War seems to us to be a confrontation between two forces that are on opposite sides of the front, but in our time war takes other forms.
No less destructive can be a hybrid war, the goal of which is total control not only over the opposing side, but also over allies. It may be carried out quietly, but the consequences will be no less terrible.
Features of hybrid warfare
Military and non-military tools are used, which are combined with information warfare methods.The importance of indirect and asymmetrical actions is increasing.
Hidden force measures are used.
The protest potential of the population is used
What is hybrid warfare. Expert Dmitry Gusev speaks
A powerful weapon of hybrid warfare is the preparation and implementation of actions using a network form of control. Here horizontal polycentric structures are created and rigid hierarchical management pyramids are built. 
Secret subversive actions, rebellions, and separatist uprisings are possible, in which state governance structures are attacked. Military actions can be supported by internal structures (nationalist organizations, pseudo-religious groups, organized crime, oligarchs).
Stages of implementing a hybrid war
A hybrid war can be waged in three directions:1. Military actions: creation of illegal armed groups, provoking conflicts of various types in the target country, seizure of government buildings and important infrastructure, introduction of regular armed forces under the guise of local armed groups, discrediting the actions of the existing leadership.
2. Information war: influence on the population of the target country, introduction of the necessary information among citizens of the aggressor country, tactical information support in the international community.
3. Energy influence: seizure or destruction of the energy infrastructure of the target country, disruption of stability in the operation of the energy system, termination of energy supplies to ensure the functioning of society.
Hybrid warfare strategy
Hybrid warfare is designed to ignore any human rights. Its overall goal is to transfer the victim state under external control. For this purpose, the undermining of political, socio-economic, information, propaganda and many other forces is used. The hybrid war strategy is aimed at creating instability in the current government and organizing a protest movement.The main principle of the strategy is to throw all forces at the bottlenecks and vulnerabilities of the target country in order to destabilize the political and military leadership, socio-economic structures and cultural and ideological sphere. All this leads to the breakdown of the state and the transfer of its control to external forces.
Features of the hybrid war strategy:
An important role is given to information, diplomatic, cyber and economic methods;
The shortest possible time frame for eliminating the previous government and taking control of the aggressor country;
The absence of a clearly defined external aggressor, which makes it possible to wage war with formal compliance with legal norms.
How to counter hybrid warfare technologies?
A hybrid war is not always a short war. To prevent the aggressor country from achieving its goal, the following measures must be taken:Develop a state concept to counter hybrid warfare.
Prepare personnel capable of effective confrontation.
Control of civilian security forces.
Develop indicators that help quickly determine the extent of the threat. Timely identification of vulnerabilities.
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We reviewed the basics of the theory of hybrid warfare and described 7 principles of its conduct. This lesson will be devoted to continuing the study of the theory of hybrid warfare. The last lesson, but not the final one. Hybrid War- this is by no means an invention of the ruling regime of modern neo-Soviet Muscovy. Hybrid tactics in Ancient Rome used by criminal gangs, regular soldiers and irregular fighters against Vespasian's Roman legions during the Jewish revolt in 66 BC.
An example of the use of hybrid power is also the Soviet partisan movement during the Second World War. To understand what hybrid warfare means requires an in-depth study of the reasons that form hybrid power and at the same time in which it is formed. Logically speaking, a hybrid force is formed to produce specific battlefield effects directly on the enemy combatant.
The formation of this force would be limited by both the available means (in the disposal of these combatants) and the available ways in which these means could be applied to achieve the desired goals.
For hybrid force, this formation process is different from conventional and irregular warfare. In this, the constraints and motivations that drive hybrid power make hybrid warfare itself, both with a unique logic and explained in the principles of the theories.
Hybrid warfare, as a military term, was first introduced in 2007 in the United States. In its original interpretation, the term was described as the convergence of regular and irregular threats using simple and complex military technology through decentralized planning and execution. Let's just take a break for a few seconds.
Imagine the level of strategic thought of the subjects of US strategy when they initially used the term “hybrid war” in their own country.
For, there was no such concept and term as “decentralized planning and execution” either in the Russian imperial army or in Soviet army, neither in Russian army. Decentralized planning is planning carried out at the platoon level.
Hybrid warfare, definition.
In 2007, the term "hybrid threat", as an original idea, was explored in more detail. That is, hybrid warfare began to be interpreted as a fusion of many energies, from conventional and unconventional forces, in conjunction with terrorism and criminal behavior. This fusion is oriented toward a desired common goal through political guidelines that simultaneously and adaptively unify all elements of power.
