of his absolute power, was the unification around Moscow of most of the Russian lands, including as a result of open military conflicts with the Principality of Lithuania. However, in many ways this became possible precisely thanks to the overthrow of more than two centuries of the Mongol-Tatar yoke.
Foreign policy of the autocracy during the reign of Peter I
A significant stage in the development of the foreign policy of the Russian autocracy was the period of the reign of Peter I. In many ways, the relevant aspects were predetermined by the fact that Peter I sought to turn Russia into a great European power with access to the seas, etc.
Among the most important measures of the foreign policy of Peter I, carried out in order to achieve this task, can be named:
- The Azov campaigns are Russian military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire, carried out in 1695 and 1696, which ended with the capture of the Turkish fortress of Azov;
- The Grand Embassy is the diplomatic mission of Peter I to Western Europe in 1697-1698, for the purpose of establishing diplomatic relations in Europe and introducing the Tsar to the life and customs of foreigners, as well as to invite foreign specialists to Russian service;
- The Northern War with Sweden (1700-1721) for the possession of the Baltic lands, which ended in the defeat of Sweden, etc.
At the same time, the result of the considered and many other foreign policy measures was the formation of the Russian Empire, which has access to the Baltic Sea and has a powerful army and navy with its capital in St. Petersburg.
Protection of "foundations". Nicholas II, who ascended the throne in 1894, tried to follow the reactionary course of his father. However, not to mention the fact that he did not inherit Alexander III’s strong will and strong character, the socio-economic and political crisis that struck Russia at the beginning of the 20th century significantly complicated the problems facing the tsarist government. They could no longer be resolved through purely reactionary measures. As a result, the new tsar inevitably pursued a dual policy: in a number of cases, Nicholas II had to maneuver and make concessions to the “spirit of the times.”
The young king’s desire to rule according to his father’s behests was most clearly manifested in his defense of the existing system. The death of Alexander III, whose name became a symbol of unlimited, autocratic power, awakened timid hopes for change in liberal circles. These hopes were reflected in some greeting addresses addressed to the Tsar, compiled at the end of 1894 in zemstvo assemblies on the occasion of the wedding of Nicholas II. They expressed extremely carefully, in the most vague terms, the idea of the desirability of involving public figures in governing the state. The reaction from Nicholas II followed immediately. In January 1895, receiving deputations from the nobility, zemstvos and cities in the Winter Palace, the tsar in a short speech called hopes for a change in the political system “meaningless dreams,” declaring that he would “protect the principles of autocracy as firmly and steadily” as he protected their late Alexander III.
Having thus determined the general course of his reign, Nicholas II waged a decisive struggle against the opponents of the autocracy. For these purposes, he, first of all, used the mechanism of a state of emergency, thoroughly developed under his father. At the very beginning of the reign of Alexander III, in the midst of the struggle against the “People's Will,” the famous Regulations on August 14, 1881 on measures to protect state order and public safety were issued. In accordance with this Regulation, the heads of local administration - the Governor-General, governors and mayors - received emergency powers. They were given the right to administrative exile for a period of 5 years, without trial or investigation, on one suspicion of political unreliability. They could prohibit all public meetings, close any commercial, industrial and educational institutions. Finally, local authorities could interfere in the activities of zemstvo and city public bodies, dismissing those employees with whom they were for some reason dissatisfied.
This so-called enhanced security regime was initially introduced temporarily, for three years. However, then the government of Alexander III carefully confirmed it at the beginning of each new triennium. Nicholas II followed the same path. As a result, a number of the most important Russian provinces: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, etc., were in a similar regime continuously for 24 years - until 1905. In 1901, at the first signs of the impending revolution, Nicholas II introduced enhanced security for almost throughout the rest of Russia.