State and non-state actors, at the tactical, operational or strategic level, can conduct this form of warfare. By and large, even this initial definition of the concept of “hybrid war” comprehensively describes the method of military operations that the modern state regime of Muscovy unleashed in eastern Ukraine.
At the same time, British military theorists do not consider the different logic regarding the formation and use of the hybrid threat. According to them, hybrid warfare can be carried out by irregular forces that have access to more advanced weapons and systems usually fielded by regular forces. We can also observe this version of the definition in the example of eastern Ukraine. Hybrid warfare can adapt from an ongoing individual campaign and evolve into a large-scale war if circumstances and resources allow it.
As confirmation of these words, one can recall the ideological slogans of the Muscovites, aimed at fighting a certain fascism. And also nonsense in the form of the destroyer "Adolf Hitler" of the Right Sector, which fired at Donbass. Israeli military theorists describe hybrid threat and hybrid warfare as a method of social warfare that is not limited by social restrictions.
Therefore, a hybrid threat not only gains physical advantage through a combination of conventional technologies and organizations with unconventional tactics. But it also gains a cognitive advantage from the very lack of social constraints. For the ordinary forces of the State must adhere to the laws and customs of war governed by the Geneva Conventions.
Added to this dual advantage is the idea that hybrid forces operate as a networked system that is not much faster than conventional force since it relies on popular opinion, its support base, and internal feedback loops.
The non-state nature of hybrid warfare.
This is exactly what was said in the previous lesson, expressed in different words. These are the first and second principles of hybrid warfare. That is, the composition of a hybrid force, its capabilities and effects are unique to the force's own specific context. And also that there is a specific ideology within the hybrid force that creates internal tension in the organization. Since 2008, the theory of hybrid warfare in the United States has been refined.
Hybrid power actors were found to attempt to integrate the internal tactical effects of success and information technology on failure through the deliberate exploitation of cognitive and moral domains. The hybrid force is thus able to compress the levels of war, and thus accelerate the pace at both the tactical and strategic levels in a manner faster than a more conventional participant is able to carry out the same process.
In this theoretical model, a hybrid participant will always gain a perceived strategic advantage over a conventional participant, regardless of tactical outcomes. To reiterate: A hybrid force is a military organization that uses a combination of conventional and unconventional organizations, equipment and techniques in a unique operating environment designed to achieve greater strategic effects. Thus, in a hybrid war, the hybrid force extends its ideological influence across geographic boundaries to those regions where the central government and security institutions are weak to resist infiltration.
That is, this happens where there is a high level of state corruption. The degree of corruption of a particular state is determined through the formula:
Degree of corruption=Monopolies+Degree of decision-making in society - Accountability and transparency of the state apparatus - Morality.
In 2009, the theory of hybrid warfare was analyzed even more deeply. Hybrid warfare began to be interpreted as a basic unity of cognitive and material approaches in the production of effects.
This unity of cognitive and material domains allows for flexibility in a strategic context in which “social rules” can be revised in an iterative process to the advantage of the hybrid in terms of legality and military norms. The resulting flexibility facilitates adaptation, which allows the hybrid force to quickly take advantage of opportunities both in terms of material equipment and in terms of cognitive influence on the environment. This is the only definition that is not suitable for explaining the processes taking place in the east of Ukraine due to the lack of strategists as such in the regime of modern Muscovy.
As a result, since 2010, a hybrid threat has been defined as a dynamic combination of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal organizations and capabilities adapting to counter traditional advantages, as we have seen in events in eastern Ukraine since March 2014. Moreover, these forces may cooperate in the context of pursuing their own organizational common goals.
Hybrid threats can exploit media technologies and their positions within political military and social infrastructures. Hybrid threats adapt creatively by combining advanced weapons, command and control, cyber activities, and combined weapons tactics to engage conventional forces when conditions are favorable. I emphasize: in 2010 the word “can be used” was used, and since 2010 the Muscovite hybrid force has acted exactly like this.
Hybrid war, generalization of concepts.
After reviewing available military theories and the various forms of hybrid warfare, it is appropriate to return to one of the world's most respected military theorists of war, Carl von Clausewitz. To look at the theory of hybrid war a little more broadly. Clausewitz defined war as the act of using force to force our enemy to fulfill our desires. Or impose complete lack of will, which is what the modern Muscovite regime of Putin is trying to achieve. Clausewitz theorized that the ultimate expression of war—ideal war or absolute war—occurs where all available resources and assets are applied to achieve the desired end state of war.
However, Clausewitz pointed out that this ultimate expression of war would often be in conflict with the desired political goals of the war. Thus he outlined in general outline the concept of limited war, during which military forces optimize available means to satisfy limited political objectives. As a result of the generalization of the concept of ideal or total war, limited war and military operations that occur below the level of declared war have become accepted generalizations about war in general.
This idea of limited war, with its inherent ideas of social limitation and thresholds of military potential, has a very modern meaning in the design and employment of military organizations. In times of war, the state actor will act according to available and determined means, a portion of the gross domestic product. Generating GDP to technological capabilities as well as to the projected contingency needs of a political target state planned against potential adversaries in a variety of contexts. Something that has never happened in Russia in general and in principle throughout history.
As a result, a typical military organization will be optimized for a wide range of potential scenarios based on likely political nature. In most resource-rich countries such as the US and China, this results in a broad force that prepares for offense, defense and operations through actions on a variable scale. Optimization is not just about cutting down. Optimization is bringing to certain capabilities. And the modern army of Muscovy has been optimized to the point that it began to operate using the same methods. as well as the Hezbollah group.
In reality, this optimized force is not prepared for a specific context, but rather is optimized to best perform a wide range of scenarios for the resulting employment in fewer optimizations for a unique context. However, not all military organizations develop in this way. Countries with limited resources or technological capabilities must decide on the breadth and depth of these optimizations.
This practice can then lead to many variations of military organizations from broad and flat armies, primarily light infantry intended for specific functions such as population control and internal regime survival, to small or medium-sized forces with depth of combined weaponry. To counter specific external threats, such as enemy tanks, missiles or aircraft. In general, these less resourced organizations will correspond to the usual model of multiple full-spectrum armed forces, such as the USSR Army.
But on a smaller scale, such as the Egyptian army of the 1973 period, based on the Soviet type of organizational model. In some cases, organizations will develop optimized structures outside of conventional models. These unconventional structures will be optimized for a specific contextual purpose, using resources and capabilities not contained in conventional military force. An example of this is the so-called people's militia of Donbass.
Observers often refer to these unconventional organizations as asymmetric or hybrid threats that offer certain advantages to automatically change the battlefield calculus when composing a more conventional force. These observers then often refer to the resulting conflict as a hybrid war. In other words, hybrid warfare can best be described as an optimized form of warfare that allows a belligerent to attempt to use all available resources, both conventional and unconventional, in a unique cultural context to exert a specific impact against a conventional enemy, which has been the case in eastern Ukraine since 2014 and observed.
Of course, most adults understand what the word “war” means; there is no need to explain anything here. However, quite recently a new synthesized term “hybrid war” has come to the fore, the predicate (qualifier) of which significantly rethinks the usual concept of war. The concept of the integrity of this concept is a subject for reflection by military leaders, political scientists, and analysts.
Let's look at what a hybrid war is, how this phrase appeared, what is the meaning and content contained in it, and what is its relevance. We use common sense, world experience and reflections of respected figures of Russian science.
Hybrid war, concept
As you know, military strategy includes the following types of wars: small wars, conventional wars, regional wars. But all these varieties relate to phenomena when the armed forces of one side oppose the armed forces of the second side.
In such wars, biological, nuclear, chemical and various non-traditional types of weapons are used, but, as a rule, in classical military clashes standard weapons are used or, as they are called in the West, “lethal weapons”, which are primarily intended for death soldiers and the extermination of the country's military forces.
There is also the term "symmetrical warfare", a phenomenon that refers to the war of armed forces pursuing an aggressive policy with various potential opponents who later become real. A clear example is the Afghan war waged by the Soviet Union, and the Afghan war still taking place in the country.
We can come to the conclusion, considering the concept of hybrid war, that this is a type of war that combines a wide range of influences produced by the enemy using both military and irregular forces, in which civilian components also take part. In the writings of military experts, one comes across a term close to this: “war of controlled chaos.”
The term “hybrid threats” is also widely used today, defining threats emanating from an adversary capable of simultaneously using traditional and non-traditional tools for the purposes necessary to achieve.
Hybrid warfare: what is it?
The traditional understanding of what classical war is is formed in our civic consciousness by upbringing and education, which has always had a patriotic and historical orientation. We imagine war as a process of confrontation between two sides located on opposite sides of the front. The enemy invades our land, we win it back and continue to live.