Nicholas II paid extreme attention to improving the political police. Here he also fully continued the traditions of the previous reign. Those few security departments - in Moscow, Warsaw and St. Petersburg, which were established as an experiment under Alexander III, now served as the basis for the creation of an entire network of political investigation agencies. In 1902, departments for the protection of public order and security - simply the secret police - were created in all provincial cities of Russia. Leading secret police figures - S.V. Zubatov, A.V. Gerasimov, P.I. Rachkovsky and others - achieved a lot in their field of activity, developing detective methods at a high professional level, organizing a unique collection and recording of information about opponents of the autocracy, etc. But at the same time, they did not disdain openly illegal actions - there would be results. The main means of fighting the revolution and the opposition is provocation: the secret police widely introduced their secret agents into various public circles and underground organizations, who, while supplying valuable information, at the same time, willy-nilly, had to take part in a wide variety of anti-government activities - from publishing opposition magazines before organizing the murders of tsarist ministers.
Thanks to the tireless activities of the secret police, as well as due to the constant growth of public discontent, the royal courts also had to work at full capacity. The number of cases of state crimes considered in 1903 increased 12 times compared to 1894. Political cases, as a rule, were considered by military courts, although this contradicted both the spirit and the letter of the Judicial Charters of 1864, i.e., it was a violation of the laws of the Russian Empire. But by taking political cases away from the jury, the autocratic government could be confident that its opponents would be punished with maximum cruelty. Unlike jurors, military judges, specially selected, disciplined officers, never allowed themselves to be “liberal” when passing sentences.
The most common occurrence under Nicholas II was the involvement of not only the police and gendarmerie, but also troops - Cossacks, dragoons, soldiers - to combat riots, which undoubtedly was an emergency measure. The inability to govern the country by ordinary means, observing its legislation, and the constant use of emergency measures were clear evidence of the crisis of power. The system that Nicholas II so consistently defended has clearly outlived its usefulness; it could be preserved and maintained only with the help of administrative and police arbitrariness, relying on the bayonet and whip.
Autocracy and nobility. For centuries, the only reliable support of autocratic power was the local nobility. Nicholas II, like his predecessors, understood this well. In speeches and official documents, the tsar constantly emphasized his particularly favorable attitude towards the “noble class” and his readiness to meet their wishes.
The matter, however, was not limited to words. Throughout his reign, Nicholas II resolutely opposed any attempts to confiscate the land of the landowners. At the same time, the government provided constant financial support to the local nobility, which was clearly manifested in the ever-expanding activities of the Noble Bank: by the beginning of the 20th century. the amount of loans he issued to landowners on preferential terms exceeded 1 billion rubles. The same goal was pursued by other financial measures: lowering interest on loans to debtor landowners, establishing mutual aid funds for the nobility.
All this led to the fact that most of the local nobility saw the autocratic government as a protector and patroness and, in turn, was ready to provide it with all possible support. However, by the beginning of the 20th century. the nobility had already ceased to be homogeneous socially and politically. A relatively small but extremely active part of the landowners, who managed to adapt to new conditions and rebuild their economy on a capitalist basis, increasingly accepted liberal ideology. These landowners, who played a leading role in some zemstvos, advocated strict adherence to the rule of law, rejection of emergency measures, expansion of the rights of local self-government and, accordingly, limiting the omnipotence of the bureaucracy. Constitutional ideas also became increasingly popular in this environment. Thus, part of the landed nobility went into opposition to autocratic power, drawing closer to the liberal bourgeoisie.
Autocracy and the bourgeoisie. The autocracy fought uncompromisingly against any claims of this class to state power, but in the economic sphere it had no difficulty finding a common language with it. Government loans and tax benefits, a protective customs policy and the desire to seize new sources of raw materials and sales markets - in these matters, the reign of Nicholas II fully met the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie. S. Yu. Witte remained the Minister of Finance under Nicholas for a long time, having taken this post under his father. This brilliant statesman, closely associated with commercial and industrial circles, took a number of serious measures that contributed to the development of capitalist relations in Russia. The main one was the monetary reform: in 1897, a gold currency was introduced into circulation, which stabilized the ruble exchange rate and ensured stable profits for entrepreneurs. Witte was one of the main organizers of the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway, which contributed to the intensification of Russian policy in the Far East. On his initiative, Russia began economic penetration into Northern China.
All this led to the fact that the bourgeoisie in Russia for a long time did not represent any serious organized opposition to the autocracy. The constant growth of the labor movement also played a significant role in her restrained attitude towards the tsarist government: factory owners needed police protection, a force capable of establishing order. Only during the years of the first Russian revolution, when it became increasingly clear that it was no longer possible to govern Russia with the help of emergency measures, constitutional sentiments began to appear among the industrial bourgeoisie.
Peasant question. The name of S. Yu. Witte is also associated with attempts at a new approach by the ruling bureaucracy to the peasant question. The famine years, which were becoming commonplace in Russia, the decline in the solvency of the peasantry, the noticeable increase in peasant unrest - all this forced the government to look for a way out of this situation. According to Witte and his supporters, the Russian village needed a strong, enterprising owner. Such an owner could appear here only if the peasants were equalized in rights with representatives of other strata, destroying their class isolation. And first of all, it was necessary to destroy the community: to allow the peasants to leave it of their own free will, securing their plots as private property.
However, this point of view had serious opponents in the ruling spheres, grouped around the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve. In their opinion, such transformations were not only unnecessary, but also harmful. This group perfectly expressed the interests of the landowners of the old, feudal order, who benefited from the inert, half-impoverished existence of the Russian countryside; in the person of the peasant owners, these landowners were afraid to meet dangerous competitors. Plehve and his supporters intended to solve the peasant question using traditional, proven methods: to preserve the class isolation of the peasants, artificially maintaining the community, and at the same time, in every possible way to strengthen administrative and political supervision over the village.
After a short struggle, Plehve’s group won: in 1903, the Tsar’s manifesto declared that the preservation of the class distinction of the peasantry and the inviolability of the community should remain the guiding principles in any revision of peasant legislation. Such an approach to matters excluded the possibility of any serious changes and inevitably led to the growth of revolutionary sentiments among the peasants who made up the bulk of the Russian population.
Questions and tasks
1. Tell us about the most characteristic features of the domestic policy pursued by Nicholas II at the end of the 19th century. Why do you think repressive traits prevailed in it? Were other approaches to solving pressing socio-economic and political problems possible under those conditions? 2. What was the attitude of the autocratic government towards various segments of the Russian population? What was it determined by?
Zubatovshchina"
S.V. Zubatov and “Zubatovism”. IN beginning of the 20th century The labor issue becomes the focus of attention of the tsarist government. The most far-sighted representatives of the authorities come to the conclusion that the labor movement is beginning to pose the most serious danger to the existing system. Equally obvious to them is the fact that the traditional police-administrative means of combating this movement - mass arrests, exile, etc. - not only do not pacify, but inflame it even more. In search of a way out of this situation, some government officials began to support that peculiar policy on the labor issue, which soon became known as “Zubatovism” - after its main inspirer and guide, the head of the Moscow security department S.V. Zubatov.
Zubatov, a professional and very outstanding figure in political investigation, was well versed in the Russian revolutionary movement. He quickly appreciated what a terrible, explosive force the labor movement could transform into under the leadership of revolutionary intellectuals who tried to give it a political coloring and direct it against the autocracy. At the same time, Zubatov considered the workers’ struggle to improve their financial situation to be quite natural for state power not at all dangerous. He saw the main task of the government precisely to keep the labor movement within the framework of this purely economic struggle, to distract it from politics, and to neutralize the influence of the revolutionaries. And for this, Zubatov believed, government officials needed to take control of the labor movement, skillfully lead it and, if necessary, provide workers with some support in the fight against entrepreneurs. Thus, Zubatov hoped to strengthen the workers’ faith in the “good king”, under with whose patronage a peaceful solution to all problems is possible.
Implementation of “Zubatovism” in practice. Some representatives of the ruling bureaucracy treated the “Zubatovism” with understanding and sympathy. At one time, Zubatov was supported by Plehve; he was patronized by the Moscow Governor-General, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, the Tsar’s uncle, who had a great influence on his nephew. With his permission, Zubatov began to carry out his unusual experiment in Moscow in 1901.
"Workers' Mutual Benefit Societies" began to appear at various industrial enterprises. They were led by the workers themselves, propagated by Zubatov and his employees. Such leaders (M.A. Afanasyev, F.A. Sleptsov, etc.) formed a kind of council that led the Zubatov movement under the control of Zubatov himself. In various parts of Moscow, the council organized district meetings of workers, opened teahouses - unique workers' clubs, and tried to give unity and integrity to the movement. The most important thing is that Zubatov's societies, and, if necessary, Zubatov himself, began to intervene in conflicts between workers and entrepreneurs, forcing the latter to make some concessions.