However, at present, new types of war as armed confrontation between countries are emerging and being implemented. What does hybrid confrontation mean, which arose as a consequence of technological development, technical growth in the level of defensive instruments, offensive weapons, in other words, confrontation technologies.
At the same time, the targets themselves change significantly. They are no longer the taking of the lives of soldiers and the destruction of material objects. Here the most important goals are to influence the mass consciousness of society, the expert judgments of persons responsible for making important government decisions, including congressmen, ministers, deputies, presidents, when they are instilled with certain theories, instilling value positions that motivate them to take certain actions. Such confrontation is also a state one.
What does hybrid warfare mean? This means that an armed confrontation also arises; it’s just that, in addition to the traditional ones, special technologies, information, technical and global network devices also act as weapons.
Original source of the concept
We know that the word “hybrid” means some newly produced product that arises as a result of crossing different types of this product. Thus, a hybrid war may not have the obvious features of an armed conflict, but is still nothing more than a war.
Initially, the term “hybrid form” or “hybrid” was used in relation to political organizations. That is, it was meant that organizations that are not political are responsible for the implementation of political functions.
For example, in the literature there is a reference to organized groups of fans of the Milan football club, founded by Berlusconi. On the one hand, they represented only the interests of Milan fans, on the other, they actively supported Berlusconi’s political activities and were a powerful force for solving his political problems.
Let us note that in the USSR there was a similar format of the organization, formed during perestroika, presenting itself at the beginning of its activities as an oppositional environmental movement. At first glance, it was aimed at maintaining and protecting the environment, but over time it revealed its political implications, aimed at destabilizing the social situation in the country.
It is difficult to determine when the first hybrid war occurred, and in general, whether a similar fact existed earlier in history. One thing is clear that a certain circle of people benefit from the use of this formulation in modern life.
Interpretation may vary
The spread and increased use of the concept of “hybrid war” is a very natural phenomenon. It is important to note that initially, when this term was just beginning to come into circulation, it was absolutely not used in relation to Russia, and its content seemed completely different. Then, when using this concept, they meant that it meant a combination of classical war with elements of terrorism, guerrilla and cyber warfare, that is, completely different components. In particular, they referred to the activities of Hezbollah carried out during the Lebanon War and others. It did not actively participate in the war, but used rebels, guerrillas, and so on.
If you look into the distant past, you can find many that describe similar phenomena, for example, the so-called “Scythian war”. Therefore, the phenomenon of hybrid warfare should not be classified as fundamentally new in its nature and course. However, its current interpretation differs significantly from the previously existing one.
A new understanding of the issue, war, was born by interested parties in relation to Russia in connection with the events of 2014 that occurred in Ukraine. Several articles have appeared in the press that Russia is conducting hybrid wars around the world. Referring to the information published by the Russia Today agency, one can find that our country allegedly appears to society as a global aggressor, using propaganda means, cyber techniques and much more, becoming a threat on a planetary scale to the preservation of world order. In this “magical” way, all military events taking place in the world can be subsumed under Russian hybrid wars, which will make it a convenient and justified target for all ill-wishers.
Let's turn our eyes to the West
So, let's consider the system of views regarding hybrid wars abroad. It's no secret that there are official instructions, containing a description of the strategy and actions of military command in situations such as hybrid warfare. For example, the “white book” of the commanders of special operations of the ground forces of the United States of America, which is freely available to users of the “global network,” entitled “Countering Unconventional Warfare.” It contains a separate concept with the symbolic name “Win in a difficult world.”
It examines a hybrid war from such a perspective, that it is a war in which real military steps imply, first of all, implicit, secret, but typical military actions, during which the hostile side attacks the regular army and (or) government structures of the enemy. The attack comes at the expense of separatists and local rebels, who are supported by finances and weapons from abroad and certain internal structures: organized crime, pseudo-religious and nationalist organizations, oligarchs.
The same documents from America and NATO indicate that a fundamental role for successful confrontation during hybrid wars is played by the armed forces of friendly countries, which in the middle and final stages of such wars should be united under the auspices of the United States along with the unification of their intelligence services and governments. All this must happen within the framework of a “comprehensive intergovernmental, interdepartmental and international strategy.”