In parallel with such actions, the Zubatovites launched active propaganda work. The Historical Museum began to host regular Sunday meetings of workers, nicknamed the “Zubatov parliament.” At these meetings, serious academic economists - V. E. Den, I. X. Ozerov - gave lectures related to the life of workers: about cooperation, mutual aid funds, and the housing issue. After the lectures, debates were held. In 1901 -1902 Sunday meetings were extremely popular - it was difficult to get into the auditorium of the Historical Museum, which accommodated about 700 people.
Well-directed propaganda and individual, small handouts did their job at first. “Zubatovshchina” had an undoubted success among the workers, a significant part of whom were by no means alien to the belief in the “good tsar.” When at the beginning of 1902 Zubatov decided to hold a kind of review of forces and organized a grandiose patriotic manifestation in the Kremlin in front of the monument to Alexander II (February 19, in memory of the abolition of serfdom), about 50 thousand people took part in it. At the same time, exemplary order was ensured; Zubatov himself regarded the demonstration as “a dress rehearsal for managing the people’s communities.”
In addition to Moscow, Zubatov, with the help of his employees, launched active activities in the western outskirts of Russia, where, on his initiative, the Independent Jewish Labor Party was created. To the “independents” - Jewish workers and artisans - Zubatov promised a quick and fair solution from above not only the labor, but also the national question - subject to the refusal of the Jewish population of the outskirts from the political, revolutionary struggle.
It seemed that Zubatov could triumph - he had achieved undoubted success. Both in Moscow and on the western outskirts, the influence of “Zubatovism” was great and constantly growing. The revolutionaries operating in these regions began to experience serious difficulties - the labor movement was gradually leaving their control. Attempts to counter “Zubatovism” with the help of counter-propaganda - leaflets, speeches at rallies, etc. - did not bring noticeable results.
The collapse of “Zubatovism”. However, the successes of the “Zubatovism” were temporary and transitory. Zubatov's activities caused increasing dissatisfaction among Moscow entrepreneurs. Already at the beginning of 1902, an acute conflict arose between the owner of a large textile factory, Yu. P. Guzhon, and the Zubatov organizations. Goujon, supported by other industrialists, filed a complaint against Zubatov with the Ministry of Finance. S. Yu. Witte reacted to the troubles of the Moscow capitalists with full understanding: the Minister of Finance from the very beginning of the “Zubatovism” perceived it as illegal and dangerous demagogy, not calming, but revolutionizing the workers.
At that time, Zubatov still had influential patrons, although they were already beginning to be frightened by the scale of “Zubatovism”; More and more doubts arose regarding the final results of this movement. Meanwhile, conflicts between entrepreneurs and workers not only did not stop, but began to take increasingly drastic forms. Zubatov’s own attempts to find a common language with the factory owners, entering into personal contact with them and convincing them to make some concessions to the workers, ended in complete failure. The complaints of entrepreneurs became more and more persistent, and the bureaucratic tops began to listen to them more and more attentively, not only by Zubatov’s principled opponent Witte, but also by his recent patron Plehve.
The fatal year for “Zubatovism” was 1903. In the conditions of a general strike in the south of Russia, Zubatov’s “Independent Labor Party” failed to keep the workers within the framework of the economic struggle. Moreover, in order to maintain their influence on the workers, some leaders of the “independents” themselves were forced to take an active part in the political struggle. Having found out this, Plehve was completely disillusioned with the “Zubatovism”. He dismissed Zubatov and dissolved the Independent Labor Party. In Moscow, Zubatov organizations still existed for some time, but their activities were limited to ideological, educational work- lectures and tea. As soon as the workers became convinced that legal opposition organizations were unable to change their situation for the better, they immediately refused to support them.
Thus, in conditions when the government did not want to take real measures aimed at improving the situation of the Russian proletariat, “Zubatovism” quickly turned into pure demagoguery. And as a result, instead of resolving the workers’ issue in favor of the autocracy, it aggravated it even more: the mass of workers, disillusioned with the legal, economic struggle, begins to pin all their hopes on the revolutionary movement.
Questions and tasks
1. What caused the “Zubatovism”? What ideas underlay “police socialism”? 2. How was the “Zubatovism” implemented in practice? 3. Explain the reasons why this policy failed. Do you think Zubatov had a chance of success?
Foreign policy
Main directions of foreign policy. IN end of the 19th century The formation of blocs of European powers opposing each other began. In 1882, the Triple Alliance was created, uniting Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. The block had an aggressive character. The powers that were part of it - especially Germany - sought to maximize their political and economic influence in various regions: in South-Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. In 1894, shortly before the death of Alexander III, a Russian-French alliance was created - the Entente 1, which opposed the Triple Alliance, trying to contain its expansion.
_____________________
1 From French Entente cordiale - heartfelt agreement.
Under Nicholas II, the Russian-French alliance continued to play a similar role. In the first years of his reign, the young king adhered to the traditions of the previous reign in foreign policy. In almost all regions that were in the sphere of Russian foreign policy interests, its government sought to maintain stability, maintaining the existing balance of forces. For these purposes, along with other measures, Nicholas II issued a call for gradual disarmament. In 1899, on his initiative, an international conference was held in The Hague, at which Russia proposed that all states freeze their weapons and military budgets; in the future, it was intended to begin a serious reduction in them. However, these proposals were rejected, and Germany and its allies came out most actively against them.
It is Germany that becomes Russia’s most dangerous adversary, actively pushing it back in the region that throughout the 19th century. was considered the most important in Russian foreign policy. In the last decades of this century, Germany has been launching a powerful political and economic expansion in the Middle East. By the beginning of the 20th century. Most of the railways of the Ottoman Empire ended up in the hands of German bankers. In 1899, they received the right to build the grandiose Berlin-Baghdad railway, which was to become the main pillar of the economic influence of this power in the Middle East. At the same time, the political dependence of the Turkish government on Germany is growing. Thus, the danger increasingly increased that the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, on which Russia’s economic well-being and defense capabilities largely depended, would fall under the control of a state hostile to it.
Russia waged a long-standing struggle with Austria-Hungary for dominance in the Balkans. However, at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. these powers manage to find a common language here - albeit very briefly. Through a series of treaties, they secured for themselves the spheres of influence that had developed by this time.
The situation in the Middle East, in Iran, where Russian economic and political interests collided with British ones, also more or less stabilized. By the end of the 19th century. they came to a state of relative equilibrium: Russia had a noticeable predominance in the north of Iran, England in the south. In addition, England, which was increasingly frightened by the expansionist aspirations of Germany, began to take the first steps towards rapprochement with its eternal rival, offering Russia to conclude an agreement on Iran that was quite beneficial for it. However, at the end of the 19th century. The Russian government took a wait-and-see position on this issue.
Far Eastern policy. In the last decades of the 19th century. Russia has pursued an increasingly active foreign policy in the Far East, a region that has never previously attracted much attention from Russian diplomats. However, in new era, when Russia increasingly faced questions about the export of capital and the expansion of foreign markets, when competition between the great powers for political and economic dominance became increasingly intense, in these conditions the Far East came to the fore. The Far Eastern countries - China, rich in various raw materials and at the same time extremely weak politically and militarily, as well as Korea, which was dependent on it, were relatively inaccessible to other European states - had a common border with Russia.
However, in the Far East, Russia faced an unexpected enemy - Japan. In this very recently backward, feudal country in the 1860s. almost simultaneously with Russia, bourgeois reforms were carried out, which brought it to a new level of development politically, economically, and militarily. Feeling strong, Japan begins to expand its territories and create a grandiose Pacific empire. The capture of a significant part of China and Korea was supposed to be the most important step on this way.
At first, Russia pursued a rather cautious and restrained policy in the Far East, inspired by S. Yu. Witte. When in 1894-1895, having defeated China, Japan imposed a predatory peace treaty on it, it was Russia that achieved its revision, forcing the aggressor to return most of the occupied territories. Following this, Russia entered into a defensive alliance with China and received the right to build the Trans-Siberian Railway, without going around Chinese territory, but directly, through Manchuria - the northern part of China. This so-called Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) was to become the basis of Russian economic influence in northern China.