Making it a reality
Studying the United States, we can conclude that when hybrid wars arise, other states are simultaneously involved in the conflict between two countries. Their actions consist of “providing comprehensive assistance to the rebels in the recruitment of supporters, their logistical and operational support, training, influencing the social sphere and the economy, coordinating diplomatic actions and conducting some security operations.” It is not difficult to notice that all these events, without any exception, are taking place today in Ukraine under the undisguised leadership of the United States. At the same time, it is customary to make a reference to Putin’s war against the sovereignty of Ukraine.
Thus, we can conclude that the West is well aware of the scheme for inciting hybrid wars, and this term itself came to us from there. The first tests were carried out in Syria, Iraq and Ukraine. Now Western political statements attribute Russia to a hybrid war with Ukraine. They present a lot of their own objective arguments that fit their definition of what hybrid warfare is. Let us note that America already demonstrated such behavior to the world 30 years ago, when there was a contingent in Afghanistan Soviet Union. A softer and intermediate form of hybrid wars are the so-called “color” revolutions, already well known to the world.
The essence of what is happening
From all of the above, it can be understood that the emergence of the phrase “hybrid war” has a sufficient background, which consists in improving the methods and types of confrontation between states. This concept reflects the available realities of using the tools of struggle and the latest achievements in the field of rivalry between countries.
To clearly understand what hybrid warfare is, let's give this term the following definition. This is a type of military confrontation between individual states, which involves in an armed conflict, in addition to or instead of the regular army, special missions and intelligence services, guerrilla and mercenary forces, terrorist attacks, protest riots. In this case, the main goal most often is not the occupation and appropriation of territory, but a change in the political regime or the foundations of state policy in the country under attack.
The meaning of the final part of the definition is that the traditional goals of war, such as the seizure of material assets, natural resources, territories, treasuries, gold, and so on, have not sunk into oblivion. It’s just that the aggressive aggressive armed struggle has acquired different contours, and its goals are now achieved differently. Hybrid war tactics lead to bringing the political regime of the attacked state to a state of desovereignized, puppet, easily controlled by the aggressively attacking country, and then all decisions will be made in its favor.
Cold War with the USSR
It is easy to see that Russia’s position in the global balance leaves much to be desired. The consumerism coefficient in our state is much less than one. In other words, we produce and donate many times more products to the world community than we consume in Russia itself.
The Cold War also traces some of the concept of hybrid warfare. Its outcome demonstrated that waging a “hot” war is not at all necessary to achieve the goals that, for example, were set by Adolf Hitler. He never managed to achieve his goal, unlike the West. Thus, there are definitely clear similarities between classical and hybrid warfare. The common goal of all these interstate conflicts is to take possession of the wealth of the enemy country, defeat it and make it manageable.
What are we seeing today?
Currently, everything is happening that has been happening for many years in Russian history. To paraphrase the Russian classic Aksakov I.S., we can say that if the question of Russia’s lust for power and desire to start a war is raised, then one must understand: one of the Western or Western European countries is preparing to unscrupulously seize someone else’s land.
Today it is obvious that the term “hybrid war” is used against our country. It is also obvious that this term was introduced into use and surrounded by general attention in order to expose Russia as an aggressor fomenting war. However, under the cover of all this “political fog,” completely similar actions are taking place on the part of Western countries. It may seem that neither the Americans nor the British are participating in the war, but military instructors, various “private” armies, etc., are constantly present on the territory of Ukraine. They don’t seem to be fighting, but they are directly involved in the war.
Against the backdrop of current events, it becomes relevant to say that Western states have planned and are entering their initial stages of a hybrid war against Russia. There is comprehensive pressure on our state, implicit involvement in an aggressive, targeted impact on the economic and social balance.
Resistance to Western provocation
It is quite easy to understand in what ways NATO is preparing a hybrid war against Russia. Having delved into the essence of this term, we can observe preparatory work everywhere. Trainings and testing are being conducted, resources are being accumulated, and appropriate infrastructure is being developed within our country.
To summarize, we can conclude that hybrid warfare is a modern evolved form of warfare. Scroll the latest forms wars dictated by the West can also be supplemented with cyber warfare, network warfare, information warfare, cognitive warfare, the 1st phase war in Iraq, and the distant war that unfolded in Yugoslavia.
But here’s what’s surprising and amazing. If we read completely recent state documents developed and adopted already in 2014 by our government, then neither in the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation”, nor in the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, nor in the “Concept foreign policy RF” we will not find a single use or decoding of the concepts of all these wars, including the hybrid one. What can we say here? All that remains is to confirm your thoughts about the origins of such terms and the purposes of their use.