Witte hoped that such a policy of guardianship and protection of China would allow Russia to gradually take control of the entire country. However, the remaining European powers, Japan and the United States, in turn, are beginning to increasingly penetrate into China, imposing enslaving agreements on it, taking away strategically important territories. Russia hastened to get involved in this process: in 1898, it received a lease from China for ice-free Port Arthur with the right to turn it into a naval base. Since that time, Russia's policy in the Far East has become increasingly adventurous. A joint-stock company for the exploitation of the natural resources of Manchuria and Korea played a fatal role in the aggravation of the foreign policy situation. This society, which united shady businessmen and representatives of court circles, had powerful political connections and enjoyed great influence in the highest spheres. By the name of its most active leader, A. M. Bezobrazov, it received the nickname “Bezobrazov’s clique.” By pushing the Russian government to take provocative, thoughtless actions in the Far Eastern region, convincing it to end the policy of “concessions,” the Bezobrazovites were leading the way to war. Witte's attempts to resist the “clique” only led to him having to resign.
Meanwhile, Japan in 1903 demanded that Russia stop interfering in Korean affairs, recognizing this territory as a sphere of Japanese influence. The Russian government made concessions, but the Japanese telegraph delayed its official response. Japan, eager to start a war at all costs, used this delay to its advantage. Diplomatic relations with Russia were severed; on the night of January 26, 1904, Japanese warships attacked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur.
Russo-Japanese War. The war turned out to be a serious test for Russia. She had to fight in an environment of foreign policy isolation. Moreover, if France and Germany took a neutral position, then England and the United States, which considered Russia their most dangerous enemy in the Far East, openly provided Japan with generous military and economic assistance. In general, to the complete surprise of the Russian government, Japan, technically, turned out to be superbly prepared for war, which largely predetermined its superiority on land and at sea. Japan also had a serious advantage in terms of command personnel, who acted very thoughtfully, decisively and energetically. The Russian command, on the contrary, was characterized by passivity and lack of initiative; similar traits, in particular, were inherent in A.N. Kuropatkin, who was placed at the head of the Manchurian army. To this it should be added that the meaning and goals of the war were completely incomprehensible to both soldiers and officers.
Military operations boiled down to the fact that the 3rd Japanese Army besieged Port Arthur, and the 1st, 2nd and 4th actively acted against the Russian army, pushing it deeper into Manchuria. In August 1904, near Liaoyang, the Japanese tried to encircle and defeat the Russian army. During heavy fighting, Russian troops showed amazing resilience; the Japanese lost 24 thousand people versus 15 thousand for the Russians. The Japanese armies were unable to complete their task. Moreover, the Russian army received a real opportunity for a counteroffensive. However, Kuropatkin did not use this opportunity: he retreated, taking the army further to the north. The attempt of the commander of the Russian army to turn the tide of the military campaign in his favor, made later, in September 1904, turned out to be poorly prepared and did not bring success. It only led to the fact that Russian troops took up reliable defensive positions on the Shahe River, forcing the Japanese to stop the offensive. The “Shahei sitting” began, which lasted for several months.
Meanwhile, Port Arthur heroically resisted. In the fall of 1904, the Japanese launched three assaults on the fortress, suffering heavy losses and achieving no results. Then their main forces were sent to capture Mount Vysokaya, which dominated the fortress. The battle for Vysokaya lasted 9 days and cost the Japanese army 7,500 soldiers and officers. And yet, on November 22, the Japanese captured the mountain. A terrible blow for the defenders of the fortress was the death of the head of the ground forces of Port Arthur, General V. I. Kondratenko. Soon after this, the head of the Kwantung fortified area, General A. M. Stessel, surrendered Port Arthur. In February 1905, the Manchurian army also suffered a serious defeat near Mukden.
Military operations at sea developed just as bleakly for Russia. On March 31, 1904, the commander of the Pacific squadron, talented naval commander Admiral S. O. Makarov, died on the battleship Petropavlovsk, which was blown up by a Japanese mine. The squadron found itself locked in the Port Arthur roadstead, and its attempt to break through to Vladivostok ended in failure. In the fall of 1904, first the 2nd Pacific Squadron, and then the 3rd, were sent from the Baltic Sea to the rescue of Port Arthur. They arrived in the Far East only five months after the surrender of the fortress. The 2nd squadron was defeated in the Tsushima Strait, and the 3rd, surrounded by the Japanese fleet, surrendered without a fight.
The war, so unsuccessful for Russia, cost its enemy enormous losses. In addition, excessive strengthening of Japan in the Far East was in no way included in the plans of its allies, especially the United States. It was the American government that played the role of mediator in the peace negotiations that took place in Portsmouth (USA). On the Russian side, they were masterfully led by S. Yu. Witte, who achieved good results in this difficult situation. According to the Treaty of Portsmouth (August 1905), Russia escaped with minimal territorial losses - the southern part of Sakhalin Island. In addition, she lost Port Arthur to the Japanese. Witte managed to get the Japanese side to waive the requirement to pay war indemnity. But, despite the relatively successful results of the peace negotiations, the war with Japan played a serious role in destabilizing the internal political situation in the country. Both society and the people perceived it as a national disgrace. The entire course of military operations convinced us of the mediocrity and irresponsibility of those at the top, unable to defend the interests of Russia. The surrender of Port Arthur, Mukden, Tsushima - all these events completely undermined the prestige of autocratic power.
Questions and tasks
1. Describe the general foreign policy course of Russia in the first years of the reign of Nicholas II 2. What caused the interest of the tsarist government in the Far Eastern region? Why did Japan turn out to be Russia's main adversary here? 3. Tell us about the course of military operations in the Russo-Japanese War. Why did Russia lose this war?
Having ascended the throne in 1894, Tsar Nicholas II, in conducting domestic policy, chose the reactionary course of his father, Alexander III. However, the growing socio-economic crises and the intensification of national liberation movements during this period did not allow the tsar to use the methods that were effective during the reign of Alexander III.
Moreover, the new king did not have the rigidity and willpower that was inherent in his father, which also made it impossible to continue following the old course. The result was a dual domestic policy; very often Nicholas II was forced to make significant liberal concessions, as required by new times.
Defense of autocratic foundations
Nicholas II was able to implement the desire to rule the state, according to the behests of his father, in the first period of his reign, directing a reactionary course towards strengthening the autocracy. Already in 1895, the tsar declared that the adoption of a new constitution was a waste of time, since the previous law had not yet lost its effectiveness.
It was this year that the period of tough struggle with opponents of the monarchy began. In addition to the revolutionary-minded masses and peasants who expressed their dissatisfaction with the imperial policies, the king saw subjects of persecution and liberals as hidden admirers of opposition forces.
The emperor considered the noble class to be the main support of the autocracy. So in 1897, Nicholas II issued a decree according to which representatives of noble families had the right to receive a loan from the Noble Bank without interest charges. During the year, the amount that was paid to the St. Petersburg aristocracy reached 1 billion rubles.
Autocracy and bourgeoisie
With the development of industry, a new bourgeois class emerged in the Russian Empire. By the time Nicholas II ascended the throne, the bourgeois class had strengthened significantly and for the first time began to put forward claims to participate in public administration.
Fearing a seizure of power by wealthy entrepreneurs, the tsar severely limited the political opportunities of this class. At the same time, the government found a common language with the bourgeoisie on issues related to economic development.
Large entrepreneurs were provided with government benefits, new sources of raw materials, and interest-free lending. The interests of the Russian bourgeoisie were also defended by the famous statesman S. Witte, who took many measures to strengthen capitalist relations in the state.
On the initiative of S. Witte, a monetary reform was carried out in the state in 1897, thanks to which the ruble exchange rate stabilized. Also during this period, as part of economic reform, construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway began, which allowed Russian entrepreneurs to enter the Chinese market.
Peasant question
Since 1894, serious changes in policy regarding the peasantry began. Witte actively advocated equalizing peasant rights with representatives of other classes, introducing permission to freely leave the community and providing the opportunity for private land ownership.