Of course, hybrid war has recently become a reality, clearly and confidently defining its contours, the power of influence and effectiveness of which significantly exceed the same characteristics of war in the traditional sense. Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Gerasimov, speaking about hybrid warfare, considers it superior to any military means used in real military operations. Therefore, a priority in strengthening civic consciousness is to understand the methods and means of doing so. Today, each of us must stand up for our own future, do everything possible to preserve our country as an integral, sovereign state, correctly assess and calmly respond to all provocations coming from the West.
It is important to objectively perceive the current situation, to consider any social and economic phenomenon primarily from the position of a Russian citizen who is not indifferent to the fate of his great Motherland.
NATO leadership is developing a new concept for collecting and analyzing information in the context of hybrid wars. The Alliance is going to draw data from social networks, from diplomats, various kinds of research centers, scientists, local residents, and not rely solely on military intelligence. In essence, this concept is the so-called hybrid war.
The concept of “hybrid warfare” first appeared in military documents of the United States and Great Britain in the 21st century. It means the subjugation of a certain territory with the help of information, electronic, cyber operations combined with the actions of the armed forces, special services and intense economic pressure.
The most successful definition of the concept of hybrid warfare is given in the annual London publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2015:
“The use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign aimed at achieving surprise, seizing the initiative and gaining psychological advantages used in diplomatic actions, large-scale and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations, cover and concealment of military and intelligence activities combined with economic pressure.”
“The combination of traditional and hybrid methods is already a characteristic feature of any armed conflict. Moreover, if the latter can be used without open use military force, then classic fighting without hybrid ones, no longer,” explained Lieutenant General Valery Zaparenko, ex-deputy chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, to Gazeta.Ru.
In particular, the events in southeastern Ukraine convincingly demonstrated that information from social networks, if properly analyzed, can provide intelligence with much more reliable data than reports from an intelligence network.
“In this regard, the NATO military leadership is developing a new concept of information warfare. If we do this, we will be able to cover a much wider range of sources of reliable information. In all cases, the speed of collecting information will be decisive,” says former French Air Force Commander-in-Chief General Denis Mercier in an article published in the newspaper Financial Times .
The alliance is currently discussing other non-military threats, in particular cyber attacks, where the criminals are invisible and intangible. This adds another dimension to NATO's areas of competence, the military leader adds. “Today we are faced with scenarios where the threshold of the crisis is not yet defined and is not clear, that is, we are talking about so-called hybrid scenarios with non-state or secret actors,” continues Mercier.
NATO military leaders warn that Russia's entire strategy today is to create all sorts of problems and provocations that are sometimes difficult to identify and that could lead to political paralysis of the Kremlin's opponents.
Boss General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov of the Russian Armed Forces previously stated that “in modern conflicts, the emphasis of the methods used is increasingly shifting towards the integrated use of political, economic, information and other non-military measures, implemented with the support of military force. “These are so-called hybrid methods,” the general wrote in a newspaper published "Military-industrial courier" article.
A striking example is the conflict in Syria. At its first stage, internal Syrian contradictions were transformed into armed opposition actions, then these actions, with the support of foreign instructors, were given an organized character. Subsequently, terrorist organizations supplied and directed from abroad entered into confrontation with government troops.
“The Syrian experience has confirmed that hybrid warfare requires high-tech weapons. The armed forces are effective if they have the ability to solve problems with minimal involvement of the military component,” Gerasimov wrote.
Russia's return of the Crimean Peninsula can be considered one of the first examples of a successfully carried out hybrid war in recent history. Thus, this has led NATO to reassess the role of hybrid warfare. Establishing political consensus within the alliance on how to respond to Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea or the crash of Malaysia Airlines MH17 Boeing 777 in Ukraine has taken too long, alliance strategists say.
To adequately respond to changes in the military-political standstill, bring troops to the highest levels of combat readiness and conduct military operations, a decision is required from the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's governing political body. But in this case, it is imperative to ensure consensus among the participating states in taking appropriate measures. And practice has shown how long and painful this process is - coordinating positions between NATO countries, especially when the situation on the ground is quite vague and changes very quickly.
In the case of the events of 2014, the alliance demonstrated both confusion and incompetence in Eastern European affairs. And the revision of a number of conceptual positions in NATO activities is associated precisely with these factors.
NATO believes that it correctly assesses the situation related to assessing the impact of hybrid wars on the military-political situation on the European continent.