However, such views did not find support in ruling circles. The most vehement opponent of such transformations was the Minister of Internal Affairs V. Plehve. Tsar Nicholas II also did not seek to change the historically established ways of peasant life. Despite Witte's efforts, by 1903 the peasant question was removed from the agenda without changes.
Nikolai II Alexandrovich Romanov. years of reign Under what circumstances did Nicholas II ascend the throne? Working with a document.p. 17 Leaflet from the archive: What senseless dreams is Nikolai talking about?
Autocracy and the people: The nobility is the support. The bourgeoisie is financially influential, but has no political rights. Peasants are a communal organization, maintaining a temporary position, the land issue has not been resolved. Workers - no rights, no labor legislation, the problem of strikes.
Vyacheslav Konstantinovich Pleve. Minister of Internal Affairs () Covered the country with a network of security departments, strengthening the role of their chiefs, giving them administrative rights. I tried to cope with the growing roar. movement as support for the organization S.V. Zubatov, and by intensifying repression, sending punitive expeditions against peasant protests, supporting Jewish pogroms, etc. He was one of those figures who convinced Nicholas II of the need for the Russo-Japanese War (“To hold the revolution, we need a small victorious war”). He was killed by the Socialist Revolutionary E.S.Sozonov.S.V. Zubatova
Sergei Yulievich Witte. Minister of Finance. Minister of Railways (1892), Minister of Finance (), Chairman of the Committee of Ministers (190306), Chairman of the Council of Ministers (190506). He achieved the introduction of the “gold standard” in Russia (1897), promoted the influx of capital into Russia from abroad, and encouraged investment in railway construction (including the Great Siberian Road). Witte’s activities led to a sharp acceleration in the rate of industrial growth in the Russian Empire, for which he was nicknamed “the grandfather of Russian industrialization.” Opponent of the outbreak of war with Japan and the main negotiator at the conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace. The actual author of the manifesto of October 17, 1905, which envisaged the beginning of the transformation of Russia into a constitutional monarchy. By rank, actual Privy Councilor (1899). Since 1903 member of the State Council. Author of multi-volume memoirs.
"Zubatov's socialism." Sergey Vasilievich Zubatov. Attempt by the security department in take the labor movement under the tutelage of the government. The principles of the legal labor movement as presented by Zubatov: Creation of “Mutual Aid Societies for Mechanical Workers” Replacement of revolutionary teaching with evolutionary one, and therefore, denial, in contrast to revolutionaries, of all forms and types of violence. Preaching the advantages of the autocratic form of government in the field of social relations, as a form that is extra-classical, contains the principle of arbitration, and therefore is hostile to violent methods and prone to justice. An explanation of the difference between the revolutionary workers' movement, proceeding from socialist principles, and the professional one, based on the principles of the capitalist system: the first is occupied with the reform of all classes of society, and the second with its own immediate interests. A firm understanding of the position that the boundaries of amateur activity end where the rights of power begin: going beyond this line was recognized as unacceptable self-will; everything must be directed to power and through power.
Foreign policy: “Great Asian program” of Nicholas II of inclusion of China in the sphere of interests of Russia “Bezobrazov clique” (Bezobrazov, Plehve and others advocated an aggressive foreign policy in the Far East “We need a small victorious war!”) Witte, Stolypin advocated economic cooperation with the countries of Asia and the East (concession-CER lease of Port Arthur since 1898))
Foreign policy. Causes of the Russo-Japanese War: Russo-Japanese War. 1). The rapid strengthening of Russia in the Far East (in 1898 the Chinese Eastern Railway was built in Manchuria, the Trans-Siberian Railway was built through to Vladivostok, Russia built naval bases on the Liaodun Peninsula. Russia's position in Korea was strengthened) worried Japan, the USA and England. They began to push Japan to start a war against Russia in order to limit its influence in the region; 2). The tsarist government was striving for war with a seemingly weak and distant country - it needed a “small victorious war,” believed V.K. Plehve and others; 3). It was necessary to strengthen Russia's position in the international arena; 4). The desire of the Russian government to distract the people from revolutionary sentiments. The main result of the war was that, contrary to hopes that the “victorious war” would delay the revolution, it, according to S.Yu. Witte, brought her closer “by tens of years.”