“We are on the right track, but we need financial resources and trained personnel,” says General Mercier.
Currently, a list of shortcomings of the NATO bloc in the military sphere is being compiled. It will be presented to the defense ministers of participating states next year. The emphasis in the upcoming work will be on the compliance of the NATO structure with the conditions of conducting hybrid wars - conflicts of the new time.
ABOUT The term “Russian hybrid war” has recently been regularly used by Western media. Some specialized publications additionally use the term “Gerasimov Doctrine.” The meaning of these concepts and their origin is explained in an article by a former professor of applied systems science and a member of the Institute of Technology intelligent systems (Instituts für Technik Intelligenter Systeme, ITIS) at the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich (Germany), Dr. Reiner K. HUBER.
“InWoen Info” is interested in the reader’s opinion, so thank you in advance for your comments
.In official assessments, official experts very quickly agreed that the beginning of March [ 2018] was marked by hacker attacks on the data networks of the government of the Federal Republic and other states, primarily Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, probably controlled by the Kremlin. If this were confirmed, it would be further confirmation that Putin's Russia has long been waging a strategic information war against the West. Does Moscow want to regain the spheres of influence lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union through hybrid wars? Or is it striving for a “Eurasian Union from Vladivostok to Lisbon,” as envisioned by ultra-conservative Kremlin consultant Alexander Dugin?
Regarding the term “hybrid warfare”
The term "hybrid warfare" first appears in 2007 in an article by Frank HOFFMAN ( Frank HOFFMAN). In it, a former U.S. Navy Marine Corps officer describes an analytical framework for explaining the successes that relatively weak military adversaries—nonstate actors such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda—could achieve against numerically and technologically superior U.S. forces.
F. Hoffman comes to the conclusion that hybrid warfare is the coordinated use of military and non-military means, which on the main battlefield (main battlefield) achieve synergy in the physical and psychological dimensions of the conflict (Frank Hofmann: “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars » – Conflictinthe 21stCentury:TheRiseofHybridWars, - Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Research, 2007). Along with “hybrid warfare,” there are other terms such as “asymmetric warfare,” coined by al-Qaeda in the context of the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.
In Russian military-scientific journals, the Western discussion regarding F. Hoffman's ideas on hybrid warfare was initially rejected. But this changed when scholars in the West tried to find hints in Russian military literature about the concept of a successful annexation of Crimea. At the same time, they came across an article by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery GERASIMOV, dated 2013. Although the term “hybrid war” was not mentioned in it, V. Gerasimov was later hailed as the “father of the concept of hybrid war” (Maria Snegovaya: “Putin’s information war in Ukraine: Soviet origins of Russia’s hybrid war” – Putin’s information war in Ukraine: Soviet origins of Russia’s hybrid warfare, — Institute for War Research, Russia Report No. 1, September 2015).
NGSh of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Valery GERASIMOV The concept of “hybrid warfare,” as applied in Ukraine, is mentioned in the West as an example of the use of means state power below the military threshold. Seen as a means by which Russia attempts to achieve the strategic goals of Russian revisionist foreign policy. These means include cyber operations, as well as information and propaganda campaigns carried out by the international television news channel Rossiya Segodnya ( Russia Today) and his agents. These also include financial and ideological support for right-wing or left-wing populist movements and parties, especially on social media in the respective target countries.
Gerasimov Doctrine
The mentioned article by V. Gerasimov is based on a speech he gave in January 2013 to officers Russian Academy Military Sciences. It was a provocative appeal to the military establishment. V. Gerasimov reported innovative military considerations as necessary condition for further modernization of the Russian Armed Forces. He referred to the Chinese general and military strategist Sun Tzu (formerly 496 BC), who proclaimed the motto: “The best strategy is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Now it has become a necessary form of warfare - the usual rules of war have changed.
Political goals can now be achieved not only by conventional firepower, but also through “the widespread use of disinformation, political, economic, humanitarian and other non-military measures that are used in conjunction with the protest potential of the [hostile] population.” These ideas were implemented in the concept of a “new generation of Russian war,” which in the West was called the “Gerasimov Doctrine” ( Gerassimow-Doktrin). American political scientist Molly McCUE ( Molly McKE.W.) ironically comments on Gerasimov’s theses: “It is better to split the enemy’s society than to attack him head-on.” ( Politico Magazine, September / October 2017).
Quite late in the West, it became clear to independent experts and NATO observers that Russia was waging a war in Ukraine in accordance with the rules of this doctrine. The Kremlin has been covering the conflict between pro-Russian forces and ultranationalists in Ukraine, starting with protests in Kyiv against President Yanukovych. Thus, a pretext was obtained for the annexation of Crimea and the start of a war in eastern Ukraine.
Russian justifications, in both cases talking about the democratic right to self-determination of the local population, were taken up by pro-Russian separatists in the region. At the same time, cyber operations arose - and are still being carried out - to monitor the situation, to purposefully influence the political leadership in Ukraine and the population. Cyber operations should lead to sabotage and destabilize Ukraine, as well as other states, including the Baltic countries.
Phases of the new generation of Russian war
Based on the diaries of the Russian campaign in Ukraine - Janis BERZINS ( Janis BERZINS), Director of the Center for Security and Strategic Studies ( Center for Security and Strategic Research, СSSR) at the National Defense Academy of Latvia, one of the first in the West to present a publicly available description of the Gerasimov doctrine.
In it, he identified eight phases, in each of which it is necessary to achieve established goals. Each phase builds on the next phase, so it is a prerequisite for the success of the next phase. The first five non-kinetic phases present only non-military means and methods, the last three (kinetic) only stages and methods using weapons. However, in five non-kinetic phases, military means of intimidating the enemy are identified in the form of decoy air attacks, temporary military exercises and large maneuvers near the borders of enemy territory from Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries.
- Phase 1. Creation of favorable political, economic and military conditions for internal destabilization through ideological, diplomatic and economic operations, as well as disinformation activities and methods of psychological warfare.
- Phase 2. Misleading the political and military leadership of the enemy through the dissemination of erroneous data through diplomatic channels, the media, and subsequently through one’s own government and its own armed forces.
- Phase 3. Promotions that result in government officials and officials the enemy leaves their posts, being intimidated, deceived or bribed.
- Phase 4. Growing discontent of the population through the activation of the “fifth column”, the penetration of combat groups and the intensification of subversive actions.
- Phase 5. Preparation of military operations, during which various kinds of problems are created in the attacked country and individual combat groups (little green men) are sent in to interact with the armed opposition.
- Phase 6. Commencement of hostilities after thorough reconnaissance and subversion. All (Russian) troops, including special forces, must take their positions.
- Phase 7. Destruction of the enemy's main defense forces by coordinated actions of all forces, including electronic warfare.
- Phase 8. Defeat remaining pockets of resistance and destroy resisting units through special operations.
Although from the Russian point of view the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was successfully completed in phase 5, the attack by Russian-backed separatists in the Donbass with resistance from the Ukrainian Armed Forces was stuck in phase 6. Signed in February 2015 by German Chancellor Angela MERKEL, Presidents of France Francois HOLLAND, Ukraine Petro POROSHENKO and Russia's Vladimir PUTIN and the Minsk agreements aimed at de-escalation and restoration of peace have so far done little to change the confrontation between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the separatist forces.
Over the past four years, the conflict in eastern Ukraine has cost more than 10 thousand human lives. The agreed monitoring of a ceasefire in the region, part of the Minsk agreements, failed as neither side took the required steps. Currently, there is also no progress visible in the so-called Minsk process. Since the agreements specified in the Minsk agreements do not formally oblige Russia to anything, it cannot be ruled out that Putin, if the international situation is convenient for him, will not reactivate phase 6 and - if Ukraine does not surrender earlier - will launch phases 7 and 8 in order to annex Donbass, and then also annex the rest of Ukraine.
Conclusion
This “new generation of Russian war” blurs the line between war and peace, as was observed with the annexation of Crimea. Is Russia testing the states of the Western world with cyber attacks, their readiness and ability to respond to such hybrid strategies? If we accept this, then Russia is on the path to a new conflict - in the hope that it can be won without the use of military force. Already tearing out, for example, a state from the ranks of the Baltic countries would be a great success for Russia on the path to the “New Russia” described several years ago.
If only the West and NATO states could react cohesively and in a timely manner to at least one “test conflict” of Russia, conducted in accordance with the Gerasimov doctrine. However, this is complicated by the fact that key evidence that in the early stages of the conflict cyber attacks are controlled from the Kremlin is unlikely to be obtained. As a result, political support for an effective response is currently difficult to obtain. This is precisely the calculation of the new generation of Russian war.
Based on materials from the magazine " Europäische Sicherheit &Technik»